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Preface
Section 27 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 pro
vided for the establishment of a presidential commission to evaluate
state workers' compensation laws. In 1972, the National Commission
on State Workmen's Compensation Laws issued its report, which found
many shortcomings and inadequacies in the state programs. It called
upon the states to improve their laws and the administration of these
programs, but urged that federally set minimum standards be imposed
if these reforms were not implemented by 1975. The threat of such
federal intervention in an area that traditionally had been left to the states
caused many states to upgrade their programs dramatically, especially
in the area of benefits. However, efforts to set and impose federal stan
dards, which began in 1973, never succeeded in the Congress.
By the late 1970s, federal interest in state workers' compensation pro
grams had shifted to the problems of occupational diseases. This had
been prompted by a number of studies that appeared to demonstrate
some major difficulties in the way the states were handling the com
pensation of workers or the survivors of workers who might have con
tracted an occupational illness. Compounding this was the upheaval
created in about 1981 over growing numbers of workers' compensa
tion and product liability claims involving asbestos exposure. Once more,
there was a serious inclination shown by some in the U.S. Congress
to legislate in the area of occupational disease compensation.
A variety of difficult issues had to be confronted in the course of the
debate over federal involvement. Should the federal government im
pose standards on the states or should the state systems simply be sup
planted in this area? Should such legislation deal with all occupational
diseases or only with those specified in a statute? Would compensation
be provided solely for newly emerging cases, or would cases be ac
cepted where death or disability had occurred before the enactment of
the law? Who was to bear financial responsibility for such a compen
sation program? Who would administer such a program? Could a federal
program coexist with the state workers' compensation systems without
somehow undermining them? Was legislation understood to be the
vn

forerunner of an eventual usurpation of the state programs, many of
which had existed for about 70 years?
In the course of legislative skirmishing, answers to such questions
appear to emerge more from ideology than from analysis or experience.
Perhaps it is convenient or comfortable for the parties engaged in such
debates to resort to some conventional wisdom rather than to a hard
look at evidence. Possibly, the inevitable exigencies of time and a lack
of available evidence account for the casual or superficial manner in
which such tough questions are analyzed. Or possibly, legislative in
itiatives are navigating in totally uncharted areas.
Current or future debates regarding federal workers' compensation
legislation need not deal with those issues de novo. Instead, the parties
can turn to the experience of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
(CMHSA) of 1969, which created a compensation program for victims
of a specific type of occupational disease. That program's existence
allows us to evaluate at least one model of how a federal compensation
scheme operates. The purpose of this study is to describe and evaluate
that program.
This study focuses primarily on the period 1969-1981. The CMHSA
or Black Lung program was substantially modified in 1982 and later,
and it is premature to detail that more recent experience. Moreover,
by 1982 the program had largely accomplished the goals its supporters
had set for it. Although the amendments of 1981 are referred to when
necessary throughout the text, they are treated in this study almost as
an epilogue.
The first chapter of the study provides an explanation of how the
federal government wandered into the area of occupational disease com
pensation in 1969. The next chapter gives an outline of the legislation
and an explanation of why the statute was modified in 1972 and again
in 1977. The medical issues of black lung compensation are described
in chapter 3. This leads to a discussion in chapter 4 of the standards
of proof imposed in the law and by the agencies that administer the
law. Administrative matters and insurance issues are the focus of chapter
5. The purpose of chapter 6 is to give the reader some idea of the dimen
sions of the program, including an idea of the numbers of beneficiaries,
Vlll

the size of benefits available, and the costs of the program. The con
cluding chapter includes a description of the 1981 amendments. Also,
it contains some material drawn from evaluations of the program under
taken by the General Accounting Office, using source data that could
not be made available to me.
In assessing any governmental program, a critical initial step is to
properly specify what the goals of the program were. Depending upon
one's choice in this, however, the program can be considered to have
been either highly successful or a crushing failure. I leave it to the readers
to make their own assessment. My own views, which have changed
often during the preparation of this study, are summarized in chapter 7.
Peter S. Earth
Storrs, Connecticut
March 1987
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The Development
of the Black Lung Act
Until early in the twentieth century, an employer's liability
for compensating an employee who was disabled as a result
of a workplace injury was determined in a civil action. 1
Similarly, the survivor of an employee killed on the job was
entitled to compensation from the employer only as a result
of winning a law suit. In either case, it was the claimant's
burden to prove that the employer had been negligent,
thereby causing the disability or death of the worker.
Demonstrating negligence was no simple matter, as
employers could rely on several potent lines of defense.
Delays of several years in reaching some final judgment were
commonplace, legal expenses were perceived as substantial,
and decisions often appeared to be capricious. Even as
claimants began winning more judgments at the turn of the
century, a few large awards were made to some claimants
while others received nothing.
Considerable pressure for reform grew during the first
decade of the twentieth century. Rather than seek to modify
the system of tort law, proposals started to build on a
relatively new approach to compensating injured workers
and survivors that had recently spread across much of in
dustrialized Europe. Known as workmen's compensation, 2
the system appeared to represent a significant improvement
for workers—and possibly for employers as well—in Ger
many, England and some other western European nations.
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Beginning with Wisconsin and New York State in 1911, the
various states began to adopt their own workers' compensa
tion laws, thereby replacing the existing tort approach.
As each state enacted such a law, considerable variation
appeared in terms of the administration of the system,
coverage, benefits, insurance arrangements and so on. All
the laws seemed to conform, more or less, to certain underly
ing principles, however. First, each system operated on a nofault basis so that claimants no longer needed to prove
employer negligence. Benefits were to be paid for disability
or death "arising out of and in the course of employment,"
a phrase found in all of the state laws and closely mimicking
language in the various European states. The no-fault
feature of the laws led to the hope that compensation would
be paid swiftly and with little or no controversy and litiga
tion. Benefits were to be paid in proportion to the wages
earned by the employee prior to disability or death. As a
kind of quid pro quo, each of the state laws made workers'
compensation the "exclusive remedy" of workers or sur
vivors against their employers. Thus, employers became
obligated to provide benefits under this new scheme, but
they freed themselves of the threat of possible law suits by in
jured employees or their survivors.
As the states administered their workers' compensation
laws, a number of difficulties emerged in the matter of
claims for occupational diseases. 3 A common problem was
the need to establish the cause of the disease that disabled or
killed a worker. Another cause of dispute between claimants
and defendants often involved the question of whether or
not disease was even present. Contention could arise also
over the identification of the disease itself, since the presence
of one disease rather than another might be more likely to be
found compensable by those administering the compensa
tion system.
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Until 1969, the compensation of workers or their survivors
for industrial injuries or diseases had been left entirely to
state governments in the United States. 4 Since the federal
government played virtually no direct role in the employeremployee relationship at the time states began enacting these
laws, there was no question that if workers' compensation
laws were to be developed, they would be left in the hands of
the states. Federal legislation in this area prior to the
mid-1930s would almost certainly have been declared un
constitutional. As each state refined its own unique system
of compensation, and as various interests arose that depend
ed upon that system, any potential role for the federal
government seemed to diminish. Yet despite its historic inac
tivity, in 1969 the federal government shifted from its
historic position and passed legislation to provide compensa
tion to a specific class of workers—coal miners—for a single
specific occupational disease. The purpose of this chapter is
to explain how that change occurred.

The Nature of the Coal Mining Industry
Several factors set coal mining apart from other industries
as a source of employment. These differences are due to a
variety of special circumstances surrounding this work. One
of coal mining's special, though not unique, characteristics is
the physical risk of harm associated with it. The industry has
been widely regarded as dangerous. Best known perhaps are
the large-scale disasters where scores of miners have died in a
single accidental occurrence. Yet the nature of the work also
contributes to smaller scale or individual incidents that lead
to death or disability. For example, in the period 1926-30,
the fatality rate in coal mining was almost 2 per million manhours of work. 5 Assuming a 2,000 hour work year, about 1
worker in 250 would die in a mining accident each year.
Though the rate had fallen to 0.84 fatalities per 1 million
man-hours by 1969, the rate was still high—about 1 fatality
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annually for every 600 miners employed full time, or a rate
7-9 times greater than that for the entire employed
workforce. 6 Recognition of the dangers was widespread.
A second characteristic of mining is its isolation, both
geographically and culturally, from other areas of the na
tion. Coal is mined, generally, in remote regions that are
rarely, if ever, seen by people from the more populated parts
of the country. This implies that coal mining is more than
simply an occupation. Instead, it represents a form of society
that was not touched by developments in the balance of the
nation for much of this century. Set apart in this way, miners
have often been subject to different treatment and standards
by government.
A third characteristic of mining is the secular decline that
gripped the mining economy during the 1960s. Coal produc
tion that had been at 631 million tons in 1947 fell to below
500 million tons per year during the early 1960s and had not
exceeded 560 million tons per year by 1969. Moreover, in the
later years of this period, less coal was being taken from the
more labor-intensive underground mines and, instead, was
surface-mined. Surface mining was found primarily in the
middle west and western states, meaning that mining in Appalachia was even more adversely affected. The price of
domestic coal, measured in constant dollars, fell in most
years from 1947 to 1969, and by 39 percent overall during
this period. 7
The changing sources of coal, along with its displacement
by other forms of energy, had a tremendous impact on
employment in the industry. Between 1950 and 1970,
employment in coal mining declined by 70 percent, from
483,000 to 144,000." In addition to the decline in the quantity
of coal demanded and the relative shift to surface-mined
coal, the sharp increase in labor productivity in belowground mines contributed to the drop in employment (see
table 1-1).
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Table 1.1
Historical Trends in Bituminous Coal Mining
Production
(million tons)

Employment

Productivity
(tons/workday)

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955

516.3
533.7
466.8
457.3
391.7
464.6

415,582
372,897
335,217
293,106
227,397
225,093

6.77
7.04
7.47
8.17
9.47
9.84

1956
1957
1958
1959

500.9
492.7
410.4
412.0

228,163
228,635
197,402
179,636

10.28
10.59
11.33
12.22

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

415.5
403.0
422.1
458.9
487.0

169,400
150,474
143,822
141,646
128,698

12.83
13.87
14.72
15.83
16.84

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

512.1
533.9
552.6
545.2
560.5

133,732
131,752
131,523
127,984
124,532

17.52
18.52
19.17
19.37
19.90

SOURCE: The President's Commission on Coal, Staff Findings, March 1980, p. 47.
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One of the results of all this change in the economics of
coal mining was the severity of conditions for miners and
their families. With little or no other employment alter
natives in the coal mining areas, long-term unemployment
and poverty were endemic there. The economic deterioration
of the coal mine regions created a sense that a great injustice
had been perpetrated against the miners. The difficulty that
many of these workers had in being able to relocate into
totally different types of employment resulted in very slow
rates of mobility out of these depressed regions. Those per
sons who remained behind but had no work were those with
the greatest handicaps in the labor market: limited skills, ad
vanced age, or health problems.
The economic difficulties of both the individual miners
and the regions created financial difficulties for unions also.
Since the United Mine Workers' Welfare and Retirement
Fund was largely financed by a royalty based on coal ton
nage paid by the mine owners, revenues were inadequate to
meet the growing demands placed upon them by increasing
health care costs and increasing retirement rates. Conse
quently, the fund was forced to reduce or eliminate certain
benefits during the 1950s and 1960s, including some that
were formerly provided to disabled miners or to survivors of
miners. 9

The Federal Role in Coal Mine Health and Safety
It has been observed here already that one of the things
that sets coal mining apart from other industries is its
physical dangers. What role has government, at any level,
played in attempting to reduce the risks of coal mine employ
ment?
As early as 1865, a bill was introduced in Congress to
create a Federal Mining Bureau. However, it was only after a
series of disasters that the Bureau of Mines was created
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within the U.S. Department of the Interior in July of 1910. 10
The Bureau was charged with ". . .diligent investigation of
the methods of mining, especially in relation to the safety of
miners. . . ." n The act did not provide the Bureau any in
spection authority. Indeed, the law explicitly denied all
Bureau employees any right or authority in connection with
the inspection or supervision of mines. Part of the Bureau's
difficulty was remedied in Title I of the Federal Coal Mine
Safety Act of 1941, which authorized the Bureau to make in
spections and publicize its findings and recommendations.
The Bureau was unable, however, to set safety standards, an
area previously left to the states.
During a period of serious labor-management strife in
1946-47, the federal government operated a substantial por
tion of the country's coal mines. The government used its
opportunity as an employer during this period to have In
terior Secretary Krug reach an agreement with United Mine
Workers president John L. Lewis on a federal Mine Safety
Code. When the industry was returned to private ownership
in 1947, the code became a guideline (but not a standard) for
federal inspectors. Operators were free to comply or not.
Mine operators and state mine agencies were asked (in 1947
in PL 328) by the federal government simply to report on the
extent of compliance with the guidelines. Seventeen of the
coal mining states cooperated fully in reporting, two others
responded partially, and seven states did not cooperate to
any extent.
In December 1951, an explosion in a coal mine in West
Frankfort, Illinois, killed 119 miners. In the wake of the
disaster, President Truman signed PL 552 in 1952, which
made compliance with the Mine Safety Code mandatory in
mines employing 15 workers or more. Federal inspectors
were given the right to shut down dangerous mines. Subse
quently, several efforts were made both to tighten up mine
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safety provisions and to eliminate the exclusion from
coverage of the smaller mines (14 or fewer miners), including
a bill that passed in the Senate but not in the House in 1960.
It was only in 1966 that PL 89-376 accomplished these goals.
The shared responsibilities of federal and state inspectors
created obvious administrative problems. The federal role
was aimed at averting large-scale disasters. The states* safety
responsibilities dealt more with practices and conditions that
could involve injury or death to individual miners. Aside
from federal-state differences, substantial interstate varia
tions existed in inspection policies and standards.

Workers' Compensation for Coal Miners
For an industry with the great physical risks of coal min
ing, it is not surprising that workers' compensation has
always been an important issue. With the enactment of the
state laws, miners injured or killed in mine accidents had
recourse to state workers' compensation programs in order
to secure some indemnity and health care benefits. While
benefits may have been short of generous, they were not dif
ferent systematically from those available to workers in
other industries. 12 However, the widely shared perception
was that workers who were disabled or the survivors of those
killed by dust diseases had little or no access to workers'
compensation benefits.
The two states with sizable populations of miners that did
provide compensation for coal mine dust diseases before
1969 were Pennsylvania and Alabama. In the former,
benefits were provided under a distinct program for miners
with pneumoconiosis and were lower and less favorable in
several respects than benefits available under the regular
workers' compensation law. A benefit ceiling of $75/month
was set on the program. Under the special program enacted
in Pennsylvania, about 25,000 miners received some com-
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pensation for coal workers' pneumoconiosis from January
1966 through early in 1969. 13 In Alabama, 1,318 cases of
coal workers' pneumoconiosis were compensated between
1962 and 1966. 14 It was very difficult for coal miners to
receive workers' compensation benefits for dust diseases in
West Virginia, though some did for silicosis. Only in 1969
was the workers' compensation law there liberalized for dust
diseases in coal workers.
In the late 1960s, little interest in workers' compensation
programs had surfaced at a national level. 15 Concerns re
garding state programs were not evident, especially in regard
to the arcane matter of compensation for occupational
disease. This was not the case, however, at the state level,
particularly in West Viriginia, which was in a state of fer
ment. A grass roots movement that began to coalesce among
the miners in 1968 had begun to move for (better) compensa
tion for dust diseases suffered by coal miners. A series of
resolutions was introduced at the United Mine Workers of
America (UMWA) convention in 1968 by various local
unions. They won endorsement easily from the convention.
The issue had been given high visibility in West Virginia, par
ticularly through the efforts of three physicians who worked
closely with the miners there: Isadore Buff, a cardiologist;
Donald Rasmussen of the Appalachian Regional Hospital in
Beckley, West Virginia; and H. A. Wells.
Following the convention, negotiations occurred between
the UMWA and the customary coalition of mine operators
over a new labor-management contract. In early October
1968, the first nationwide strike in 16 years was called by the
union, and an agreement followed on October 14, 1968. The
new contract provided a number of improvements in wages
and fringe benefits over the three years of the new contract,
but it did not contain any new language regarding either
safety or compensation for occupational disease. The 1968
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contract was consistent in this respect with a long history of
UMWA contracts that had concentrated on wages and fringe
benefits of working miners, but showed little concern with
issues of safety or occupational health. The "business as
usual" practice by the union displayed some insensitivity to
concerns regarding compensation and safety on the heels of
the interest demonstrated by the membership at their con
vention less than five weeks prior to the signing of the new
collective bargaining agreement. The issues of safety and
health might have disappeared or been forgotten except that
the Farmington disaster followed so closely on the heels of
this new contract.
Concern about dust diseases and compensation for them
was generated by the three West Virginia doctors and also by
Ralph Nader. At the local level, interest was also stimulated
and spread by young activists who had been drawn to Appalachia as VISTA workers (Volunteers in Service to
America), or in a variety of Great Society antipoverty pro
grams established primarily under the Office of Economic
Opportunity. Believing that economic and social injustice
had led first to disease and then to economic deprivation ow
ing to the lack of compensation, these young persons provid
ed both the energy and organizational skills that allowed
local Black Lung Associations to be formed and to grow.
The union was not considered an ally. Instead, it was
perceived as a part of the same establishment that paid little
or no attention to the plight of sick miners or their survivors.
The black lung movement during 1968 must be understood
to have been driven by a dynamic that was more than in
dependent of the UMWA; in large measure it was hostile to
the union and seen as a source of political threat to the union
leadership.
The three physicians appeared in coal mining communities
throughout West Virginia. Dr. Buff warned his audience
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that they all had black lung disease and that they would die
from it. 16 Buff traveled with a pair of lungs that he showed
to his audiences. Dr. Wells would participate in the same
program, holding up dried, black tissue sections that he
claimed were ". . .a slice of your brother's lungs." 17
In January of 1969, a large rally was held by black lung
advocates at the Charleston Civic Center to focus attention
on the issue. In addition to the trio of physicians, Con
gressman Ken Hechler (D-W. Va.) spoke to the group and
read a long letter sent by Ralph Nader. The targets for much
of the rally were the mine operators, the medical establish
ment that did not acknowledge black lung as a disease, and
the union, for its apparent lack of interest in issues of health
and safety and compensation. The breach between much of
the union's leadership and the miner activists of the black
lung movement can be understood in terms of the political
divisions that were operative in the UMWA at this time and
the eventual challenge to the Tony Boyle presidency. 18
Although black lung legislation had been proposed in the
West Virginia legislature that session, by February 1969 no
action had been taken. At this time a series of wildcat strikes
in southern West Virginia had spread quickly through other
mine fields in the state. The original causes of the strike are
in dispute but the issue that prompted its widening was the
demand by miners for black lung legislation. As the strike
spread, miners traveled to Charleston to let state legislators
know that they wanted an improved compensation law.
Bringing enormous pressure on the governor and state
legislators, the miners marched through the city, ringed the
legislature, threatened continued shutdowns of the mines
and eventually pushed through legislation that liberalized
workers' compensation for coal miners with dust diseases.
Only after Governor Arch Moore signed the legislation did
most of the state's coal mines reopen in early March 1969.
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The role played by the UMWA in the West Virginia black
lung strike was a passive one at best, and actually was seen as
less than supportive by the activists in the black lung move
ment. One reason given by the UMWA for its role was that it
had sought federal rather than state legislation to deal with
problems of safety, health and compensation. By being an
inactive party in the black lung strike in West Virginia, the
union unwittingly had allowed a dissident group to emerge
that could challenge its leadership. Thus the UMWA was
forced into a more active role in the development of federal
legislation.

The Development of the Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969
On November 20, 1968 an explosion occurred in a huge
mine (subsequently described by some as the size of Manhat
tan Island) owned by the Consolidation Coal Company at
Farmington, West Virginia. In a year that recorded 309
fatalities in the coal mines in 13 different states, 150 of which
were in West Virginia alone, two things made Farmington
different. First, the magnitude of the toll from a single acci
dent exceeded anything that had occurred since the West
Frankfort, Illinois disaster in 1961. Of the 99 miners under
ground at the time of the explosion, 78 were entombed when
the mine was sealed 10 days after the blast. Second, the pro
longed process of search and rescue lent itself to massive
media coverage. Farmington became subject to nightly re
porting on the network news. Very extensive coverage was
given to the story in The New York Times and other national
press. Coal mine safety was not simply an issue for the coal
mining states any longer. A strong sense developed, spurred
by the attention given to this community, that something had
to be done for the miners to assure their safety in the
workplace.
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There is little dispute that the Farmington disaster was the
catalyst that moved Congress to act. A widely shared goal in
the Congress was to enact improved coal mine safety legisla
tion within a year of the date of the Farmington explosion.
The political environment guaranteed that the public's revul
sion regarding the death toll in the mines would have to be
assuaged. Lyndon Johnson's administration had proposed
stricter mine safety legislation prior to this disaster. Farm
ington assured that something would be done. The physical
danger of coal mining combined with a sense of economic
hardship, if not injustice, assured that some federal action
would be forthcoming.
In speaking on the floor of the Senate, the feeling was well
summarized by Senator Williams:
The active miner of today who toils manfully deep
in the bowels of the earth to produce about 15 tons
of coal per day was, until recently, the forgotten
man, but the tragedies of the past year and one-half
have raised him high in the eye of the public. The
people of this Nation have been shocked by these
unfortunate events and have demanded, on his
behalf, that government and industry do a great
deal more—not just half-way measures—to im
prove his lot. The active miner of today is feeling
the wonderful benefits that an aroused public can
bestow on him. The bill before the Senate today
(S.2917) is a tribute to this public awareness. 19
The legislation that eventually emerged as the federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (PL 91-173) was
directed at improving the safety of coal mining by enlarging
the role of the federal government in setting standards and
inspections. The tragedy at Farmington was treated as the
last straw that compelled the federal government to extend
its jurisdiction into areas previously left to the states. Early
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versions of the legislation that was to work its way through
the Congress made no mention of occupational disease,
compensation or pensions for disabled miners or widows of
miners. By all accounts, the portion of the law that dealt
with these matters arose as an afterthought by some, in the
process of drafting and redrafting the health and safety law.
Within three months of the Farmington disaster the Sub
committee on Labor of the Senate's Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare opened hearings on coal mine health and
safety legislation. Harrison Williams of New Jersey in
troduced a bill that embodied the views of the United Mine
Workers. Senator Javits of New York proposed a bill that
had support from the Nixon administration. Jennings Ran
dolph of West Virginia also put forward a proposal. On July
31, 1969, a bill that earlier had been reported out of the sub
committee won approval of the Committee. The bill's focus
was on prevention and contained no mention of compensa
tion.
The obvious response by the Congress to Farmington was
to legislate tighter safety standards and possibly deal with
health issues as well. Any dissatisfaction with compensation,
an area administered traditionally by a state government,
was not a federal concern. Yet the success of the black lung
movement in West Virginia would be harder to replicate in
the other coal-producing states. The mood in Congress was
one of seeking to demonstrate some sensitivity to the plight
of the miners and their families. The UMWA leadership
needed some legislative victories to validate its tactics to its
own rank-and-file.
In September 1969, S 2917 was brought to the floor of the
U.S. Senate by Senator Williams. It contained no reference
to compensation. The first person to raise the issue publicly
on the Senate floor was Senator Byrd (D-W. Virginia).
Senator Williams responded that a "short-term program"

Development of the Act 15

could be handled "temporarily" by amending the bill direct
ly on the Senate floor. The two senators agreed that a study
of the matter could be conducted at the time that a tem
porary program might be put into place. Their exchange
helps to convey the spirit of that time:
Mr. Byrd of West Virginia: Mr. President, I would
like to ask the able Senator from New Jersey a
question as to what consideration, if any, was given
to the possibility of having provisions included in
the bill which would provide compensation for
miners suffering from black lung who do not
qualify for compensation under State law.
The reason I ask the question is that I have been
very interested in legislation which would provide
for compensation to miners suffering from
pulmonary diseases who are not covered by State
statute. In West Virginia there are many miners
suffering from black lung and other pulmonary
diseases who do not qualify under State statutes for
compensation.
With this in mind, I gave considerable time to the
development of proposed legislation which would
provide Federal assistance in this area. I was able to
work with Washington headquarters of the United
Mineworkers of America in developing a proposed
bill which would provide Federal assistance over a
period of 20 years, with the Federal assistance
decreasing, I believe, in the amount of 5 percent a
year and the States picking up the additional costs
annually, but with no cost to the coal industry. I
have felt that if the Federal Government could pro
vide assistance along this line, without additional
cost to the industry, we would not incur the opposi
tion of the industry, which is already heavily

16 Development of the Act

burdened with overhead costs: but, at the same
time, the Federal Government would be assuming
some responsibility in this area, and I think it
should assume such responsibility.
So it was with the advice and counsel and
assistance of Mr. George Titler, vice president, and
other officials of the United Mineworkers of
America, that I was able to prepare the proposed
legislation, and my senior colleagues, Senator Ran
dolph, and I joined in co-sponsoring it.
As the able Senator from New Jersey will recall, I
appeared before his subcommittee and testified in
support of this measure. My first question,
therefore, is, Was consideration given in the sub
committee deliberations to adding provisions deal
ing with compensation?
My second question is, What are the prospects
for such legislation at this point being added by
way of an amendment to this bill?
My third question is, If such prospects are not
good, what encouragement or assurance could the
able Senator give to the Senator from West Virginia
as to the prospects for such legislation in the near
future?
Mr. Williams of New Jersey: First, the commit
tee did not have before it any proposed legislation
dealing exclusively with workmen's compensation
for black lung disease, pneumoconiosis. One of the
bills, S. 1094, although it included provisions on
this subject, had health and safety as its major
thrust, I believe I am accurate when I state by
recollection that the first time the attention of the
committee was directly drawn to the need for com-
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pensation for men disabled by black lung disease
was by the junior Senator from West Virginia (Mr.
Byrd). Of course, it was my personal feeling as
chairman of the subcommittee that this certainly
should receive careful attention and, so far as the
chairman was concerned, most sympathetic con
sideration.
As we continued our hearings and deliberations
on the safety and health measure, we did not deal in
any comprehensive way with this particular ap
proach of compensation for the disease. As
necessary as it is, it was not dealt with at that point
to the extent that we were able to include it in the
pending bill.
So far as amendments here are concerned, it
would seem to me that it is now established that this
disease, without preadventure, is associated with
the dust in the coal mining process, that it is disabl
ing, and that it should be a compensable disease.
I would believe that our committee responsibility
should be to consider it in depth. In the meantime,
if there were a way to deal with this temporarily
through a measure to bring disability payments to
men disabled by the disease, certainly I would try to
find, even now, a way to deal with the emergency in
a temporary fashion looking toward a comprehen
sive long-range program of compensation for men
disabled by pneumoconiosis.
Mr. Byrd of West Virginia: Mr. President I
thank the able Senator for his response. I under
stand his answer to be that it is quite possible that
consideration might be given on the floor of the
Senate to language which would establish a short-
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term program to assist coal miners who suffer from
pulmonary diseases and who do not qualify under
State statutes. Am I correct?
Mr. Williams of New Jersey: That is what I tried
to convey to the Senator, yes. 20
The following day, the two senators from W. Virginia met
with the very powerful chairman of the House Committee on
Education and Labor, Representative Carl Perkins of Ken
tucky. The senior Senator, Randolph, introduced amend
ments to S 2917, co-sponsored by Senator Byrd. One of these
(Amendment #211), extended a federal workers* compensa
tion law, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com
pensation Act to coal miners not covered by a state workers'
compensation law. The law was to become effective two
years after the 31st day of December that followed the enact
ment of the law. It would provide compensation to miners
who were disabled or died as a result of "respiratory
disease," and whose state workers' compensation law did
not "contain provisions substantially the same" as those
contained in the Longshore Act. Benefits would be paid by
the mine operators under insurance arrangements; however,
where this was not done, the Secretary of Labor would make
payments from an Employees' Benefit Fund (Sec. 714). The
fund would be repaid by having the Secretary of Labor ob
tain the money from "the employer of the injured
employee," but the amendment also provided for funding
through general revenues (Sec. 714 (F) (4)).
This amendment also called for the Employees' Benefit
Fund to pay benefits in cases where the miner or survivor
had not received compensation previously, but would have
been able to if the provisions in the amended Longshore Act
had applied at the time. Thus, "old" cases were to be
covered under this amendment, though compensation was to
be paid only for the period of time after the effective date of
the law.
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Senators Randolph, Byrd, Javits, Williams and Yarborough co-sponsored Amendment #212, introduced at the
same time as #211. It represented a significant compromise
from 211 and in several ways showed the imprint of Senator
Javits, one of whose goals was to keep temporary any federal
benefits program for black lung. This amendment called for
the states to administer a black lung program with funds pro
vided from the federal trust fund established in the proposed
law. The states would receive and adjudicate claims based on
standards issued by the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare. Benefits were to be paid to either of two types of
claimants. First, benefits were to be paid to "any coal miner
who is totally disabled and unable to be gainfully employed
on the date of enactment of this Act due to complicated
pneumoconiosis which arises out of, or in the course of, his
employment in one or more of the Nation's coal mines."
(Sec. 106) The second category of potential beneficiaries was
"widows and children of any miner who, at the time of his
death, was totally disabled and unable to be gainfully
employed due to complicated pneumoconiosis arising out of,
or in the course of, such employment." (Sec. 106)
Amendment 212 described the time horizon for this pro
gram as "a temporary and limited basis, interim emergency
health disability benefits. ..." (Sec. 106) Several elements
stand out in this proposal. First, benefits were limited to old
cases only, that is, where disability had already occurred
prior to the enactment of the law. Benefits would cease to be
paid by the federal Trust Fund by June 30,1972 at the latest,
with the states taking responsibility thereafter. The terms
temporary, limited and emergency are sprinkled throughout
the amendment. Death benefits were to be paid regardless of
the cause of death, so long as the miner was totally disabled
and unable to be gainfully employed at the time of death and
was suffering from complicated pneumoconiosis. Similarly,
benefits for living miners also were limited to the relatively
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few persons who were unable to work and were totally
disabled due to complicated pneumoconiosis. Of note also is
the terminology used, "arising out of or in the course of
employment," a phrase that appears in every state's
workers' compensation law. (In virtually every state,
however, the word and appears in place of the word or.) This
clearly tagged the law as a piece of workers' compensation
legislation.
After a series of further amendments, compromises and a
resolution of the major issue that delayed matters in the
Senate, i.e., its authority to legislate a revenue-raising
measure not initiated by the House of Representatives, the
Senate passed a black lung amendment on September 30,
1969. The vote was 91-0 in favor of the amendment, which
carried Senator Randolph's name, with nine senators not
voting. This Senate version was Title V, Interim Emergency
Coal Mine Health Disability Benefits, and was incorporated
in the act that passed the Senate unanimously on October 2,
1969.
On September 23, Congressmen Dent, Perkins, Burton
and 22 others introduced HR 13950, their proposed version
of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. It followed months
of work and debate within the House Labor Subcommittee.
By October 3, 1969, the bill emerged from the House Com
mittee on Education and Labor without amendment and had
83 sponsors. Section 112 of this bill dealt with compensation
for death or total disability due to complicated
pneumoconiosis.
Basically, it provided that general revenues would be pro
vided by the U.S. Treasury to fund either grants to states or
direct payments to beneficiaries by the Secretary of Labor
where no agreement was made with a state. Payments were
to be for retroactive cases and not for prospective ones. The
compensation provision passed in committee by a vote of 25
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to 9. In reporting on the bill, the committee made a point of
describing section 112 as follows:
This program of payment ... is not a workmen's
compensation plan. It is not intended to be so and
it contains none of the characteristic features which
mark any workmen's compensation plan.
Moreover, it is clearly not intended to establish a
federal prerogative or precedent in the area of
payments for the death, injury or illness of
workers. These provisions of the bill are a limited
response in the form of emergency assistance to the
miners who suffer from, and the widows of those
who have died with, complicated
pneumoconiosis. 2 1
Yet, in justifying the section the committee appeared to con
tradict itself:
One of the compelling reasons the committee found
it necessary to include this program was the failure
of the States to assume compensation respon
sibilities for the miners covered by this program.
State laws are generally remiss in providing com
pensation for individuals who suffer an occupa
tional disease as it is, and only one state—Penn
sylvania—provides retroactive benefits to in
dividuals disabled by pneumoconiosis."
The House version used the traditional workers' compen
sation phraseology, ". . .arising out of or in the course of
employment." (Sec. 112 (G) (1)) In that sense, the section
looked something like a compensation act.
The bill was explicitly limited to workers employed in
underground mines. It contained a rebuttable presumption
that if a worker with complicated pneumoconiosis is or was
employed for 10 years or longer in a coal mine, then the
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disease arose out of or in the course of employment.
Moreover, all persons with complicated pneumoconiosis
were deemed to be totally disabled.
Ten members of the Committee dissented from the ma
jority's position on the bill. (Actually 12 did, but 2 of these
supported section 112.) Several reasons for their dissatisfac
tion with the compensation provision were given. The core
of their argument, however, was that such legislation
represented a threat to state workers' compensation laws by
providing a federal program where none had existed before.
"We believe that the long-standing and ever improving State
system of workmen's compensation will be in serious danger
of ultimate reduction to a mere subordinate appendage of a
federalized system of workmen's compensation or even of
complete elimination.""
In one dissent, a compensation administrator from Maine
who had testified earlier on the bill for the association of
state workers' compensation administrators, the Interna
tional Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Com
missions (IAIABC), was quoted as saying:
The bills under consideration call for abandonment
of our 55 year-old workmen's compensation
system. (And,) The health, safety, and well-being
of all workers, with few exceptions, is a matter of
state concern. Workmen's compensation ad
ministration is a professional specialty demanding
experience and dedication and an intimate
knowledge of local problems. This proposed
legislation would replace local control with a cen
tralized administration impairing development in
the various regions of this country. 24
That opposition to black lung legislation arose over the
mere creation of a new compensation program was not sur-

Development of the Act 23

prising. Workers' compensation programs in the states pro
vided the livelihood for many persons in the legal and health
professions, for segments of the insurance industry and for
state administrators. A growing federal involvement posed a
legitimate threat to these groups at a time when federal pro
grams were rapidly expanding into a host of areas once left
to the states. It is a testimonial to the strength of these in
terest groups that so much of the opposition to the Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act was directed at this one small
piece of the proposed law, and that it was directed at the
principle of compensation much more than at the details of
it. As stated on the floor of the House by Congressman
Scherle of Iowa in seeking to rid the bill of Section 112, the
compensation provision, "If this section is not struck, it will
be the first step toward the ultimate federalization of all
workmen's compensation." 23
One of the specifics in the law that did occupy lawmakers
was the bill's funding. Several issues were critical for them.
The difficulties of the coal industry in the years preceding
1969 were certainly well known to senators and congressmen
from coal mining areas. Consequently, they hoped to avoid
putting much of the burden of financing the benefits section
of the law on the industry, especially at a time where the
health and safety aspects of the law were certain to drive up
production costs and reduce productivity in mines. Since
black lung was thought to be exclusively a problem of the
underground mines, a tax levied on coal production would
shift some of the cost burden onto the surface mines, thereby
relieving some of the potential costs to the underground sec
tor. It would mean also that less of a competitive edge would
be given to the surface mines vis-a-vis the underground
mines. However, many of the black lung supporters in the
Congress from states such as Kentucky, Pennsylvania and
West Virginia were eager to have benefits paid out of general
revenues of the U.S. Treasury.
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On October 29, 1969, HR 13950 was debated on the floor
of the House. Congressman Scherle of Iowa sought to
amend it by dropping the compensation provision, Section
112. After that failed by a voice vote, he moved to have the
bill recommitted, however that effort failed also. This led
immediately to a vote on the bill, which passed 389-4. In an
editorial, The New York Times applauded the action of the
House and then predicted, "The Conference Committee
should have a relatively easy task of reconciling the two ver
sions now that both chambers have made clear their refusal
to be sidetracked by the once omnipotent industry
lobbyists." 26 This proved to be one of many predictions
made about the program that later proved to be completely
wrong.
In November of 1969, conferees from the House and
Senate met in order to reconcile the differences in the bills
passed by each house. What emerged was S 2917, a version
that looked significantly different from either of the versions
that had earlier passed in both chambers. Indeed, the dif
ferences were great enough for John Erlenborn, the ranking
Republican in the House Committee that fashioned the bill,
to ask on a point of order for the Speaker of the House to
rule that the conference report not be accepted. The grounds
for such a decision would have been that the final version of
the law amended matters that had not been in disagreement
in the House and Senate versions. Erlenborn's point of order
was overruled, thereby setting up the vote in the House on
the conferees' version of the bill.
Erlenborn's position had been a difficult one. His work on
the Coal Mine Health and Safety law had been substantial
and had led to a number of compromises by the majority. In
exchange for that, Erlenborn had supported the bill in
cluding the black lung compensation provisions (Section
112). However, from his perspective the bill which was
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returned from conference to the House of Representatives
had been substantially undermined. According to him, the
conference made at least seven changes in areas where the
two versions previously passed were not in conflict and that
changed the law substantially. Foremost among these,
although both houses had provided only for the compensa
tion of complicated pneumoconiosis, the conference
stipulated that benefits were for the far broader coverage of
"diseases of the lung caused by dust." Thus compensation
could be paid, presumably, for a wide range of diseases in
cluding simple pneumoconiosis, a condition that was far
more prevalent than complicated pneumoconiosis.
Another important change was to obligate the coal mine
operator to pay disability benefits where there was either no
appropriate coverage under the state's compensation law, or
where the Secretary of Labor had not approved the provi
sions of the state's law. It also added an obligation on mine
operators to be covered under an insurance arrangement for
such claims.
The conferee's bill also required the Secretary of Labor to
pay for compensation where the mine operator was not in
sured or if the mine operator was no longer in business. A
mine operator would be liable to the U.S. Government in a
civil action for recovery of these funds.
The anger expressed by Erlenborn toward the conference
and its report as dictated by the majority Democrats emerges
clearly in the record of the floor debate. Using terms like
"underhanded," "travesty" and "behind scenes dealing,"
he and fellow Republicans, such as Steiger and Esch, who
had previously supported the House black lung provisions in
committee and in the House vote, demonstrated their sense
of having been sandbagged by House Democrats such as
Perkins, Dent and Burton. Unable to win on the point of
order, Erlenborn moved to recommit the bill but lost by

26 Development of the Act

258-83, essentially guaranteeing the acceptance of the con
ference version of the bill. All of the controversy was
directed at the black lung compensation portion of the law.
As the debate about the integrity of the conference wound
down, the remaining discussion focused on the cost of the
bill. The Nixon administration had promised to provide its
thinking on the legislation, but had never developed a
coherent position on it. Only after the two chambers of the
Congress had passed their bills did the administration begin
to play an active role. Strong threats emerged that the presi
dent might veto the legislation, partly on the matter of cost.
Well after the Conference Committee had begun its work,
and only four days before its final report was issued,
Secretary of Interior Hickel wrote to Senator Javits, pro
viding him with estimates of the cost of the benefits provi
sion of the law. Based on the disability criteria used to deter
mine eligibility, the Interior Department estimated that black
lung legislation would cost between $155 million and $384
million in the first full year of the program, and between
$1.2 billion and $3.0 billion cumulatively for 20 years. 27
HickeFs estimates were ridiculed by Carl Perkins on the
grounds that they were provided hopelessly late in the
legislative process, and for being excessively high,
presumably for political reasons. Further, Perkins asserted
that ". . .this legislation transcends petty arguments over
costs." 28
Additional criticism of the administration's stance was ex
pressed by Congressman Dent: "At one point a senator came
before us (the Senate-House Conference Committee) and
told us that the cost would be as much as $180 million.
Gentlemen, if you took every miner in these United States
and if you paid him $5,000 a year and bought his wife a chin
chilla coat, you would not spend that much money. Finally,
after a little bit of fact finding, he came down to $154 million
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and yesterday he came down to $124 million." 29 Dent
estimated that compensation for living miners could not con
ceivably exceed $32.3 million.
HickePs estimates were attacked by another of the legisla
tion's primary movers, Congressman Phillip Burton. He
charged that the last minute cost figures were". . .politically
motivated and White House dictated ... an ignoble effort
to deny any meaningful help to black lung widows and
miners. . . ." 30
The administration provided virtually no support for
Erlenborn and others who were fearful that the compensa
tion provision had been carried too far. Ultimately, the Nix
on White House argued simply that workers' compensation
was a matter to be left for the states. In the absence of any
leadership from the White House, the final bill was a
creature of the Democratic majority in both Houses. The
conference report was easily accepted in the House by a vote
of 333-12 on December 17, 1969.
On December 18, the Senate took up the Conference Com
mittee's report. Unlike the House, there was no disagree
ment voiced by members of the Senate. Senator Javits ex
plained how the compromises had been reached with the
House members of the conference. All of the discussion was
centered on the black lung provisions. Senator Williams in
dicated that he anticipated that 50,000 claimants would
receive federal benefits under the law. 31 Javits asserted that
Secretary Hickel's cost estimates were wrong and that he
estimated the cost of the program would be between $80 and
$100 million and "certainly no more than $120 million per
year." 32 The conference report was approved in the Senate
without a roll call vote. It was signed by President Nixon,
despite his previous threat to veto it, on December 23 and
became law on December 30, 1969.
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The passage of Title IV of the Coal Mine Health and Safe
ty Act was a tribute to the legislative prowess and doggedness
of a few key members of Congress. None played a more
significant role in shaping the final outcome than did Carl
Perkins of Kentucky. While the legislation's most fervent
supporters came from coal mining areas, there were at least
three prominent exceptions, Congressman Phillip Burton of
California, Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey, and
Senator Jacob Javits of New York did not represent such
areas. Support for Title IV was helped by the very prominent
positions in the Congress held by certain senators and con
gressmen from the coal mining areas. Senator Jennings Ran
dolph, who sat on the Subcommittee on Labor along with
Schweiker (R-Pennsylvania) and Taft (R-Ohio), had been
chairman of the Senate Public Works Committee, earning
for himself the sobriquet, the "Prince of Pork." The ranking
Republican on the committee was John Sherman Cooper of
Kentucky. Senator Byrd of West Virginia also served on the
Appropriations Committee, and at that time had begun to
climb the ladder of his party's hierarchy, serving as secretary
of the Senate Democratic Conference.
In the House, the key Education and Labor Committee
was headed by Perkins, who had served in the House since
1948. Congressman Daniel Flood, representing the an
thracite districts in Pennsylvania, was chairman of the Ap
propriations Committee for the Labor Department and
Health, Education and Welfare and was the speaker pro
tempore. Congressman Hechler, a Columbia University
Ph.D., was chairman of the Subcommittee on Advanced
Research and Technology. John Dent of Pennsylvania held
no special position of influence in the House, but his
previous experience as an attorney, a former coal company
executive, and a local union president (United Rubber
Workers #1875) was helpful. Ultimately, there was little
reason to expect much opposition to a bill that was pushed

Development of the Act 29

by such Congressional heavyweights and that appeared to be
relatively cheap, if not innocuous.

Summary
The arguments introduced above are directed at showing
the special place that mining occupied in the public percep
tion. A combination of very high physical risk, growing
dissatisfaction with state safety regulations, and economic
deterioration in the industry meant that federal policy pro
viding special treatment for the miners was not a surprising
development by the end of the 1960s. In addition, this will
ingness to give the miners some assistance or support must
also be viewed against the backdrop of Lyndon Johnson's
Great Society.
Beginning in 1964 and extending through the balance of
that decade, a very broad range of public programs of cash,
health care and other services and in-kind assistance was pro
vided to specific clusters within the country. Targeted at
groups from the unborn to the aged, at veterans, exoffenders, the handicapped, Indians, inner-city residents,
the rural poor and myriad other populations, the prevalent
view appeared to be that government support could right all
of the past ills of the society. By the late 1960s, miners were
simply one group that had not yet shared much of this
federal largess. Apparent shortcomings in state workers'
compensation programs that uniquely impacted coal miners
provided a potential opportunity, fortuitously, for Congress
to demonstrate its beneficence. The federal government had
an established history of enacting coal mine safety legislation
after major mining disasters. Hence, it was hardly surprising
that there was a major bill passed in 1969, following the Farmington explosion. It proved to be a convenient vehicle for
doing something that provided income to the coal miner
community. The presumed need of the law arose from inade-
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quacies that were evident in state administered programs,
both in terms of workplace safety and health, and in
workers' compensation programs for occupational diseases.
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Black Lung Law and Its Changes
1969-1981
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly outline the major
areas of black lung law as it evolved from 1969 through
1981. Here, the most significant characteristics of the law of
1969 and the amendments of 1972 and 1977 are described. In
the chapters that follow this one, more attention can be given
to specific issues and how they were developed under black
lung law.
Title IV of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 is
the section of that rather large statute dealing with compen
sation. It is called "Black Lung Benefits," with hearsay
crediting this name to Congressman Phillip Burton, a
California Democrat who actively supported the legislation
and the subsequent efforts to liberalize it. The term hardly
had been used before this time and apparently the name was
inserted in humor into the statute.
The title consists of three parts, with Part A consisting
simply of a statement of findings and declarations and six
very brief, though not insignificant, definitions. The re
mainder, Parts B and C, bifurcate the law on the basis of the
time when claims for benefits were filed. Part B, "Claims for
Benefits Filed on or Before December 31, 1972," was to be
administered by the Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, which meant by the Social Security
Administration (SSA). By contrast, Part C, "Claims for
33
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Benefits after December 31, 1972,'* was to be placed under
the management of the U.S. Department of Labor. Subse
quently, the dates noted above were changed, but Part B and
Part C have always referred to the separate programs
operated respectively by SSA and the Labor Department.
The broad and stated goal of Title IV was to provide
benefits to coal miners who were totally disabled due to
pneumoconiosis and to dependent survivors of miners who
died from that disease. There was little question raised about
the desirability of compensating either those persons whose
disease may have disabled them long before the 1969 law was
enacted or the survivors of those whose death occurred at an
earlier time. Indeed, the primary purpose of SSA's involve
ment was to administer a program for these old cases. Once
this existing backlog was dealt with, the program would
become a workers' compensation program for newly
developing victims, administered more or less by the Labor
Department. It was the hope of the bill's architects that Part
C would find the states providing entitlements and ad
ministration under their own individual workers' compensa
tion laws, with the Department's role reduced to one of certi
fying that the state was in compliance with the federal stan
dards created in the 1969 statute. Thus, SSA's administrative
responsibility for the program was a temporary one, to be
turned over to the Labor Department, whose responsibilities
were to diminish. Indeed, the latter's role was expected to be
entirely eliminated eventually.
The Part B program provided cash benefits to miners
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal
mine employment and to survivors of miners who had died
from the disease. The program was funded by the general
revenues of the U.S. Treasury (and not by the social security
trust funds). To assist applicants in furthering their claims,
certain presumptions, including an irrebuttable one, were in-
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eluded in the statute. Claims were filed in local social securi
ty offices.
Several of the characteristics of benefits under the law
seem noteworthy. First, unlike workers' compensation or
social security benefits (old age or disability), monthly
benefits paid to successful claimants were invariant with
respect to the miner's or survivor's age, the previous level of
miner earnings, or the extent of impairment—although
benefits were provided only for those judged to be totally
disabled. Benefit levels were adjusted for the number of
dependents, however. In most cases, benefits were awarded
and paid for a lifetime. Benefits were awarded based on the
date the claim was filed, not on the date when total disability
began or death occurred. Since it was possible to be found
totally disabled even though still actively employed in a mine
or elsewhere, the social security earnings test was applied so
that some or all of the cash benefits could be offset due to
wage income. Offsets were applied as well to benefits miners
received from state workers' compensation, unemployment
insurance or temporary disability programs. Since SSA con
sidered the benefits to be workers' compensation, benefits
were also offset by receipt of social security disability in
surance. Benefit levels were tied to federal employee salary
scales, so that both new awards or continuing payments rose
paripassu with federal pay levels and roughly, at least, with
rates of inflation.
The Part B program was to accept claims for two years.
The (virtually) lifetime benefits paid by the federal govern
ment under Part B were to be paid only for those successful
claimants who filed no later than December 31, 1971, or
where the miner died on or before that date, or finally, where
a miner, who was entitled to Part B benefits, died leaving a
survivor. Initially, 1972 was to be a year of transition. Suc
cessful claims filed during that year were to be paid by SSA
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only until the end of the year, with payment thereafter
becoming the administrative responsibility of the Labor
Department and possibly the states.
Essentially, liability for claims filed during this phasing-in
period of 1972 were to be paid by coal mine operators begin
ning in 1973 under either Part C or federally certified state
workers* programs, as were those claims filed after
December 31, 1972. Presumably, the claims filed during the
transition year of 1972 and later would reflect cases where
the disease had only recently emerged. The hope was that all
of the "old" cases would have been filed and dealt with in
1970 and 1971.
Some newly developing cases could be expected in the
future, but by 1972 and beyond, the number was expected to
be quite small, given the teeth in the dust suppression provi
sions of the new Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. Where
new cases were not paid under acceptable state workers'
compensation laws, they would be paid by individual mine
operators. Where benefits from neither source were forth
coming, federal general revenues would be used. Aside from
the continuing benefits paid to successful claimants under
the Part B program, federal involvement in black lung com
pensation was to cease seven years after the law's enactment,
that is, by December 30, 1976.
Since the 1969 law made individual coal mine operators
liable for the benefits to be paid under the Part C program,
the mine operators were required to obtain insurance to
assure that successful claimants would be compensated. This
obligation could be met either through a private insurance
carrier authorized by the state to sell workers' compensation
insurance, a state insurance fund, or through self-insurance
where qualified by the Secretary of Labor. Where a worthy
claimant was unable to receive benefits from a coal mine
operator, e.g., the operator had ceased to exist and no in-
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surance was available, benefits were to be paid by the
Secretary of Labor out of general revenues of the U.S.
Treasury. Unlike the (virtual) lifetime benefits provided
under Part B, no benefits were required to be paid after the
Part C program ended at the close of 1976. Thus, mine
operators' liability was temporary—limited to four years
(1973-1976)—although individual state workers' compensa
tion laws were expected to fill in thereafter.
In order to assist claimants and to ease the burden of ad
ministering the law, three presumptions were inserted into
the statute. Most significant was section 411 (c) (3), which
created an irrebuttable presumption that evidence of com
plicated pneumoconiosis meant that either the living miner
was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or that the
deceased miner's death was due to the disease.
The Social Security Administration was handed the
responsibility for administering a law that was utterly new to
it. For several reasons, including the specificity of the disease
and the population covered, the Part B program bore almost
no similarity to its disability insurance program. The 1969
statute left myriad issues to the discretion of the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, and a number of matters
seemed never to have been considered by the Congress in its
haste to legislate reform by the anniversary of the Farmington explosion. Of all the uncertainties associated with the
new program, however, perhaps the greatest was the one
regarding the dimensions of the program. However, SSA
would not have long to wait before some idea of the size of
the applicant pool materialized. Indeed, it was precisely this
realization, along with one other development, that pro
foundly reshaped the character of the 1969 law.
Almost as soon as the law was enacted, claims began to
flood into local social security offices. The same individuals
and groups responsible for the passage of Title IV sought to
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encourage potential beneficiaries to file claims. These includ
ed representatives of the Black Lung Associations and the
United Mine Workers of America, along with elected of
ficials, antipoverty workers and to some extent, SSA itself.
Undoubtedly, part of the effort by these groups was
motivated by a concern to help the needy victims of the
disease. Some of it was generated by those hoping to receive
some of the credit for the existence of a law that would pump
substantial sums of money into coal mining communities.
Individuals who assisted miners or survivors in the filing of
claims, primarily local attorneys and Black Lung Associa
tion representatives, had a financial stake in generating ac
tivity under the law. Finally, time was essential since benefits
were paid from the date of the filing of the claims, and not
the date of death or disability. Delays in filing would mean a
direct decline in the value of one's benefits.
In the first year of the law, approximately one-quarter of a
million claims were filed. By December 31, 1971, approx
imately 350,000 claims for black lung benefits were received
by SSA. At the end of 1971—two years into the term of the
law—new claims were being filed at the rate of 1,800 a week.
If the law of 1969 had remained unchanged, a massive
potential liability would have awaited coal mine operators in
1973, based on claims filed in 1972 and thereafter. It also ap
peared evident by 1971 that the belief that the old cases
would have been fully dealt with under Part B was unwar
ranted. As claims continued to pour in, the large bulk of
them involved disability or death that occurred in earlier
years.
It was not simply the massive number of claims, and
especially the continued inflow of old cases, that concerned
those members of Congress who were closely watching the
development of the program. Senators and representatives
who were strongly supportive of the law became increasingly

The Law & Its Changes 39

dissatisfied with SSA's administration of it. To be sure, the
agency had moved very swiftly to carry out the provisions of
the law and render determinations. By the end of 1971, SSA
had made determinations in almost 93 percent of the claims
filed with it, despite the continuing flow of new claims being
made. However, about half the claims made during these
first two years had been rejected by SSA. Anger and resent
ment toward the agency by the coal mining community and
their elected representatives over the rate of denials was
substantial. In actively encouraging older miners and sur
vivors to file claims, the law's supporters had given little con
sideration to the possibility that benefits would not be paid.
The consequences of the unforeseen volume of old cases,
along with the disappointment over the rejection rate, caused
the program's supporters to push for changes in the law. An
obvious need existed, in any case, to amend the law to cor
rect an error or oversight in the original act. Dependent sur
viving children of miners were able to receive benefits only
where there existed a surviving spouse. Somehow, the
language of the original law neglected to provide for
"double orphans." There was no objection in the Congress
to reopening the law to provide for these persons.
The prime mover in amending the law of 1969 was
Representative Perkins. On the Senate side, Senators
Williams, Javits and Randolph played a key role in reshap
ing the law. Ultimately, a reluctant Richard Nixon signed in
to law PL 92-303 in May 1972, following a unanimous vote
in the Senate and an overwhelming vote in the House of
Representatives (311-79). Its passage represented another
clear-cut victory for supporters of the original legislation
who hoped to liberalize its provisions further—largely,
though not entirely, representatives from the coal mining
states. Clearly, support came from more than Congressional
liberals and/or Democrats. While supportive of the
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liberalization, a continuing concern of Senator Javits of New
York was to place as much responsibility as possible on the
mine operators. In his view, the entire problem reflected the
". . .accumulated injustice of not having adequate
workmen's compensation laws on the books for
years. . . .' M Perhaps his words were being directed to the
National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation
Laws, which was created through the Senator's efforts and
was deliberating at that very time over the future of the state
programs.
Republican Senators such as Taft (Ohio) and Schweiker
(Pennsylvania) spoke enthusiastically for the bill that passed
the Senate, as did influential Democrats including the
Senators from West Virginia—Byrd and Randolph. The coal
mine operators were behind the law, so long as it delayed the
time when they would have to bear the financial responsibili
ty for successful claims. The United Mine Workers were
behind the bill solidly also. The recently elected president of
the union, Arnold Miller, had received substantial support in
his election drive from Black Lung Association groups.
The reconciliation by the Conference Committee of the
Senate and House versions of the amendments was less
dramatic or "creative" than it had been in 1969. Differences
between the chambers tended to be resolved by selecting the
more liberal provision or by splitting the difference between
the two bills where that was feasible.
The amendments of 1972 were significant in several
respects. The foremost of these was that the amendments
served to clarify for all parties, and particularly for SSA, the
agency administering the law, the intent of Congress. That
is, the law's supporters wanted much more than simply to
have created a new entitlements program. Rather, they
wanted a program that actually delivered benefits to their
constituents.
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The huge and continuing inflow of claims, including many
based on employment that ended prior to 1970, caused Con
gress to extend the dates of the act in several respects in the
1972 amendments. The House sought to extend Part B for
two additional years so that it would run until December 31,
1974. This would have delayed the coal industry's financial
liability accordingly. Further, the House sought to move the
original seven-year federal role under sec. 422 (e) (3) to nine
years, the period after which no benefits had to be provided
under Part C. When the Senate voted to extend Part B for
one year, the conferees split the difference and extended it
for 18T months. The Senate voted to make the federal role
under Part C a permanent one and the conference voted in a
compromise to keep it until December 31, 1981. After that
date, no payments to miners or their dependents were re
quired under Part C of the law. Presumably, state laws
would protect claimants who had filed for benefits only in
1972 or thereafter.
The conference also agreed that the transition period,
originally planned to operate in 1972, would run from July
1, 1973 to December 31, 1973. As such, claims filed prior to
July 1, 1973 involved lifetime benefits for miners or their
widows paid by the federal government; claims filed after
December 31, 1973 were the industry's full responsibility,
and those filed in this six-month gap were to be temporarily a
federal responsibility administered by DOL and then a
private responsibility.
The 1972 amendments substantially widened coverage
under the law by redefining both "miners" and "total
disability." The revised statute added a new presumption
which effectively expanded the meaning of pneumoconiosis.
It enlarged the coverage of survivors, thereby widening the
scope of the entitlements. It eliminated one of the financial
offsets that had been applied to black lung benefits and
made the change retroactive to 1969.
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The 1972 amendments eased the burden of proof on
claimants by preventing the government from denying a
claim solely on the basis of X-ray evidence. In so doing, it ef
fectively widened the range of impairments that could pro
duce an entitlement under the law.
Possibly the most significant change of all occurred as a
consequence of the amendment process, but it was not
reflected in the revised statute itself. In brief, SSA agreed to
revise the medical criteria it used to determine whether a clai
mant was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. Essential
ly, the agency promised to revise its published regulations in
such ways as to assure that a larger proportion of claims
would be accepted. Since the impact of these and all other
changes were made retroactive, SSA was required to review
all pending and previously denied claims using these new
standards. This involved almost 195,000 claims, 90 percent
of which had been rejected previously by the agency.
If the law's most ardent advocates were somewhat disap
pointed with its track record until 1972, they were devastated
by developments after the enactment of the amendments.
While SSA proved to be entirely accommodating to the
liberalization of the law, on July 1, 1973 administrative
responsibility for it shifted away from SSA to the Labor
Department. The Part C program quickly became a disaster
for the agency and the law's supporters. Over the next four
years, six sets of problems became clear to all parties con
cerned with black lung legislation.
First, claims flowed in under section 415 (the six-month
transition phase) and Part C in very large volume. Moreover,
the bulk of these represented old cases, not recent or newly
emerging diseases. The volume of cases had implications for
both the future costs of the program as well as for the ad
ministration of those claims.
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A second factor that became clear during this period was
that the states were not replacing the Labor Department in
the administration of the law. Few states applied to the
Secretary to have their workers' compensation programs cer
tified as acceptable to replace the federal scheme. No state
ever received certification, so this vision of how the program
would develop never materialized.
The third essential characteristic of the program that
emerged under Part C was the litigiousness of those involv
ed. The Part C program sought to place financial liability on
specific coal mine operators. Also, unlike Part B, this was a
workers' compensation program with an adversary process
involved, and employers aggressively defended claims. In
virtually every instance where a determination was made that
an employer (or the insurer) should pay compensation, the
matter was appealed.
A fourth characteristic of the program was that the
Department of Labor, almost alone, was paying benefits
under the program. In more than two out of three cases
where benefits were awarded, no responsible mine operator
could be identified or made liable. Moreover, where the ap
peals process meant that a mine operator would not pay
benefits, these were paid by the Labor Department as well,
though repayment was anticipated.
These four characteristics aside, there were two others that
made matters particularly intolerable to the supporters of the
program. One of these was the phenomenal delays that
developed in the Labor Department in making determina
tions. Partly due to the unexpected outpouring of claims,
partly due to the nature of the adversary process, and com
bined with the inexperience of and perhaps the ineptitude in
the Labor Department, the system became totally backed up.
From July 1, 1973 to December 31, 1977, no determination
had been made in about 50,000 of the 123,000 cases filed.
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The final straw, however, for the program's supporters
was the approval rate in the Labor Department. By early
1978 (at the time that the 1977 amendments became effec
tive), about 125,000 claims had been submitted to the Labor
Department, with 6,000 awards made and 70,000 claims
denied! Thus, in administering the law that the Congress
handed it in 1973, the Department had been able to accept
fewer than 8 percent of the claims received where a decision
had been rendered, and most of these had had to be paid by
the federal government rather than by the coal mine
operators. To make matters even grimmer for the Labor
Department, SSA had been able, by that time, to bring its
approval rate under the Part B program up to 70 percent.
The Labor Department's track record was not a result of
more restrictive policymakers there than in SSA. Rather,
they were administering Part C with a different set of rules;
the law gave them little choice, or at least so they believed.
By 1975, Congressman Perkins and other black lung ad
vocates worked to increase the number and proportion of
applicants who would win awards. One means of pressuring
the Labor Department was to hold hearings on the program
and to continue to press for new amendments to further
open up the law. Much of the work on the House side involv
ed working closely with representatives of the Black Lung
Associations, and the United Mine Workers. In 1975,
Perkins pushed legislation that would have provided benefits
for black lung based solely on 15 years employment in the
mines. 2 Eventually, this was softened so that an automatic
entitlement would occur for any coal miner after 30 years of
employment in the mines. Such a version was actually voted
upon favorably at one point by the House of Represen
tatives.
In 1976, Representative Perkins and the Black Lung
Associations pushed HR 10760, which created an automatic
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entitlement to benefits for miners with 30 years of work in
the mines (or 25 years in the anthracite fields). Supporters of
the bill argued that it was not a pension bill for miners, but
instead that it reflected the very great propensity for longterm coal miners to develop black lung. Such a presumption
would eliminate errors in claims adjudication and simplify
processing them. The Senate was unable to act in a timely
manner on HR 10760, but a similar bill, HR 4544 was in
troduced the following year. Largely with an eye on the
Senate and on some public reaction to HR 10760, and realiz
ing alternatives existed to accomplish this same goal, the
House cleared a version of the bill on September 19, 1977
that dropped the controversial automatic entitlement. The
Senate cleared its bill on the following day. The reconciled
version that emerged from the Conference Committee sailed
through both Houses and was signed by President Carter. In
fact, to deal with the concerns about the implementation of
Part C, two new laws emerged.
The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, PL 95-239
(actually signed March 1, 1978) was a set of sweeping
changes in the law. A primary goal of the law was to ease the
burden on claimants seeking benefits for death or total
disability due to pneumoconiosis. This was accomplished in
several ways. Probably foremost among these, the Depart
ment of Labor was finally enabled to set its own medical
standards, as well as to set temporary standards. Until per
manent ones were developed, though, these temporary ones
were explicitly to be no more restrictive than those set by
SSA under the Part B program after the 1972 amendments.
Recall that SSA had put in these post-1972 standards in
order to raise the acceptance rate for Part B claims.
The law eased the problem for claimants of providing
satisfactory evidence in several other ways. It eliminated the
critical role played, until then, by specially certified experts,
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working as consultant radiologists for the Labor Depart
ment. Further, in the absence of other (medical) evidence,
survivors could support claims by submitting affidavits
regarding a deceased miner's condition prior to death.
Autopsy reports by local physicians had to be accepted as
evidence by the Secretary of Labor beginning in 1978. Some
time limitations regarding the filing of claims were dropped.
Certain restrictions on the use of the 15-year presumption
that was added by the 1972 amendments were dropped, mak
ing the presumption usable by more claimants. Additionally,
a rebuttable presumption that the miner was disabled due to
pneumoconiosis was added for survivors claims where the
worker was employed 25 years or more and died prior to
June 30, 1971.
The concept of total disability was substantially broaden
ed by several provisions of the law. For example, the Depart
ment was prohibited from using employment in the coal
mines as evidence that the miner was not totally disabled at
the time of death or of filing. The scope of coverage was fur
ther widened by adding three occupational categories and by
significantly redefining the relevant workplace covered.
Prior to the 1977 amendments, the Part C program was to
be terminated by December 30, 1981. This had been stretch
ed out in 1972, so that the original termination date of 1976
had been pushed back five more years. In 1977, the provision
that identified an ending date for the Part C program (sec
tion 422 (c) (3)) was eliminated, thereby appearing to make
the program permanent. With improved dust conditions an
ticipated due to the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969
and its amendments, and with the states expected to be fully
in line to replace the Part C program, the termination of the
federal role had seemed reasonable at one time. Since the lat
ter had clearly not occurred and since doubts existed about
the potential for eliminating black lung disease, Congress
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chose to drop any pretense that this was only a temporary
federal program.
To make its intent perfectly clear, the 1977 amendments
required the Labor Department to re-review all claims
previously denied and to evaluate them, along with the tens
of thousands of pending cases, based on the new amend
ments. Moreover, new information could be provided by
claimants who had been denied. Claims previously denied
under Part B were to be reviewed again as well, though
SSA's review needed only to have been based on the existing
file. If a previously denied claimant, or one denied after the
new review by SSA, wished to submit new material or
evidence, that file would then be evaluated by the Labor
Department.
The goal of the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act was to
raise the probability that a miner or survivor would receive
compensation under the program. But it did not deal with a
central issue of liability, that is, the source of funding. Since
the large majority of cases under Part C were ones where no
"responsible operator'* could be identified, and employers
were vigorously contesting liability where they were so
designated, almost all payments under the Department of
Labor program came from the U.S. Treasury. Recall, that
the original concept of the 1969 law had been that the
Treasury would pay for the old cases only, and that the mine
operators would be responsible for very recent and newly
emerging ones beginning with claims made after 1971.
Senators and congressmen from the mining areas particular
ly had been sensitive to the economically precarious position
of the coal industry by 1969 and thereafter and did not want
to burden it with substantial new costs for compensation.
The 1972 amendments deferred the time when the mine
operators would have to begin paying for black lung. And by
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1977, very little payment had been made by them in any case.
In defense of the industry, however, many of the Part C (and
section 415) claims were based on employment in the mines
that had occurred many years earlier.
To deal with the issue of liability, the Congress opted for a
"superfund" approach, with the passage of the Black Lung
Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, PL 95-227. Signed into law on
February 10, 1978, the new statute levied a tonnage tax to be
paid by all coal producers. These funds went to a federal
Trust Fund to be used to pay benefits in three categories of
claims. First, the Trust Fund was to be responsible where the
Labor Department did not identify a "responsible
operator." Second, the Trust Fund would be liable to pay
successful claimants where the last employment in the mines
had occurred prior to January 1,1970. Thus, the coal mining
industry now became financially responsible for the very old
cases, though no single operator would be required to pay in
these old cases. Finally, the Trust Fund would make
payments where a benefit was awarded but the designated
responsible operator did not pay in a timely manner. The
Trust Fund would then seek repayment by the mine
operator.
The creation of the new Trust Fund raised several intrigu
ing questions. Was the tonnage tax rate to be equal across all
producers, regardless of the risks of disease and of past and
future claims emanating from employment therein? Would
the tax be adequate to pay for the Trust Fund's obligations?
And who would pay for claims filed in the early years of the
program, where the last employment in the mines was after
January 1, 1970? The latter problem arose because of two
legislative changes in the 1977 amendments. First, coal mine
operators previously had not been liable for claims filed
prior to July 1, 1973 under the Part B program. Yet the 1977
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changes made individual mine operators liable for claims fil
ed at any time where coal mine employment had occurred
prior to December 31, 1969. Congress had recast liability to
be based not on the date of filing but on the date of last
employment. Second, previously denied claims filed between
January 1, 1970 and July 1, 1973 would have to be recon
sidered by SSA and the Labor Department with more liberal
criteria applied because of the 1977 amendments. Thus,
denied claims that had once been the potential liability of the
U.S. Treasury were to be reopened and could now become
the liability of individual mine operators or, conceivably,
their insurance carriers.
The trust fund concept satisfied those parties who wanted
the coal mining industry, rather than the U.S. Treasury, to
bear financial responsibility for black lung disease. Some in
volved parties would have preferred the Trust Fund to be us
ed to pay for all successful claims, thereby eliminating in
dividual mine operator liability. For example, Arnold Miller,
President of the United Mine Workers of America, testified
that this was his union's preference, primarily because it
would remove the mine operators from the claims process. 3
The adversary process was perceived by the union to be
responsible for many of the delays and claims denials that
had characterized the Part C program.
The 1977 amendments meant that the Labor Department
would dramatically alter its administration of black lung
claims. First, it would now be able to award benefits to a
larger proportion of claimants, including those previously
denied claims that it would reassess. Second, it would have
to develop procedures that would allow the Department to
open the logjam that had developed, and to process incom
ing claims and deliver benefits more promptly. The 1977
amendments gave the agency the tools to carry out both of
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these goals. Subsequently, it would be argued that the Labor
Department accomplished these goals at the expense of its
compensating many claimants who were neither totally
disabled due to pneumoconiosis nor survivors of miners who
died from the disease. An alternative view was that, from
1978 to 1981, the Department responded to the clear call of
the Congress in the 1977 amendments, much as SSA had em
phatically responded to the 1972 amendments. As we will
see, benefits during this period were awarded at a much
higher approval rate than they had been, and the backlog
was substantially reduced.
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1. Legislative History of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, Part 2, prepared for the Subcommittee on Labor, U.S. Senate,
1975, p. 2117.
2. HR 3333.
3. Hearings before the Committee on Education and Labor, 95th Con
gress, 1st session, March 14-17, 1977.

Medical Issues
in Black Lung Compensation
In 1969, as members of both Houses of Congress debated
the merits of Title IV of the Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act, most appeared not to differentiate at all between terms
such as black lung, pneumoconiosis, complicated
pneumoconiosis, or some others that were bandied about.
This may have reflected an inability on the part of some
members to comprehend certain medical concepts or ter
minology, but it may also have been a sign of disinterest in
an issue that promised to affect only small numbers of peo
ple and relatively few dollars. Yet major problems that soon
surfaced in the program and continued to dog it over its en
tire existence were the product of this initial lack of preci
sion. The focus of this chapter is on the medical issues that
confronted the program.
While there were numerous difficult questions regarding
the administration of this program, they all sprang from a
single basic concept. It was the intent of Congress that a
specific group of workers would be compensated if they had
been rendered totally disabled due to a specific disease, or
their survivors would be compensated if death was due to the
specific disease. By limiting compensation to a specific
population and a single disease, and by excluding partial
disabilities for purposes of compensation, a set of very dif
ficult decisions had to be made about how to construct the
appropriate boundaries of the program. Since little or no
53
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guidance was provided on these matters in the 1969 law, it
was left originally to SSA to decide them. Dissatisfaction
with that agency's administration was reflected in the
passage of the 1972 amendments and, subsequently, the 1977
and 1981 amendments were products of congressional
displeasure with the way that the boundaries were set by the
Labor Department. A considerable amount of the blame for
that displeasure, however, resulted from the ambiguities and
vagueness in the legislation itself. What disease(s) did Con
gress seek to compensate? How was the disease to be iden
tified? Did total disability mean what it had meant under the
Social Security Disability Insurance program? Was the basis
for compensation impairment or was it to be disability?
This chapter examines the three sets of medical issues that
created intense controversy under the law. Each issue is
treated separately here, but they are not entirely unrelated.
The issues developed in the presence of scientific uncertain
ties, but not because a total lack of consensus or agreement
existed. Instead, even where the medical-scientific communi
ty was largely, though not wholly, in agreement, the presence
of any type of controversy enabled Congress to legislate
without due consideration of the medical issues. The
legislative branch sought to achieve certain social and
economic goals and the existence of medical uncertainties or
disputes enabled Congress to do precisely that.
The three sets of issues involve: (1) the methods ap
propriate to the diagnosis of the disease; (2) relating the
presence of the disease to the assessment of disability; and
(3) identifying the disease(s) to be compensated under law. 1
It is the third issue that is addressed here initially. Ironically,
that issue had become relatively unimportant in most state
workers' compensation laws, just as it grew controversial in
the federal law. During the 1970s and 1980s, the states
became generally less restrictive in their compensation for
claims involving occupational diseases, ending the archaic
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practice of limiting compensation solely to diseases that were
listed on a schedule. Had the states become more responsive
to claimants with diseases prior to 1969, perhaps no black
lung legislation would have developed. Yet, the perception
that state practices had been and were restrictive led to
passage of the 1969 law, which, ironically, itself was highly
restrictive. It provided compensation to only a single class of
occupational disease cases, black lung, and excluded all
other diseases. In creating such a categoric entitlement, the
law made the determination of black lung a critical compo
nent of the compensation process.

Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis
Respiratory and pulmonary diseases among coal workers
have long been known, if not well understood. 2 In 1831,
Gregory identified coal as a factor in lung disease in miners.
By 1837, Thomas Stratton had coined the name anthracosis.
Until then, lung diseases in coal workers had been called
miner's asthma. Observing lower death rates in miners than
in other parts of the population, Smart wrote in 1885 that,
"there must be some protective feature in coal mining opera
tion, and that the preserving element might, after all, be the
dust derived from the coal." 3 Indeed, this contributed to a
view held by a number of physicians late in the 19th century
and even into the early 20th century that coal dust had cer
tain beneficial qualities for one's health. More likely, it
probably reflected upon the good health of those who
became coal miners.
Toward the end of the 19th century, mines in Great Britain
became deeper and more machinery was introduced, with the
consequence that more dust was produced and health condi
tions actually worsened. The increase in lung diseases in
miners was believed by most authorities to be due to the free
crystalline silica that was a by-product of the mining process.
Whether silicosis or another form of dust-induced disease,
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that is, a pneumoconiosis, was responsible for the increase in
lung disease remained to be established, but concern regard
ing the health of coal miners extended beyond Great Britain.
Writing in 1925, H.R.M. Landis, a physician at the Universi
ty of Pennsylvania, observed, "A man who works in a coal
mine . . . sufficiently long will inevitably develop
pneumonokoniosis [sic]. The changes may occur more
quickly and be more extensive in one person than
another . . . but there is no question as to the ultimate
result. In fact, the progress of the pulmonary changes is so
definite that, given the type of dust and the length of the ex
posure, one can almost predict the (X-ray) findings."4
A 1928 study by Collins and Gilchrist and another by
Gough in 1940 appeared to establish that coal dust, in the
absence of silica, could product pneumoconiosis. Autopsies
confirmed the presence of disease without abnormal
amounts of silica in the lungs.
A major watershed occurred when the Medical Research
Council of Great Britain issued three separate reports on the
subject in 1941, 1943, and 1945, which led directly to the
placement of coal workers* pneumoconiosis on the schedule
of compensable diseases. Indeed, the term coal workers'
pneumoconiosis (CWP) first appeared in these reports. The
British had found higher rates of CWP amongst anthracite
miners, as well as differences related to the mines from
which the coal was taken. At that time there was speculation
that the chemical composition and the amount of volatile
matter in the coal might explain some of these differences.
Research and interest in the U.S. in CWP lagged behind
Britain. In the late 1950s and 1960s, several studies were
done evaluating the causes of death among U.S. coal miners.
Outside the research community, however, there appeared to
be only limited recognition of the British findings that coal
dust was associated with pneumoconiosis, aside from
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silicosis. It was only in the late 1960s and in the 1970s that
coal workers' pneumoconiosis came to be recognized widely
in this country as an occupational disease caused by coal
dust.
The differentiation between silicosis and coal workers'
pneumoconiosis was significant in both England and the
U.S. Workers in most states and Great Britain who
developed disabling silicosis could reasonably expect to
receive some compensation for it, certainly by the late 1930s.
However, if the symptoms of silicosis were not present or if
the miner's work did not bring him into contact with silica,
compensation was not likely to be paid. The symptoms of
CWP and silicosis are not exactly alike. Consequently,
miners would not be compensated in many instances where
there was no silicosis present, though the worker was suffer
ing from another pulmonary disorder which might have been
CWP.
Coal workers' pneumoconiosis is a disorder caused by
deposition of coal mine dust in the lungs. 5 It is customarily
categorized into two sets: simple CWP and complicated
CWP. According to a widely adopted scheme developed by
and for the International Labor Organization and the
University of Cincinnati, simple CWP is classified using the
numbers 0, 1, 2, and 3. The patient is rated solely on the
basis of X-rays, with the higher numbers indicative of larger
numbers of small, pneumoconiotic opacities per unit area. A
rating of 0 is indicative of few or no such opacities meaning
the disease is not present. The rating 1 means few but
definite opacities appear on the X-ray film and indicates that
the disease is judged to be present, a 2 indicates the presence
of a moderate number of small opacities and 3 is the
classification when many small opacities are found. Within
each numerical classification, a second number is added so
that the rating can be further refined. Essentially, these sec-
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ond numbers connote below average, average, or above
average within the major numerical categories.
While the major categories of simple CWP are classified
by the numbers 1, 2, or 3, complicated CWP is classified by
three letters, A, B, and C. Category A refers to the presence
of one or more large opacities measuring one centimeter or
more in diameter, with the sum total not exceeding five cen
timeters. Category B describes a greater involvement than A,
and C defines a condition that is greater than B. In com
plicated pneumoconiosis, the large lesion that creates the
opacity on the film is typically seen on a background with
many small lesions characteristic of category 2 or 3 simple
pneumoconiosis. A large lesion with no such background
may indicate the presence of a tumor and no
pneumoconiosis.
This system of classification, by itself, is not meant to ex
plain the cause of the lesion(s) or to determine what type of
pneumoconiosis, if any, is involved. Nor does the classifica
tion serve to describe the extent of respiratory impairment.
X-ray findings similar to CWP could result from other con
ditions such as silicosis, berylliosis, aluminosis, talc
pneumoconiosis or benign conditions like stannosis (tin) and
silver polisher's lung. 6 However, this classification scheme
has been useful beyond simply categorizing the extent of in
volvement as seen by the X-ray.
Most of the authorities on CWP use the term complicated
CWP interchangeably with progressive massive fibrosis
(PMF). At least one group has termed this imprecise, 7 but
generally the two are treated as synonyms. This is the least of
the problems of terminology. Testifying for the National In
stitute for Occupational Safety and Health on proposed
federal regulations to administer the law, Dr. James Mer
chant observed, "There is still considerable confusion
among U.S. pathologists as to what exactly constitutes
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CWP. In addition, the terminology is confusing; an analysis
of 1,300 cases submitted to the National Coal Miner Autop
sy Study revealed that pathologists used 165 different terms
to describe the lesion seen in coal workers' lungs. Currently,
no pathological standards for CWP exist in the U.S." 8
The ventilatory (or bellows) function of the lungs is
measured by spirometry. 9 Evidence of impairment is
associated with bronchitis, cigarette smoking and/or com
plicated CWP, but not with simple CWP. Persons with sim
ple CWP are unaware of the presence of some impairment
and usually become informed of the condition only after
having been X-rayed. By contrast, persons with complicated
CWP, particularly B or C, usually complain of shortness of
breath (dyspnea) on exertion, and of coughing and sputum.
Also, complicated CWP is associated with certain cardiopulmonary problems, including cor pulmonale (right ven
tricular disease and failure), that is not associated with sim
ple CWP.
Coughing and sputum are found in many miners, but
these symptons are equally likely to be present in miners with
or without X-ray evidence of CWP. Where these conditions
exist, they are typically due to (industrial) bronchitis or em
physema. This bronchitis, unlike that caused by cigarette
smoking, has an insignificant clinical effect on ventilatory
capacity.
The gas exchange function of the lungs shows a similar
type of dichotomy between simple and complicated CWP.
There is little or no deviation from the norm in miners with
simple CWP. However, where complicated CWP, par
ticularly category B or C is present, the diffusing capacity
and the arterial blood gas tests reveal impairment, especially
during exercise.
It is almost universally accepted that simple CWP (that is,
categories 1, 2, or 3) is not disabling. Indeed, some in-
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dividuals with simple CWP are unaware of any type of
respiratory-pulmonary problems. Even less disagreement ex
ists regarding the position that serious functional impair
ment is associated with category B or C of complicated
CWP. As such, it is often disabling for persons employed in
tasks involving some physical exertion. Some dispute exists
on whether or not category A of complicated CWP virtually
always causes serious functional impairment, as it does in
category B or C.
Another significant difference between simple and com
plicated CWP is that the latter is considered to be pro
gressive, in that it can advance even in the absence of further
coal dust exposure. By contrast, simple CWP not only will
not advance if exposure to coal dust ends, the condition can
be reversed if the worker is removed from the hazardous ex
posure. Where workers with simple CWP continue to be ex
posed, their condition may advance so as to be classified as
complicated CWP.
CWP rarely develops before 10 years of exposure to the
dust. The incidence of CWP is higher among persons expos
ed to anthracite coal dust, a type of coal found only in this
country in a small area of Pennsylvania and little mined in
recent years. Its effects vary also by the region of the country
where the coal is found, and also by the type of work done in
the mines. The highest rates of simple CWP are found in Appalachia, the next highest in the Midwest and the lowest in
the western part of the country. Simple CWP does not affect
longevity. There is no effective treatment for complicated
CWP but some forms of relief exist for the symptoms.
Another critical difference between simple and com
plicated CWP is the frequency with which they are found
among active and former miners. Considerable evidence ex
ists regarding the differential incidence of simple and com
plicated CWP among miner populations. While there are
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some significant differences reported among different
studies, it is absolutely clear that complicated CWP tends to
be found relatively infrequently compared to simple CWP.
The differences in findings by medical researchers as to the
relative occurrence of simple and complicated CWP likely
derive from differences in populations being examined. In
one study 9,706 miners from 21 bituminous mines and 2 an
thracite mines were examined between 1969 and 1971. 10 W.
Keith Morgan found almost 30 percent had simple CWP and
about 2.5 percent had PMF. (Many of the latter cases came
from the anthracite mines.) Roger Mitchell estimated that 10
percent-30 percent of current miners have CWP with
perhaps one-third of these having PMF. 11 He cited further
evidence from Great Britain that about 1 percent of simple
CWP cases become complicated each year. Earlier in the
same report, it is estimated that 2 percent of simple CWP
cases a year become complicated CWP. 12 About 70 percent
of those persons with complicated CWP are in category A,
where there is less likelihood of serious functional impair
ment than in categories B and C.
During the 1970s, NIOSH began an extensive program to
monitor the health of coal miners, providing additional
evidence on the incidence of CWP. Data from two of their
recent surveys, presented in table 3.1, indicated lower levels
of CWP, and especially of complicated pneumoconiosis,
than do the studies cited earlier. Aside from some differences
in research methodologies, the different findings of these
later studies may be explained, in part at least, by two
phenomena. First, persons with CWP may have dropped out
of coal mining and are no longer in the group surveyed, due
to the presence of the Black Lung programs. Second, the
dust controls imposed by the 1969 legislation may account
for some of the apparent decline in incidence. It is unlikely,
however, that these controls could have had a major impact
on PMF, particularly in the Round Two Surveillance Study
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(see table 3.1), since it was undertaken from mid-1973 to ear
ly 1975.
The differences between simple and complicated CWP
described above place the 1969 legislative debate into
somewhat better perspective. The version of the bill that
finally passed the House of Representatives (HR 13950),
provided compensation specifically for "complicated
pneumoconiosis," which was defined precisely in section
110(b) (7) (B): "The term * complicated pneumoconiosis'
means an advanced stage of a chronic coal dust of the lung
which (i) when diagnosed by chest roentgenogram yields one
or more large opacities (greater than one centimeter in
diameter) and would be classified in Category A, B, or C in
the International Classification ... by the International
Labor Organization. ..." Had this language been retained
it would have ruled out compensation for the far larger
cohort of miners or former miners with simple CWP or other
pulmonary-respiratory diseases. Moreover, it would have
made the process of identifying eligible claimants much
simpler than it eventually was, since category A, B, or C is
not difficult to observe by trained roentgenologists. The
Senate's version of the 1969 law also limited benefits to per
sons with "complicated pneumoconiosis" from coal mine
employment. While that bill provided no definition of com
plicated pneumoconiosis, there has been no controversy over
either the meaning of complicated pneumoconiosis or its
diagnosis.
Although both the House and the Senate bills specifically
limited compensation to complicated CWP, the term "com
plicated" had been dropped when the bill emerged from the
Conference Committee. In section 402(b), the law defined
pneumoconiosis as "a chronic dust disease of the lung aris
ing out of employment in an underground coal mine." By
entirely eliminating the term "complicated" that had ap-

Table 3.1
Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis—The NIOSH National Coal Workers' Health Surveillance Program
Round Two (1973-1975)
Radiographic category (ILO-U/C)
(Percent)
Years mining

Total #
miners

0

1

2

3

PMF

0 to 9
10 to 19
20 to 29
30 to 39
40 plus

91,159
8,398
7,609
5,392
1,615

99.3
87.1
72.2
62.0
56.0

06
11.6
21.5
27.3
30.2

00
1.0
5.1
80
9.2

0.0
0.1
0.3
1.2
1.2

0.0
0.3
0.9
1.6
3.5

Total

114,173

94.2

4.5

0.9

0.1

0.2

Round Three (1978-1980)
Radiographic category (ILO-U/C)
(Percent)
Years mining

Total #
miners

0

1

2

3

PMF

0 to 9
10 to 19
20 to 29
30 to 39
40 plus

39,483
6,618
2,704
2,919
554

98.9
93.2
82.4
71.7
66.6

1.1
6.4
15.2
21.5
24.4

0.0
0.3
1.9
4.5
5.8

0.0
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.7

0.0
0.1
0.3
2.0
2.5

Total

52,278

95.5

3.9

0.5

0.4

0.2

SOURCE: Summary tables appear in materials prepared by NIOSH, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and
Means, House of Representatives, July 27, September 28, 1981, p. 32.
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peared in both the Senate and House bills, and by an im
mense revision of the definition from the version originally
passed by the House, the Conference Committee was able to
completely alter the character of the law.
The disease(s) to be compensated under the 1969 law had
been described as pneumoconiosis or PMF and not as "black
lung." With one or two exceptions, the term "black lung"
does not appear in the scientific literature until 1969 or short
ly thereafter. There is a medical condition, anthracosis,
which refers to the blackening of the lungs found in coal
miners. By 1920, however, it was realized that this was mere
ly a pigment deposition, found widely at autopsy in persons
from industrialized areas far removed from coal mining
regions, and not a disease. Thus, the term used in 1969 and
thereafter, black lung, is a legal or political concept and not
a medical one. As such, it applies to whatever disease(s) the
lawmakers or administrators wish it to. Unlike the fairly
precise medical meaning of simple or complicated CWP, the
term black lung has the twin virtues to some of being catchy
and emotional, while providing maximum flexibility or am
biguity.
The term, black lung, did not appear in either the House
or Senate version of the 1969 law, but is found in the bill
reported by the Conference Committee. While it is not used
in the text of the various sections of the law, Title IV is entitl
ed "Black Lung Benefits."
By defining pneumoconiosis as it did, and by using the
term black lung rather than CWP, the law opened the door
to claims for a variety of respiratory and pulmonary diseases
that are not CWP. It also created a variety of problems for
those charged with administering the program. First, it rais
ed expectations among miners, their families and their
representatives that compensation would be forthcoming for
virtually all pulmonary-respiratory diseases contracted by a
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miner, not simply for a single, reasonably well-defined one.
Second, partly because of the original language in the
separate Senate and House bills, many persons believed that
only CWP was to be compensable under the law. That no
tion was reinforced by the language in the law which referred
to "pneumoconiosis." Third, the definition of the disease
that was inserted by the Conference Committee forced the
law's administrators to identify those other diseases and con
ditions that would be compensable on the grounds that they
arise out of coal mine employment and are dust-induced.
Aside from CWP, at least two other lung conditions are
understood to be related to coal mining. Silicosis (another
type of pneumoconiosis) is found in workers involved in
mine construction or transportation work. 13 These workers
are exposed to aerosolized sands applied to the rail tracks in
the mines to provide some traction. Construction workers,
primarily roof bolters, also are exposed when they bore holes
in the rock strata outside the coal seam. Generally, the
presence of the disease is diagnosed by X-ray.
The other lung disease that is widely associated with coal
mining is industrial bronchitis. Workers in all dusty trades
can develop industrial bronchitis, which results from the
dust being deposited in the trachea and bronchi, the airways
that carry the inhaled air to the gas-exchanging portion of
the lung. A properly functioning lung performs two
necessary functions. First, it acts as a bellows, moving both
inhaled air into the lungs and exhaled air out of the body.
Second, the gas exchange function occurs as oxygen is
transferred to the blood and carbon dioxide is removed from
it to be exhaled. Dust in the trachea and bronchi may reduce
the ventilatory capacity (the bellows function) of the patient,
but not substantially. The body seeks to rid itself of the dust
particles by producing excess mucus, leading to phlegm and
coughing. Because the particles are removed, the condition
does not appear on X-rays.
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The presence of coughing and sputum and slight reduc
tions in ventilatory capacity occur no more frequently in
miners with simple CWP than in those without the condi
tion. Increasing the degree of simple CWP (and thereby the
dust content of the lungs) does not lead to concomitant
reductions in ventilatory capacity. Miners with reduced ven
tilatory function have difficulty due to the obstruction of the
airways reflecting industrial bronchitis, and not due to sim
ple CWP. Obstructed airways due to coal dust may be un
comfortable but are not likely to cause disability. However,
for persons with PMF, more serious airway obstruction may
exist, and consequently substantial functional impairment
may be present. The incidence of breathing impairments in
coal miners is significant. The National Study of Coal
Workers' Pneumoconiosis surveyed the health condition of
over 9,300 miners. It reported that 40.4 percent suffered
some form of bronchitis, 11.2 percent had persistent
breathlessness, and 24.2 percent had "significant" airway
obstruction. 14
Cigarette smoking is also a cause of obstructed airways.
Unlike industrial bronchitis, however, cigarette smoking is
associated with a loss of flexibility in the lungs (emphysema)
and destroys their ability to exchange gas. There does not ap
pear to be any special synergism between cigarette smoking
and coal dust, however, as in the case of asbestos exposure.
In miners with chronically obstructed airways, the relative
contributory causes as apportioned between cigarette smok
ing and coal mine dust are a matter of dispute. The director
of NIOSH has suggested that about 50 percent of the cases
arising in coal miners are due to cigarettes. 15 Dr. W. Keith
Morgan directly challenged this estimate. Based on com
parisons of nonsmoking surface miners with nonsmoking
mine face employees, he found that the average ventilatory
capacities were 102 percent and 98 percent, respectively, of
the predicted normal values. He termed this difference
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"statistically significant" but "clinically insignificant." 16
Based on this he assessed cigarette smoking as having from 6
to 10 times the effect of coal dust on ventilatory capacity.
The product of these legislative ambiguities and medical
uncertainties were administrative, political and informa
tional problems. In the first two-three years under the new
law, numerous claims were denied to severely impaired
miners, former miners or survivors of workers who had
respiratory and pulmonary conditions at the time of their
death. The basis for the denials tended to be X-rays that
displayed no evidence of disabling pneumoconiosis. Some of
these people suffered "black lung," however, to the extent
that they did have industrial bronchitis, or cigarette-induced
bronchitis and emphysema. Denials of compensation
benefits by the Social Security Administration infuriated the
supporters of the black lung program in Congress, the
United Mine Workers union and the various Black Lung
Associations. The key source of the problem, however, was
the ambiguity created by the 1969 law regarding the
disease(s) to be compensated. Reflecting this, Senator Byrd
of West Virginia argued, "Let us stop quibbling with dying
men as to whether their lungs are riddled with black lung or
whether they are afflicted with asthma, or silicosis, or
chronic bronchitis." 1 7
Congress took three steps to force the Social Security Ad
ministration and the Labor Department to widen the
coverage of the law beyond CWP. In the 1972 amendments it
moved indirectly by disallowing X-ray evidence as the sole
basis for denial of a claim. Thus, persons with no evidence of
CWP based on X-rays were now to be eligible for benefits.
Second, it added the 15-year rule (section 411(c)): a rebuttable presumption of pneumoconiosis was established
retroactive to December 30, 1969, for a coal miner who
worked 15 years in underground mines (or in substantially
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similar conditions), if the person had a totally disabling
pulmonary or respiratory condition, even with a chest X-ray
that was negative for pneumoconiosis. The presumption
clearly smoothed the path of claimants unable to
demonstrate CWP due to negative X-rays.
Finally, in the 1977 amendments, Congress reworded its
1969 definition of pneumoconiosis so as to make it far more
inclusive: "The term * pneumoconiosis' means a chronic dust
disease of the lung and its sequela, including respiratory and
pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employ
ment." 18 (The underlined words were those added by the
1977 amendments.) While scientists could be left to ponder
and argue what this meant, the intent of Congress to widen
the basis of eligibility was absolutely clear to the ad
ministrators of the program. The disease(s) to be covered
under the law was (were) much more than CWP.
The meaning of the disease(s) to be compensated was not
settled with the 1977 amendments. In April 1978, the Depart
ment of Labor issued proposed regulations to implement the
1977 amendments. Included was an elaboration of the
definition of pneumoconiosis. 19 Almost two years later, the
final version of the Department's regulations implementing
the amendments of 1977 was issued. 20 In the Labor Depart
ment's interpretation, the definition "... includes, but is
not limited to, coal workers' pneumoconiosis, anthracosilicosis, anthracosis, massive pulmonary fibrosis,
progressive massive fibrosis, silicosis or silicotuberculosis,
arising out of coal mine employment. For purposes of this
definition, a disease * arising out of coal mine employment'
includes any chronic pulmonary disease resulting in
respiratory or pulmonary impairment significantly related
to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal
mine employment." 21 (Italics added here for emphasis.) In
issuing its proposed regulations in 1978, the Labor Depart-
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ment had proposed to explicitly exclude lung cancer and
diseases of bacteriological or viral origin from being con
sidered to have arisen out of dust exposure in coal mine
employment. One measure of the Department's timidity in
the face of oversight by Rep. Perkins and other advocates of
a more liberalized program was that it backed off from even
this in its final version. It chose not to specify bronchitis and
emphysema as chronic pulmonary diseases that arise out of
coal mine employment. However, since the interpretation of
the definition was not limited to the diseases listed, bron
chitis and emphysema were clearly compensable, so long as
other criteria for benefits were also met.
The Labor Department also sought as inclusive a defini
tion as possible through the use of the aggravation theory.
Under the Department's regulation, a claimant need only
show that dust exposure in coal mine employment substan
tially aggravated an underlying or pre-existing condition. In
deed this was somewhat stricter than the regulations propos
ed in 1978 which did not include the word "substantially."
This tightening probably resulted from a hint provided by
the courts after the proposed regulations were issued that the
Department may have overstepped its legislative grounds in
interpreting the meaning of pneumoconiosis in this way. 22
To summarize, coal workers' pneumoconiosis is a discrete
disease, now recognized as such by the medical community.
In its simple form, the condition is not disabling. In 1969,
both Houses of Congress endorsed a new entitlements pro
gram for workers disabled by or deceased due to complicated
CWP. The Conference Committee eliminated the term
"complicated," and defined somewhat vaguely the disease
to be compensated. The definition was modified in 1977 to
permit broader coverage. The Labor Department, eager to
overcome its inability to compensate most applicants, fur
ther extended the disease(s) to be compensated through the
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regulations it issued in 1978 and 1980. By then, "black lung"
bore little relationship to coal workers' pneumoconiosis.

Diagnosis
The expressed aim of Congress in 1969 was to compensate
coal miners totally disabled or killed due to pneumoconiosis
arising out of underground coal mine employment. Had
Congress meant to compensate only complicated CWP, or
even CWP (in the presence of functional impairment), the
matter of diagnosis would have been relatively straightfor
ward. As noted earier in this chapter, the presence or absence
of pneumoconiosis can be found by qualified readers of
chest X-rays where the film quality is adequate. While X-ray
evidence does not completely simplify an adjudicator's needs
where only pneumoconiosis is to be compensable, it makes
the task quite manageable.
If one has a compensation program dealing solely with
disability or death due to CWP, there are at least five
diagnostic problems that exist where X-ray films are used as
the primary method of screening or diagnosis. One type of
problem exists where one or more large (1 cm. or larger in
diameter) lesions appear on X-rays. Though this is
characteristic of complicated CWP, it may also be evidence
of other diseases, including some other pneumoconioses
such as silicosis. X-ray evidence is problematic where
silicosis is not compensable but CWP is. The matter can be
dealt with, though not to the satisfaction of all parties, by us
ing presumptions involving work histories. Large lesions
may also be seen in X-rays where a tumor is present.
However, complicated CWP, as distinct from a tumor, is
typically characterized by a large lesion or lesions on a
background consistent with category 2 or 3 pneumoconiosis.
Thus, the presence of large lesions can usually be diagnosed
correctly as pneumoconiosis or not.
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A more difficult problem occurs at the very margin of
category 1 (simple) pneumoconiosis and category 0 (no
pneumoconiosis). 23 where the presence of pneumoconiosis is
a necessary condition for compensation, difficulties can oc
cur due to challenges in diagnosing the presence of the
disease at its very earliest stages. This is complicated by the
fact that some opacities that appear in chest X-rays may be
related solely to the aging process. Dr. Russell Morgan has
written, "The problem here is that pneumoconiosis is not the
only condition that manifests itself by the presence of small,
rounded or irregular opacities on the chest roentgenogram.
Many other states, including some that might be considered
to be normal physiological processes (e.g., aging) may pro
duce them too." 24
A third set of problems occurs because the quality of the
film may affect the ability to make a diagnosis or may affect
the finding itself. One authority estimates that perhaps 25
percent of the roughly 20,000 X-rays he has read of workers
who have been occupationally exposed to various dusts were
of substandard diagnostic quality, or unreadable for pur
poses of detecting and classifying pneumoconiosis. 25 Where
the film is underexposed, the less experienced reader will
have a tendency to find disease where none is present. Where
the X-ray film is overexposed it can cause the changes due to
pneumoconiosis to be masked or obliterated. Morgan also
pointed to the problem of poor quality X-rays for purposes
of proper diagnosis. 26
A related but separate issue that created immense dif
ficulties under the law is the technical ability of X-ray
readers. Even where the quality of X-ray films is satisfac
tory, not all physicians possess the skill or the training to
properly read them. Testifying in 1978, Dr. William Cole
estimated that "less than 200 physicians and radiologists
have demonstrated a proficiency in the correct use of the
classifications system" (the ILO-U/C scheme). 27
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The need for expert readers of X-ray films became ap
parent early in the life of the black lung program. In 1976,
NIOSH, in association with the Johns Hopkins School of
Medicine, developed an examination to test the proficiency
of readers in classifying chest roentgenograms. Of the first
140 persons to take the examination, 77 were passed,
thereby, qualifying as "B" readers. These experts worked as
consultants to the government and were used to review
X-rays and findings sent in from the field. An "A" reader is
typically a local physician who has taken a course directed by
NIOSH/Johns Hopkins or has otherwise demonstrated a
proficiency in the ILO-U/C system. "B" readers have
demonstrated a higher level of proficiency than "A"
readers.
The issues of film and reader quality have been posed here
in the abstract. In fact, the U.S. Department of Labor con
ducted a study in 1977 where its expert "B" readers
evaluated 18,014 X-rays and the reports filed on them by the
field physicians who had evaluated black lung claims for the
Department. (See table 3.2 below.) The study demonstrated
a widespread pattern of disparities with a strong bias toward
field physicians finding excessive (unwarranted) instances of
disease. For example, and at its worst, the study found that
in 10,044 instances where field physicians reported finding
simple pneumoconiosis, over 10 percent of the X-rays were
unreadable. Of the balance of almost 9,000 cases, only 27.5
percent were actually simple pneumoconiosis, according to
expert readers. Over 70 percent were judged to be not
pneumoconiosis, and 2.4 percent were found to be com
plicated pneumoconiosis.
The problem of X-ray reader quality stems from several
underlying causes. At one level, the ability to read such
X-rays properly develops with experience. Moreover, the
skill will atrophy if not maintained. At another level, some
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physicians have a reputation as being more or less inclined to
find pneumoconiosis. In the coal mining areas, some physi
cians developed reputations as being "sympathetic" to
miners and were prone to diagnose pneumoconiosis. Some
doctors had precisely the opposite reputation. Testifying in
1981, Dr. Keith Morgan argued "I regret that many
radiologists invariably interpret every film as positive. In the
case of certain radiologists whose services are invariably
given to claimants, I have yet to see an X-ray which has not
been read as positive. In looking through a hundred con
secutive reports of one of these radiologists, all of which
were reported as either category 2 or 3 simple CWP, only
seven were subsequently reported as positive by a *B'
reader." 28
Aside from the issues noted, X-rays have other limitations
as a means of screening workers for compensation benefits.
Clearly, mechanisms must be developed to determine compensability where claimants have died without having chest
X-rays prior to death. Further, X-rays can indicate the
presence of disease but not necessarily the degree of func
tional impairment. The matter can be partially finessed, as in
the case of black lung, by creating the presumption in the law
that complicated pneumoconiosis was totally disabling.
However, for the far more common cases involving the
radiological diagnosis of simple pneumoconiosis, other
criteria must be developed to measure impairment/disability
and determine eligibility for compensation.
The shortcomings and limitations of X-ray evidence in
pneumoconiosis claims make several other methods of
diagnosis useful. For example, autopsies are considered a
highly effective way of establishing that the deceased person
had CWP at the time of death. It is also useful in establishing
the cause of death and the linkages between the pulmonaryrespiratory disease and any other factors causing death. The

Table 3.2
Comparative Results of readings by Field Physicians and "B" Readers
Identifying 18,014 Chest Roentgenograms for the Department of Labor hi 1977
_____________ _______
_______________ ——————————————————————————————
______________
____
__
——————————————————————————————
——————————————————————————————
7603
# of films classified negative by field physicians
1.
668
less # of films declared unreadable by "B" readers
6935
# of readable films classified negative by field physicians
6299 or 90.8%
# of these films classified negative by "B" readers
609 or 8.8%
# of these films upgraded to simple pneumoconiosis by "B" readers
27 or 0.4%
# of these films upgraded to complicated pneumoconiosis by "B" readers
2.

# of films classified simple pneumoconiosis by field physicians
less # of films declared unreadable by "B" readers
# of readable films classified by simple pneumoconiosis by "B" readers
# of these films downgraded to negative by "B" readers
# of these films upgraded to complicated by "B" readers

3.

# of films classified complicated pneumoconiosis by field physicians
less ft of films declared unreadable by "B" readers
# of readable films classified complicated pneumoconiosis by field physicians
# of these films classified complicated pneumoconiosis by "B" readers
# of these films downgraded to negative by "B" readers
# of these films downgraded to simple pneumoconiosis by "B" readers

10044
1049
2570 or 27.5%
6304 or 70.1%
221 or 2.4%
367
29
338
120 or 35.5%
123 or 36.4%
95 or 28.1%
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2
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4.

# of films
# of these
# of these
# of these

classified negative by "B" readers
films classified negative by field physicians
films upgraded to simple pneumoconiosis by field physicians
films upgraded to complicated pneumoconiosis by field physicians

12716
6299 or 49.5%
6304 or 49.5%
123 or 1.0%

5.

# of films
# of these
# of these
# of these

classified simple pneumoconiosis by "B" readers
films classified simple pneumoconiosis by field physicians
films downgraded to negative by field physicians
films upgraded to complicated pneumoconiosis by field physicians

3174
2470 or 77.8%
609 or 19.2%
95 or 3.0%

6.

# of cases
# of these
# of these
# of these

classified complicated pneumoconiosis by "B" readers
cases classified complicated pneumoconiosis by field physicians
cases downgraded to negative by field physicians
cases downgraded to simple pneumoconiosis by field physicians

368
120 or 32.6%
27 or 7.3%
221 or 60.1%

SOURCE: Department of Labor.
8:
o

e.
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1969 act mandated the National Coal Workers* Autopsy
Study, which provided a voluntary, cost-free autopsy for any
former underground miner.
Dr. James Merchant of NIOSH testified on certain find
ings from the National Coal Workers' Autopsy Study which
matched the autopsy findings with the death certificates
prepared by the worker's local physician. 29 Based on 1,300
cases from 1970 to 1974, NIOSH reported that of the major
disease categories found to be the underlying cause of death,
e.g., lung cancer, tuberculosis, chronic obstructive airway
disease, heart disease, 10 to 30 percent were not shown on
the death certificate. Where autopsy revealed these diseases
to be a contributing cause of death, they were not found on
death certificates in over 50 percent of the cases. The study
confirmed the fallibility of relying too heavily on death cer
tificates for compensation purposes (or for that matter for
epidemiological work), and the desirability of using autopsy
as a diagnostic tool.
In practice, autopsy evidence was treated as having essen
tial limitations under this program. That is most clearly
reflected by the Labor Department's rules: "Because of the
nature of autopsy, autopsy findings are accorded a high pro
bative value. However, the claims examiner must keep in
mind that the physician normally applies a narrow, scientific
or medical definition of pneumoconiosis, while the claims
examiner uses a broader, legal definition. Interpretation of
autopsy reports is further complicated by the absence of any
widely agreed-upon standards for the diagnosis of
pneumoconiosis on autopsy, or for classification of the stage
of advancement." 30
Aside from X-rays and autopsy, pneumoconiosis can be
also detected by the use of biopsy. Bits of lung tissue are
removed and examined either during surgical procedures or
by inserting a needle and removing such small pieces. The

Medical Issues 77

latter is widely regarded as involving some risk to the patient,
and is therefore widely considered inappropriate for use sole
ly in the diagnosis for compensation purposes.
If the disease to be compensated was exclusively CWP,
particularly complicated CWP, the means to make proper
diagnosis would have been available readily to program ad
ministrators since 1970. Obviously, the core problem was
that it was black lung and not CWP that Congress wanted to
compensate. Whatever was meant by the "legal disease"
black lung, its diagnosis was far less clear than that of CWP.
By extending the disease definition well beyond CWP, the
law eventually forced program administrators to work in the
roundabout way of establishing, first, the existence of an im
pairment, and then using that to establish the presence of the
compensable disease.
While the 1969 law was ambiguous, at best, in identifying
the compensable disease, the agency charged with ad
ministering the law initially was confronted with the task of
determining eligibility in actual cases. Based on the Social
Security Administration's reading of the law, the agency
opted to compensate pneumoconiosis (as the law stated) and
not the medically undefined disease(s) "black lung," as the
law also stated. The criteria employed by SSA were
straightforward and partially relied on SSA's experience in
evaluating total disability under section 223 of the Social
Security Act. In its defense, SSA was given virtually no op
portunity to fully explore criteria for determining compensability. Incredibly, the 1969 law mandated that HEW pro
mulgate its regulations for determining total disability and
death due to pneumoconiosis by the end of the third month
following the month of enactment. The agency published its
regulations in the Federal Register and made them effective
immediately. While it invited the public to comment on these
regulations and to submit data and arguments about them,
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ultimately the agency did not change its regulations until
forced to do so by the 1972 amendments. To be sure, the
agency was experienced in operating a total disability in
surance program, but it acknowledged that it had not ad
ministered a program where eligibility was based on disabili
ty due to a specific disease only, and where a causal connec
tion had to be established with a specific type of employment
(underground coal mining).
Initially, SSA operated under relatively simple decision
rules. Where X-rays revealed the presence of complicated
CWP, section 411(b) (3) created the irrebuttable presump
tion of total disability or death due to pneumoconiosis.
Where X-rays revealed no pneumoconiosis, the claim was
denied. This decision reflected the medical concept of the
disease, CWP, and not the "legal disease" that black lung
could have implied.
To establish the causal or occupational connection
with coal workers' pneumoconiosis, the regulations
provide that there must be X-ray evidence of
pneumoconiosis in the living applicant (in a rare
case, a biopsy). This is based on the prevailing
medical judgement that in the absence of positive
X-ray evidence, the disease does not exist or exists
to a degree that would have no significant effect on
the claimant's functional capacity.
There is some minority medical opinion to the ef
fect that disabling pneumoconiosis may exist in the
absence of "positive" X-ray evidence thereof.
However, this issue was thoroughly considered by
the Social Security Administration, through exten
sive consultation with a wide range of medical
specialists, and the requirement was included in the
regulations as reflecting the overwhelming consen
sus of medical judgement on the issue. 31
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What remained for SSA was the very considerable task of
dealing with claimants who were found to have simple
pneumoconiosis. Section 413(b) of the statute required the
agency to make entitlement determinations "to the max
imum extent feasible'' according to the procedures used in
the Social Security Disability Insurance program. Thus, in
the presence of simple CWP the claimant's ventilatory func
tioning was tested and standards were adopted that were
basically the same as those already in place in the disability
insurance program. Indeed, the agency argued that, in the
presence of uncertainty, its administration of the program
erred on the side of generosity:
An individual's ventilatory ability may be com
promised by many diseases other than coal
workers' pneumoconiosis. Emphysema commonly
affects this ability: neurological, muscular, infec
tious, or degenerative disease may do so also. From
a medical standpoint, it is impossible in most situa
tions to determine what portion of an individual's
reduced ventilatory capacity is due to coal workers'
pneumoconiosis and what portion is due to one or
more other diseases he has. Nevertheless, to assure
fullest equity to claimants under these cir
cumstances, favorable disability determinations
have been made where a claimant has a serious
breathing impairment and has pneumoconiosis. 32
The implication of this admitted practice was that diagnosis
followed from the finding of impairment, given any evidence
of the presence of simple CWP, no matter how early or
limited the stage.
SSA drew the line where no evidence of pneumoconiosis
was found. "Some miners have emphysema or chronic bron
chitis and may be severely disabled as a result, but do not
have pneumoconiosis. Under the law, claims from such
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miners must be denied." 33 No doubt, the agency's
understanding of the law followed from the language mak
ing compensation limited to pneumoconiosis.
SSA's treatment of death claims paralleled that employed
for living miners except where the 411(c) (2) presumption re
quired otherwise. That provision presumed death due to
pneumoconiosis when a person employed 10 years or more in
underground mining died of a "respiratory disease." Sec.
411(c) (3) created the irrebuttable presumption that death
was due to pneumoconiosis (regardless of actual cause)
where the miner had had complicated pneumoconiosis.
Where the miner did not have complicated pneumoconiosis,
and where 41 l(c) (2) did not apply, the agency could and did
find grounds for compensation where respiratory disease
may have contributed to the deceased miner's demise.
"Unless death is due to trauma or clearly results from an
acute disease process, the Social Security Administration has
ordinarily held that pneumoconiosis or 'respirable disease,'
if present, was a significant contributing factor in causing
death." 34
According to SSA, most of the death claims that were
denied were characterized in either of two ways. In some
claims, there was no evidence of chronic lung disease. In
others, the miner died either from an acute disease unrelated
to pneumoconiosis or from trauma where complicated
pneumoconiosis was not found.
The presumption under 411(c) (2), which provided
benefits where death was due to "respirable" disease rather
than pneumoconiosis, was justified by its proponents on
several grounds. First, many U.S. doctors had never
recognized CWP as a disease until recently. Widows would
have been hard pressed to win claims without such a
presumption since death certificates or medical reports
would have otherwise undermined their chances for benefits.
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Also, since hard medical evidence would be difficult to ob
tain where deaths had occurred in earlier years, the standard
of proof was eased. Since the presumption was rebuttable
where medical evidence did exist and where the worker died
in the absence of complicated CWP, SSA could have sought
to rebut the presumption when another respirable disease
was the cause of death. Apparently, this was infrequently or
never done.
Despite what appeared to be a magnanimous approach to
claimants, SSA received immense criticism for its ad
ministration of the act from the law's strongest supporters.
By December 31, 1971, more claims had been denied than
were allowed (163,000 denials compared to 159,000
allowed). 33 Miners, their representatives, and others could
point to denials in cases where former miners with lung im
pairments were barely ambulatory, side by side with allowed
claims where men still worked in mines. (The latter were
workers whose X-rays showed the presence of complicated
CWP, and who gained entitlement through the irrebuttable
presumption found in sec. 411(b) (3).) The hearings that
preceded the 1972 amendments were filled with criticism of
SSA officials. Considerable anger was expressed at the
negative presumption applied by SSA, which found miners
ineligible for benefits where there was no X-ray evidence of
pneumoconiosis.
A reading of the hearings and the floor debates that
preceded the 1972 amendments provides a classic illustration
of the adversaries' inability to communicate with each other.
Black lung supporters insisted that SSA had denied large
numbers of worthy claimants with serious lung diseases
because of the agency's insistence that X-rays show signs of
the disease. They assembled some evidence from the medical
community, depending heavily on Dr. Donald L.
Rasmussen, that concluded that black lung could exist in the
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absence of positive X-ray evidence. Led by Rep. John Erlenborn, opponents argued that coal workers' pnewnoconiosis
was detectable by X-ray and that no better, single method ex
isted to diagnose the disease. Responding to the charge by
supporters of a more generous program that CWP or
fibrosis had been found on autopsy of the lungs of miners
who had been denied benefits, opponents argued that early
stages of simple CWP could have been present, but that this
would hardly have caused impairment or death.
One interpretation of the debate is that serious technical
and definitional issues were present and that many members
of Congress could not understand them. Even if that view is
correct for most of the members, the issues were clearly not
beyond the grasp of Congressmen Perkins and Erlenborn.
Their substantial quarrel was a repeat of the bitter dif
ferences that emerged over the original Conference Commit
tee's revision that changed "complicated coal workers'
pneumoconiosis" to "pneumoconiosis" and to "black
lung." Lurking behind this fundamental difference was the
extent to which this program conferred very broad or narrow
eligibility to entitlements to older miners and their survivors.
The heated nature of the debate did not reflect the relative
strength of the adversaries. A key vote in the House on a
measure proposed by Erlenborn to stop the bill, failed on a
voice vote, and the House bill was passed 311-79, with 40
members not voting. The Senate version of the bill was pass
ed unanimously.
For purposes of widening the scope of eligibility for
benefits in the 1972 amendments, two key measures were
taken. First, sec. 413 was amended to add the following:
... no claim for benefits under this part shall be
denied solely on the basis of the results of a chest
roentgenogram. In determining the validity of
claims under this part (part B), all relevant evidence
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shall be considered, including where relevant,
medical tests such as blood gas studies, X-ray ex
amination, electrocardiogram, pulmonary function
studies, or physical performance tests, and any
medical history, evidence submitted by the claim
ant's physician or his wife's affidavits and in case
of a deceased miner, other appropriate affidavits of
persons with knowledge of the miner's physical
condition, and other supportive material.
Thus, Congress made its will clear to SSA. The diagnostic
standards for determining the presence of black lung were to
be loosened, most directly by eliminating the screening
device of the X-ray. By adding a list of other medical
evidence to be considered, and in the context of the evident
dissatisfaction with the large numbers of rejections of
claims, Congress told SSA to find ways to justify compen
sating claimants. Just so that was clear to SSA, the Senate's
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare explained its in
tent: "It is not the Committee's intention that all of these
types of evidence be secured in every claim but that such
evidence be sought in those claims as is necessary to assure a
decision on the claim consistent with the remedial nature of
the legislation (italics added by the author). 36
The other method used by Congress to widen the eligibility
boundaries of the program was less obvious than the section
413 amendment but no less subtle. When Senator
Randolph's report of the committee's bill emerged, it con
tained the following:
The backlog of claims which have been filed under
these provisions cannot await the establishment of
new facilities or the development of new medical
procedures. They must be handled under present
circumstances in the light of limited medical
resources and techniques.
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Accordingly the Committee expects the Secretary
to adopt such interim evidentiary rules and disabili
ty evaluation criteria as will permit prompt and
vigorous processing of the large backlog of claims
consistent with the language and intent of these
amendments. Such interim rules and criteria shall
give full consideration to the combined employ
ment handicap of disease and age. . . , 37
It is striking that no comparable statement appears in the
report of the Committee on Education and Labor in the
House of Representatives, 38 nor was there any such reference
in the legislation itself. Yet the committee's sentiments were
well understood, particularly in the context of the amend
ments and the one-sided votes that supported them. Mark
Solomons argues that the statement in the Senate report was
conceived by HEW officials and Senate staff "as a conve
nient mechanism to permit the adoption of temporary rules
to expedite the approval of a much large number of
claims." 39
The arrangement was created and rationalized on the
grounds that adequate medical facilities were not in place to
properly diagnose and evaluate the many black lung
claimants, including those whose claims had been denied
previously by SSA and would now be reopened due to the
1972 amendments. To expedite the process of cutting into
the backlog, "interim criteria" were to be created by SSA
and applied to Part B claimants. "Permanent criteria"
which were essentially those used by SSA since 1970 would
be used by the Department of Labor to administer the Part C
program when it eventually took over the administration of
new claims on July 1, 1973. By that time, it was presumed
that better exercise or physical performance testing facilities
would be widely available in coal mining areas. More impor
tant, the mine operators would have to take financial respon
sibility for the Part C program.
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The interim criteria (also called the interim presumptions)
were proposed by SSA on September 2, 1972 in a Notice of
Rule Making published in the Federal Register, with in
terested parties given only until September 20, 1972 to sub
mit comments. On September 30, 1972, the regulations for
the interim and permanent criteria were published in final
form in the Federal Register.*0
SSA paraphrased the language of the Senate Committee's
report in explaining why it developed the interim criteria. 41
However, SSA described itself as fulfilling "congressional
intent" when indeed it was actually responding to a state
ment in a committee report, without explicit legislative sup
port.42
The interim presumptions greatly eased the burden of
claimants by substantially lowering the criteria for eligibility.
First, they created a rebuttable presumption of total disabili
ty due to pneumoconiosis where X-ray evidence showed the
presence of simple pneumoconiosis or where ventilatory
function studies demonstrated the presence of chronic
disabling pulmonary or respiratory disease and the claimant
had worked 10 years or more in coal mine employment. The
interim criteria allowed benefits either solely on the basis of
an X-ray or ventilatory tests. SSA acknowledged that the
crucial ventilatory criteria were more liberal than those in the
permanent criteria. The reason given for this was that these
more liberal criteria would compensate somewhat for the in
ability of SSA to identify workers with impaired diffusion
capacity, that is, the ability to transfer oxygen efficiently
from the lungs to the blood. Such tests could not be carried
out due to a lack of testing facilities or sometimes because
claimants were physically unable to perform the exercise part
of a test of diffusion capacity.
The ventilatory function tests were tied to the rebuttable
presumption that disability or death was due to
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pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment if the
tests indicated impairment, and the miner had been
employed 10 years or more in underground (or, with com
parable conditions, surface) coal mining. The presumption
could be rebutted if the miner was still employed in his usual
coal mining work or in comparable and gainful employment.
Conceivably, it could also be rebutted if other physical tests
indicated that no impairment was present
The interim presumptions meant that SSA had developed
an entirely new perception of congressional intent after the
1972 amendments. Essentially, where virtually any evidence
of pulmonary or respiratory impairment was found, the
claim was paid. Second, SSA sought to act very promptly.
Not only did the SSA interim criteria presume that simple
CWP was compensable, it also resulted in compensation for
other pulmonary or respiratory diseases, such as emphysema
and bronchitis, as well. What were critical were the values
considered as normal or below normal for the ventilatory
tests. By setting a high standard on the "normal" level, the
door was opened through these test standards for many
previously denied claimants as well as for new ones.
There are several ways to gauge the ventilatory test stan
dards that were set for claimants or survivors. First, a com
parison between the permanent criteria and the interim
criteria can readily be made since both appeared in the same
issue of the Federal Register. It is clear that the values in the
interim presumptions are set much higher than in the perma
nent standards. The higher the threshold is set, the larger the
number of applicants that fall below it, enlarging the set of
compensable applicants.
Second, at the time of the hearings on the 1977 amend
ments, numerous physicians commented on the interim
presumptions. The consensus of their testimony was that,
because the threshold was set so high, the standards were far
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too low. In addition, the standards were technically flawed
by not being age-adjusted. Since ventilatory capacity typical
ly declines with age, a "normal" value for a 65-year-old will
be lower than for a 45-year-old. By not adjusting for age, the
interim presumptions provided a boost for those claimants
who were older, which is to say, the large bulk of the claim
ant population.
Aside from the age adjustment issue, a "normal'* figure
does not necessarily imply that everyone falling below that
level is sick. With normal variation in the populations, per
sons without impairment often have capacities below the
average, their age aside, so that impairment is not
demonstrated simply because one's ventilatory tests place
them below the "normal" figure. If the test takes age into
account and perhaps certain other measurable factors, and
the person's ventilatory capacity is perhaps 60 percent of the
normal figure or less, one can then presume the presence of a
significant impairment. This was what the medical com
munity told the Perkins committee in 1977. 43
Dr. Harold I. Passes, former acting Chief Medical Officer
of the Bureau of Hearing and Appeals for SSA testified on
the development of the interim standards during hearings on
the 1977 amendments.44 According to him, the interim stan
dards were never given official medical approval by the
Chief Medical Officer of the Bureau of Disability Insurance
for SSA. Instead, "The criteria were designed for expediency
by the then Bureau director, Mr. Popick, a nonphysician,
and drafted by Mr. O'Brien, the chief legal counsel at the
time." 45 Thereafter, lay personnel used the criteria 99.9 per
cent of the time without seeking medical advice. The interim
criteria were
. . . extremely liberal and were not based on
substantial medical evidence that the criteria
chosen were in fact, equal to a disabling impair-
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ment. They did include many values, including
pulmonary function standards, which were entirely
normal and which would be read by at least 95 per
cent of all physicians who were knowledgeable of
the values presented as normal values. 46
Bernard Popick, who ran the Part B program in SSA, had
been the focus for much of the criticism about the standards
used by SSA until the 1972 amendments went into effect.
The use of the interim criteria allowed him to respond to the
heat directed at him and his office by black lung supporters,
particularly in the Congress. The weight of the medical
testimony regarding these criteria was that they were so
liberal as to provide benefits to many claimants who suffered
little or no impairment. As Solomons concludes, "The in
terim presumption began life a sort of dark secret, contrived
by federal agency personnel who probably saw their careers
flash before their eyes as a few powerful members of Con
gress grew more and more strident in their demands that
more claims be paid.'*47
The interim criteria applied by SSA beginning in 1973
created a special problem for the Department of Labor.
When their time came to administer claims under Part C,
they were required to use the "permanent criteria" which
were more demanding than the interim criteria. This created
the almost laughable situation of two federal agencies ad
ministering essentially the same program, using substantially
different standards to determine compensability. The cir
cumstance was hardly considered laughable at the Labor
Department, however, where the denial rate on claims was
much higher than at the Social Security Administration. The
criticism that had been heaped on SSA by black lung sup
porters before the enactment of the 1972 amendments soon
was redirected at the Labor Department with its more restric
tive standards. The Department's frustration was easy to
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understand. Since the statute appeared to give standardsetting power only to the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare, the Labor Department felt trapped by the perma
nent standards it was required to employ. (In particular, this
was dictated by sections 402(f) and 411.) In its first 18
months of administering the program, the Labor Depart
ment's approval rate was below 20 percent while SSA's ap
proval rate had risen to over 60 percent, using their interim
criteria.
Some evidence of the Labor Department's desperation can
be inferred from their report on the program submitted in
1976 to Congress. 48 Apparently to explain the large number
(and proportion) of claims denials, the Department reported
on a sampling of 1,388 denials where ventilatory test results
were available. 49 Of these, only 78 (6 percent) met the Labor
Department's standard for benefit eligibility (and therefore
had been denied on some other grounds), while 318 (23 per
cent) met the interim standards but not those of the Labor
Department. This demonstrates tangibly the consequence of
the use of the interim presumptions by SSA and the reason
for the far lower acceptance rate by the Labor Department.
In 1975, SSA apparently agreed, at the Labor Depart
ment's urging, to extend the interim presumptions to the
Part C program, but the effort was quietly killed by the Of
fice of Management and Budget, according to Solomons. 50
Until then, the Labor Department's wish to use these more
liberal standards was not based on any medical or scientific
study. Instead, it was simply a desire to have the two agen
cies use the same standards, to take the heat off the Labor
Department.
In March 1976, the House passed HR 10760, in which it
provided that no claims were to be evaluated on the basis of
criteria that were more strict than those applied by SSA in
the interim presumptions. This bill would have permitted the
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Department of Labor to use even more liberal criteria than
the interim presumptions, but the issue became moot as the
Senate was unable to complete work on the bill before the
legislative session ended.
By the time the 95th Congress began work on a black lung
reform bill, a Democratic administration was in place at the
Labor Department, and a new perception of the interim
presumptions surfaced there. According to Solomons,
What happened, in fact, was that the Social Securi
ty Administration finally made it clear to Depart
ment of Labor officials that the interim presump
tion was scientifically invalid and that it was used
by them, not as a screening device to separate ap
propriate claims from potential denials, but as an
irrebuttable presumption which would permit the
approval of large numbers of marginal claims with
a minimum of effort and without full
adjudication. 31
The result of this remarkable shift by the Labor Depart
ment placed the new administration at odds on this critical
issue with the powerful congressional advocates of liberaliz
ed standards. The Department adopted the position that
medical knowledge should be employed to develop
justifiable medical criteria. Indeed, the Senate's version of
the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 (BLBRA-1977)
empowered the Secretary of Labor in consultation with the
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health to
issue medical criteria. The House version, on the other hand,
required the Labor Department to apply the interim
presumptions to all its claims, including those previously
denied.
A compromise of sorts was accepted by the Conference
Committee whereby standards no more restrictive than the
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interim presumptions were to be applied, but only until the
Labor Department adopted new permanent medical
criteria. 32 At that point, evaluation of all subsequent claims
would be based on the new standards. Very shortly after the
amendments became effective, the Department proposed
"interim** regulations of its own to interest groups and con
gressional staffers. Solomons reports that parts of the draft
version were "severely criticized" and that the Department
was compelled to back off most of the ones that appeared to
tighten regulations. 53 The Department clearly complied with
the legislative mandate that required these interim regula
tions to be no stricter than the interim presumptions used by
SSA. Ultimately, the interim regulations proposed on April
25, 1978 were consistent with the Department's need to close
out the enormous backlog of cases that had accumulated,
along with the reevaluation of previously denied claims re
quired under BLBRA-1977.
A final version of the permanent regulations was issued in
February 1980, to be effective one month hence. The perma
nent standards were more rigorous than the interim stan
dards had been. Thus, from the effective date of the amend
ments, March 1, 1978, the Labor Department had two years
in which to administer the law using the SSA interim stan
dards—and in so doing, to reduce the mountainous load of
backed-up claims.
One way of assessing the significance of the Labor Depart
ment's use of the interim standards is available. The General
Accounting Office studied 450 claim files taken as a random
sample in 1980. 54 Almost all of these claims had been
evaluated on the basis of the interim standards. GAO found
that 205 claims had been approved from this sample, but
that only 111 of these claims would have been accepted had
the permanent standards been used instead. If the interim
criteria had not been available, fully 45 percent of the ac-
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cepted claims would have been denied. While this heftier
denial rate would likely have reduced the volume of new
claims, it would also have left the department with an enor
mous backlog of appeals and unresolved claims, to say
nothing of the wrath of the black lung supporters in the Con
gress.

Disability
To this point, the focus of this chapter has been on the
nature of the disease compensated under the black lung pro
gram and the methods used to determine whether the disease
is present. Closely related issues created a variety of other
serious problems for program administrators and for all par
ties involved with the system. These issues related to the re
quirement that living claimants be totally disabled as a con
dition of benefit eligibility. The concept of total disability is
not as straightforward as Congress may have supposed it to
be in 1969. To see why, some reference to other programs is
necessary.
To help clarify what is meant by the term "disability," it is
useful to distinguish it from the term "impairment." Impair
ment is strictly a medical or physiological (or psychological)
concept, referring to the outcome of an injury, disease or
possibly a genetic disorder. The extent of the impairment is a
measure of the loss or disorder in purely medical or scientific
terms. An impairment may be life threatening or relatively
trivial in terms of limiting an individual's physical or
psychological abilities.
Disability, by contrast, refers to the social and/or
economic loss resulting from an impairment. Thus, in most
compensation and liability systems, the major component of
disability is the loss of income due to a partial or total loss of
work-related income. If a compensation system is based
totally on impairment, two persons suffering precisely the
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same anatomical loss would receive equal benefits. The loss
of a single finger would be valued the same for a concert
pianist as it would be for a real estate salesperson. By con
trast, a pure disability system would provide equal benefits
to workers with precisely the same economic losses, even if
their impairments are vastly different. The loss of a finger
for a professional pianist could conceivably be considered
totally disabling, and comparable to the loss of both legs or
both eyes for a laborer. Indeed, compensation might be
greater for the pianist if that person's income loss was
greater than that of the laborer.
Workers' compensation systems were originally conceived
of as disability- and not impairment-based. 55 As such, the
movement by a number of states in recent years toward a
purer "wage loss approach" should perhaps be considered
less a revolution than a return to the basics. In any case,
there are numerous elements in workers' compensation
systems within the U.S. and abroad that compromise the
strict "disability principle," with added elements of an "im
pairment approach."
Just as workers' compensation systems are impure
disability schemes, so too is the Social Security Disability In
surance (SSDI) program. In broad terms, the disability
elements of SSDI are found in at least three features of the
scheme. First, benefits are paid only where there has been a
loss of earnings. Second, benefit levels are related to the ap
plicant's previous level of earnings. Third, SSDI benefits are
terminated when the recipient achieves retirement age (and
retirement benefits are paid thereafter). The source of the
disability, however, must be a "severe" impairment. Thus,
SSDI deviates from a strict disability approach, since
benefits would not be provided where a "non-severe" im
pairment results in a serious disability (loss of earnings).
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This very cursory review of these concepts should clarify
at least one other difference between impairment and
disability. Medical and health specialists are better equipped
than anyone to evaluate the extent of impairment. Disability,
however, is best judged by nonmedical people, such as voca
tional and labor market experts, economists, or others train
ed to assess the degree of economic loss. Since many com
pensation jurisdictions leave the assessment of "disability**
to physicians, it is little wonder that confusion has arisen
over the basis for compensation benefits, much less over the
terminology.
A critical distinction in compensation systems exists be
tween those that provide benefits for partial disability, and
those that do not. Partial disability benefit programs are
complicated and difficult to administer. All of the states ad
minister such programs under their workers' compensation
laws, as does the federal government under the Federal
Employees' Compensation Act. One of the inherent
challenges of a partial disability system turns out to be a
source of a certain strength. Where compensation or benefits
are available only for total disability, there is little or no
room for compromise or for legitimate uncertainty. For ex
ample, under the SSDI system with its all or nothing ap
proach, decisions that are "wrong" are totally wrong. In a
total disability-only program, benefits are paid to a person
with 100 percent disability, but not to a person judged to be
only 95 percent disabled (or some other appropriate
threshold point). By contrast, compensation for partial
disability allows the administering agency some room for
movement, whether this be done to achieve compromise or
to deal with uncertainties. "Errors" in judgment by the
agency need not be of an "all or nothing" character.
All of this serves as background to the black lung pro
gram, which, in theory at least, compensated living ap
plicants solely for totally disabling pneumoconiosis. Had the
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program been designed instead to compensate for partial
disability, many of the program's difficulties would have
been eliminated, though other problems undoubtedly would
have surfaced. The question arises why Congress did not
design a partial disability program. The record provides little
to answer this question. One of the major supporters of the
legislation in 1969,1972 and 1977 was Congressman John H.
Dent (D-Pennsylvania) who explained:
The reason we rejected the partial basis was
because we knew that they (Great Britain) paid it
on a partial basis because they did not want to pay
it on a final basis. They pay you so much—a couple
of dollars more a week if you are in the first stage,
and a couple of dollars more a week if you are in
the second stage. In other words, they want to keep
you in the mines so they decided to pay partial
benefits. It is wrong and that is why it is wrong in
Pennsylvania and it would be wrong here to do
so.'56
Dent's argument can be attacked on several grounds, the
most obvious of which is that a partially disabled miner
would more likely be able to leave the mines if he received a
partial benefit than if he received none at all. Moreover, the
level of total disability benefits under black lung was low
enough to keep mine work relatively attractive, even to
seriously impaired miners. 37
It seems likely that Congress did not want to tackle the dif
ficult chore of creating a partial disability program for a pro
gram that was to revert over (or back) to the states in a few
years. Also, the language in the original Senate and House
bills that went to the Conference Committee in 1969 dealt
with complicated pneumoconiosis. Since a widely held view
was that this condition was usually totally disabling, there
was no need to provide for a partial disability system.
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The distinction between impairment and disability
highlights one of the special difficulties encountered in the
program. Total disability implies a complete loss of earnings
or earnings capacity due to injury or disease. Consequently,
persons who have not worked because of advanced age, and
who suffer no earnings loss when disease develops, can hard
ly be considered totally disabled, though they may suffer
significant impairment.
The entire issue of work, retirement and disability takes on
a special character when applied to coal mining. As noted in
chapter 1, the huge loss of jobs in that sector in the 1950s and
1960s created many retirements that were essentially
premature and involuntary. The location of the mining
regions, especially those in the East where employment
declines were greatest, were in regions that provided few
alternative sources of employment. Generally, displaced
miners found few opportunities, either in the mining areas or
elsewhere. For these miners, loss of earnings was linked
more to the economics of coal than to the result of an im
pairment. Additionally, miners with obvious impairments
were handicapped in competing for any vacant positions that
might open in the mines. To what extent was the loss of in
come suffered by these miners a result of economic cir
cumstances and to what extent was it a result of the impaired
condition?
The original law of 1969 dealt with the issue simplistically.
Section 402(f) stated: "The term 'total disability* has the
meaning given it by regulations of the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare, but such regulations shall not pro
vide more restrictive criteria than those applicable under sec
tion 223(d) of the Social Security Act." That section referred
to the SSDI program, with which SSA had considerable ex
perience.
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The interpretation of the Conference Committee's think
ing differed in each chamber. The analysis in the Senate
stated, "The parameters of the term * total disability* will be
established from time-to-time by the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare, but he must not establish more
restrictive criteria for determining disability than the criteria
applicable under section 223(d) of the Social Security Act, as
amended, for purposes of disability under that Act. It is ex
pected that initially this criteria [sic] will be followed. As
time goes on, the Secretary may develop more liberal criteria
consistent with the purpose of this title." 58
In the House of Representatives, the analysis made no
mention of eventual liberalization of the criteria. It did state,
however: "Such standards would, among other things, re
quire that the administrators of this program apply the best
medical means available for ascertaining the disease in the
miner." 59 It seems clear from this statement that the House,
in particular, and likely the Senate as well, confused ques
tions of diagnosis with those of disability. A working miner,
for example, could be diagnosed as impaired with CWP, but
would not be considered disabled under SSDI because of his
employment status. A 65-year-old retired miner would nor
mally not be eligible for SSDI, because of his age. By making
the black lung benefit one based on impairment, it created a
new sort of entity for SSA to administer. The agency was to
apply the impairment criteria of section 223(d), but not
necessarily the disability tests which were based on any loss
of earnings and being below retirement age.
At least one issue involving disability was made perfectly
clear, although its medical basis might have been shaky.
Where a (former) miner was diagnosed as having com
plicated pneumoconiosis, section 411(c) (3) created an irrebuttable presumption that he was totally disabled due to
pneumoconiosis. In this case, continued work in coal mining

98 Medical Issues

could not be used to deny benefits since the presumption was
irrebuttable.
Where the miner was found to have some impairment
from pneumoconiosis, benefits could be paid if that condi
tion prevented the worker ". . . from doing coal mining
work and from engaging in any other type of substantial
gainful activity consistent with his vocational
competence." 60 This left open the issue that SSA normally
did not face under SSDI, that is, what to do with the 65-yearold applicant who was no longer employed. Essentially, what
SSA did was to waive, effectively, any work test and base
benefits solely on impairment criteria. For older miners short
of retirement age, the work test was applied liberally:
". . .the older, long-term miner with minimal education
and skills, who is shown to be unable to do heavy work
because of pneumoconiosis, will ordinarily be found to be
totally disabled." 61
SSA's handling of the total disability question proved to
be unsatisfactory and unacceptable to the supporters of the
program and led to a change in the definition of total
disability in the 1972 amendments. Under SSDI, a continua
tion of work by an applicant demonstrated the absence of
total disability. Further, if an applicant's impairment was
judged to be no deterrent to the person's taking gainful
employment, SSDI benefits would be denied also. In apply
ing these familiar concepts and regulations, seemingly con
sistent with the legislative requirement that the agency be no
more restrictive in evaluating total disability than under
SSDI, SSA earned the enmity of the congressional sup
porters of the program.
The Committee believes that experience in the ad
ministration of the black lung benefit provisions to
date reflects the need to modify the definition of
disability applied in the adjudication of claims
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under these provisions. The Committee makes no
judgment on whether the test in title II of the Social
Security Act 'inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity,' is an appropriate definition of ap
plication to the total universe of workers in the na
tion. But, it is unrealistic when applied to coal
miners, if it results in the denial of claims of miners
who for medical reasons can no longer be expected
to work in the mines and for whom there is, too
often, no other realistic employment opportunity,
or for whom the only opportunity for employment
may be at wages far less than they would have earn
ed had they been able to continue to work in their
usual jobs."
The Committee's report went on to provide a much
broader definition of total disability and to snipe at SSA for
disregarding the intent expressed by Congress in 1969.
Ultimately, something short of the Committee's proposed
redefinition was passed, but it substantially widened the
scope from that applied by SSA until 1972. This new version
defined total disability in a miner as "when pneumoconiosis
prevents him from engaging in gainful employment requiring
the skills and ability comparable to those of any employment
in a mine or mines in which he previously engaged with some
regularity and over a substantial period of time." 63
This revised definition carried in the 1972 amendments
meant that working miners (even aside from those with com
plicated pneumoconiosis and covered by the irrebuttable
presumption) could be considered totally disabled. So long
as the miner's work no longer was in his usual line of coal
mining employment, his working could not be used as
grounds for denying the claim due to a finding of no total
disability. It is necessary to note, however, that the awarding
of benefits did not necessarily mean that payments would be
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made to working miners. Under the Part B program, SSA
was able to offset, partially at least, black lung benefits paid
where miners continued to have earnings. However, no such
offset existed in the Part C program, so that total disability
benefits could be paid to working miners. This practice was
eliminated by the insertion of an offset provision under Part
C in the 1981 amendments. 64
The 1977 amendments reflect the realization by Congress
that it had not satisfactorily solved the total disability issue
in 1972. A number of matters arose that persuaded Congress
that it had not gone far enough in 1972. First, some working
miners were denied benefits for total disability due to
pneumoconiosis because they continued to work in their
long-term employment. Their continuing employment
reflected the need they had for some source of income, com
bined with the long delays in processing and adjudicating
claims in the Labor Department. Black lung supporters
argued that the impaired miner was "carried" by fellow
miners who assisted the person in doing his work. To deny
benefits for total disability simply because the worker was
still working at his long-term employment seemed unfair to
them, and smacked of a Catch-22. Consequently, one of the
changes in the rather lengthy definition provided by the 1977
amendments provided that, if a miner's employment condi
tions were changed, indicating the miner's reduced ability to
do his usual coal mine work, such employment could not be
used as conclusive evidence that the miner was not totally
disabled. This meant that a working miner could file a claim
and receive a positive benefit determination while still
employed in a coal mine. However, in order to receive
benefits, the miner would have to terminate that employ
ment within one year after the eligibility determination had
been made. (From section 413(d).)
A second matter dealt with by the 1977 amendments was
the treatment by program administrators of certain sur-
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vivors' claims. A number of complaints had reached con
gressional supporters of the program, that survivors' claims
were being denied where the miner still had been employed in
coal mining at the time of death. Presumably, such evidence
was interpreted by the Department of Labor to mean that the
miner was not totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis at the
time of death. Such an interpretation seriously jeopardized
the survivors' chances of obtaining benefits.
The argument for liberalizing the treatment of such claims
was based on two factors. First, as we have just seen, Con
gress was prepared to accept the argument that a miner
might be totally disabled but still employed in coal mining. If
it insisted on this for living miner claimants, consistency
compelled Congress to accept that some deceased miners
who worked in the mines until they died also might have
been totally disabled. Second, had that miner succeeded in
obtaining black lung benefits while still alive, his survivors
would have been entitled to benefits, regardless of the cause
of his death (section 412(a) (2)). The result of this line of
argument was that Congress pushed ahead in 1977 with,
"... a deceased miner's employment in a mine at the time
of death shall not be used as conclusive evidence that the
miner was not totally disabled. . . .""By making this deci
sion, Congress greatly enhanced the chances for success by
claimants wishing to invoke either the 15-year presumption
(section 411(c) (4)), or the 25-year presumption (section
411(c) (5)). 66 The latter presumption, added in 1977, was the
only place in the law, as amended, that ever made any
reference to partial disability. It provided that for certain
survivors' claims, benefits were to be paid if the miner, at the
time of death, was either partially or totally disabled due to
pneumoconiosis. Partial disability was not defined in the
statute.
Under SSDI, benefits for total disability are frequently cut
off when the recipient's condition improves, either medically
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or in terms of the labor market. SSA and the Labor Depart
ment, accustomed to that approach, did not treat benefits to
living miners as automatic lifetime awards. When some reci
pients returned to work, for example, or when some incident
occurred to suggest that the miner's impairment was not
severe enough to cause total disability, the miner might be
subject to reexamination.
While very few recipients actually had their benefits ter
minated, the possibility that this could occur upset black
lung supporters. In response to regulations proposed by the
Labor Department that had appeared earlier in the Federal
Register, Congressmen Perkins, Simon and Dent wrote the
Labor Department:
We believe that the new rule in Part 718 relating to
the reexamination of beneficiaries for the purpose
of reaffirming a miner's continued eligibility for
benefits represents a dangerous threat to the mental
and physical well-being of the beneficiaries, and
can easily be construed as an ill-conceived and
miscast attempt by the Department of Labor to
strip deserving individuals of their hard-won rights
to benefits. 67
This pressure, along with the statement that "the over
whelming majority of comments on this section suggest that
it be stricken," 68 forced the Labor Department to back off.
Once benefits were awarded the miner could expect them to
continue for life.
The problem with reexamination, as with most of the
troublesome issues, was that the agencies continued to har
bor notions of disability, while Congress was more intent on
paying for impairment. By making such a choice, Congress
allowed currently employed persons, even some still
employed in the mines, to successfully pursue claims. More
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significantly, the impairment approach opened the door for
thousands of older, nonworking, former miners to file
claims and receive benefits. That characteristic of the pro
gram is clearly reflected in the available data on the ages of
applicants and beneficiaries. For the first two full years of
the program, 77 percent of living applicants under the Part B
program were 60 years or older, and over 60 percent were 65
years or older. 69 Almost 73 percent of the allowed claims
came from persons aged 65 years and older. Indeed, 70 per
cent of the miner beneficiaries were also collecting retirement
benefits under Social Security.
The Labor Department's experience under Part C also
reflects the tendency for the program to benefit older ap
plicants. For example, by the end of 1975, more than 83 per
cent of the successful applicants were 61 years of age or older
at the time of filing, and 46 percent of the living beneficiaries
were 70 years or older at the time they filed. 70 The average
age of miner beneficiaries under Part C was 67.4 years as of
December 1979. 71
Once the Part C program brought mine operators into the
picture, they challenged the notion that total disability could
exist where the claimant was still employed. Ultimately, the
matter was dealt with by the U.S. Supreme Court, which ap
peared to identify the core issue: "... destruction of earn
ing capacity is not the sole legitimate basis for compulsory
compensation of employees. We cannot say that it would be
irrational for Congress to conclude that impairment of
health alone warrants compensation." 72
The Supreme Court's decision addressed the issue of the
authority of Congress to associate some degree of impair
ment with total disability. The Court found that Congress
had acted within its powers, though it did not speak to the
matter of the wisdom of doing so. Evidence of
pneumoconiosis, even of the complicated categories, does
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not by itself mean the employee is disabled. "The chest
X-ray is not a useful means of assessing the functional status
of the lung nor of determining disability." 73 Nevertheless,
with many retired miners showing some evidence of impair
ment, the intent of Congress was absolutely clear, as ex
emplified by the 1972 amendments and by the 1977 changes
that followed.
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73. Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis.

• 4*
Presumptions and Evidence
Workers or survivors seeking state workers' compensation
benefits for disability or death due to occupational diseases
typically encounter significant difficulties. 1 There is no need
to dwell here on the results of this pattern. Suffice it to point
to the difficulties for compensation purposes posed by
diseases of long latency or of unknown etiology, or by
diagnostic uncertainties, exposures to multiple hazards both
on the job and away from it, limited information regarding
the extent of the hazardous exposure, and so on. The special
difficulty that the worker or survivor must contend with is
that, with very rare exceptions, the claimant must shoulder
the burden of proof. Providing the proof necessary to win
benefits in state proceedings can be extremely difficult, if not
impossible. Some workers' compensation laws seek to
reduce or to shift some of that burden away from claimants
in order to increase the likelihood of their winning benefits.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the manner in
which the legislation dealt with these issues of providing
proof and adequate evidence for black lung claimants.

Presumptions
The 1969 legislation and the amendments in 1972 and 1977
sought to provide benefits to miners or to survivors where
coal mine employment was responsible for death or disabili
ty due to pneumoconiosis. Beginning in 1969, and with the
109
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next two sets of amendments, Congress attempted to ease the
customary burden of proof on claimants, thereby increasing
the probability of benefits being awarded. What all
claimants needed to prove, minimally, was that:
• the disease arose out of coal mine employment;
• the disease was pneumoconiosis;
• the disease was totally disabling or was the cause of
death.
In 1969, and even more so subsequently, supporters of the
law understood at least some of the challenges to claimants
posed by the need to prove these matters. The whole matter
of how to diagnose the presence of pneumoconiosis was wide
open in 1969. Compounding this, facilities to provide
sophisticated examinations to miners were inadequate at that
time. Moreover, with the decision by the Congress to com
pensate old cases, how would the law cope with deaths that
occurred in earlier years, particularly where no autopsy had
been performed? The probative value of death certificates
was recognized as being extremely limited. Finally, what
would it take for the miner or his survivor to prove that the
disease was caused by coal mining employment?
To deal with these issues and to ease, if not remove, the
burden on the claimant to prove one or more of these dif
ficult matters, Congress provided a number of presumptions
in the original law. It is important to note that a presumption
does not assure a claimant of being compensated. First, the
presumption may involve only a single element of a claim,
and where it is employed, the claimant must invariably prove
other points as well in order to be compensated. (Some of
those other matters to be proven can involve different
presumptions.) Second, since most of the presumptions in
this law simply shifted the burden of proof to the other par
ty, i.e., the employer or the government, they could be rebut
ted. As such, the claimant might lose even on a matter where
the presumption was invoked.
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In another section, the issues of claimant eligibility are
described. For purposes of understanding the presumptions
in the law, it is sufficient to note that three sets of en
titlements exist under the law. The original law provided that
benefits were to be paid, "in respect of total disability of any
miner due to pneumoconiosis and in respect of the death of
any miner whose death was due to pneumoconiosis." (Sec
tion 411 (a).) Thus, benefits were paid where there was an
appropriately disabled living miner or where a claimant show
ed that a miner's death was caused by the disease. In the 1972
amendments, a third source of entitlement was added involv
ing any deceased miner "who at the time of his death was
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis." This addition
meant that a widow could receive benefits even where the
miner had not made a claim for black lung by the time of his
death and whose death could not have been caused by the
disease, e.g., he died in an auto accident. 2 Moreover, this
new entitlement meant that where a living miner had suc
cessfully pursued a black lung claim, his dependent survivors
were assured of benefits upon his death, regardless of the
cause of death.
Until the 1981 changes in law, there were seven presump
tions that had been employed to aid the claimant in receiving
benefits. Three of these are found in the 1969 law (sections
411(c)(l), (2) and (3)); a fourth was added in 1972
(411(c) (4)) and a fifth was added with the 1977 amendments
(41 l(c) (5)). A sixth presumption was added by the Secretary
of Labor's administrative regulations of 1978. Finally, Con
gress imposed a set of "interim presumptions" to be used in
the 1977 amendments. Each is examined below. They are
significant in several respects, the most important perhaps
being that they reflect the attitude of the Congress towards
the matter of compensating miners and their dependents.
Sections 411(c) (1) and (2) of the original law are broadly
similar, though they have two significant differences. In
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41 l(c) (1), the law establishes that "if a miner who is suffer
ing or suffered from pneumoconiosis was employed for ten
years or more in one or more coal mines there shall be a
rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of
such employment."
Note that in order to invoke the presumption, the miner
must have had ten or more years of coal mine employment.
(With the 1972 amendments these years could have been
spent in surface as well as underground mining.) This
presumption, by itself, still left the claimant with the burden
of proving that he did have pneumoconiosis. As long as the
ten-year period of coal mine employment was shown, the
presumption was invoked, essentially making the miner's
other employment history irrelevant as a defense against the
claim. Successful rebuttal of the presumption is difficult and
rare in practice.
The Labor Department specifically identifies four lines of
argument that are not sufficient to rebut the 411(c) (1)
presumption: 3
1. The presence of other lung conditions.
2. The presence of respiratory-pulmonary impairment
prior to coal mine employment.
3. Additional dust exposure in other employment, either
prior to or subsequent to the miner's coal mine
employment.
4. Evidence that the mines where the miner worked were
relatively dust-free.
Section 411(c) (2) provides that "if a deceased miner was
employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines
and died from a respirable disease there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that his death was due to pnneumoconiosis."
This section differs from 411(c) (1) in several respects. First,
it is meant to be invoked only in death claims. Second, its

Presumptions & Evidence 113

focus is on the cause of death and not on whether it arose out
of coal mine employment. To invoke the presumption, the
claimant must show only that the miner's death was due to a
respirable disease, e.g., emphysema, etc. Having shown that,
the presumption is that the disease was pneumoconiosis.
If the claimant can use this presumption, and it is not suc
cessfully rebutted, the claimant must also prove that the
presumed pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mining employ
ment. This is particularly simple since the ten or more years
of coal mine employment that permit the use of 411(c) (2)
can then be used to invoke 411(c) (1), allowing the claimant
to presume also that the disease arose out of this employ
ment.
It is difficult to rebut the section 411(c) (2) presumption.
To do so requires that the government or the employer prove
either of two rather difficult things. The rebuttal can be that
the disease does not suggest a reasonable possibility that
death was due to pneumoconiosis. The other available rebut
tal is to prove that the respirable disease made a minimal or
insignificant contribution to the miner's death. Where death
is due to multiple causes including a respirable disease, and it
is not medically feasible to distinguish which disease caused
the death, death shall be found due to respiratory disease. At
one point the Labor Department tentatively proposed ex
cluding lung cancer and diseases of bacteriological or viral
origin from diseases covered by the section 411(c) (2)
presumption. 4 The proposal was not contained in the final
regulations "since it is possible that a relationship between
these diseases and exposure to coal mine dust and death may
be established by medical evidence in a particular case." 3
The Labor Department has interpreted section 411(c) (2)
to apply to chronic respiratory diseases only. It was found
that lung cancer is not chronic and, hence, the presumption
has not been invoked where no other disease is present.
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However, where the worker is found to have had
pneumoconiosis or another chronic respiratory illness in ad
dition to the lung cancer, the claimant may be able to employ
this presumption. It seems clear that the Labor Department
has had consistent difficulties in dealing with lung cancer
cases in disabled or deceased miners.
For the claimant with less than ten years of coal mine
employment, neither 411(c) (1) nor 411(c)(2) serve as
negative presumptions, i.e., it is not to be presumed that the
pneumoconiosis did not arise out of coal mine employment,
nor that the respirable disease that killed the worker was not
pneumoconiosis. The inability to invoke these (and the
other) presumptions simply means that the claimant
shoulders the burden of proof.
The third of the presumptions enacted in 1969 is unlike
any of the other presumptions described here. Section
411(c) (3) states that where the miner suffers or suffered
from complicated pneumoconiosis, there is an irrebuttable
presumption that the miner is totally disabled due to
pneumoconiosis, that his death was due to pneumoconiosis,
or that at the time of death he was totally disabled by
pneumoconiosis (added in 1972). The claimant still has the
burden of proof that the disease arose out of the coal mine
employment. However, where the miner was in coal mine
employment for ten or more years, the section 411(c) (1)
presumption can be invoked to meet this test.
The presence of complicated pneumoconiosis must be
established as a fact by the administrative law judge. 6 Sec
tion 411(c) (3) provides some very limited guidance in defin
ing three methods of establishing its presence, including the
size of the opacities found in the miner's chest X-rays. Even
where the miner remained employed in his usual coal mining
job for four years after his X-ray revealed the existence of
complicated pneumoconiosis, he was found totally disabled
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due to pneumoconiosis for this entire period because of sec
tion 411(c) (3). 7 The Supreme Court has upheld the use of
this irrebuttable presumption in Usery v. Turner-Elkhorn
Mining Co. 8
The prevailing attitude in the Congress between 1970 and
1972 was one of considerable unhappiness among the pro
gram's advocates regarding the difficulty that miners and
their survivors were encountering in obtaining benefits.
Evidence accumulated by SSA as well as grass roots rum
blings persuaded the law's principal supporters from the
mining states that entitlements were too difficult to achieve
under the existing administration of the act. As a result, the
1972 amendments created a new presumption, 411(c) (4), to
make benefits available to more applicants.
The newer presumption is more complicated than those
created in the original law. It states that where (1) a miner
was employed for 15 years or more in undergound coal
mines, and (2) where a chest roentgenogram submitted in
connection with the claim is interpreted as negative, and
(3) where other evidence demonstrates the existence of total
ly disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, there
shall be a presumption (rebuttable) that the miner is totally
disabled to pneumoconiosis or that his death was due to
pneumoconiosis. Where the claim involves a living miner, a
wife's affidavit may not be used by itself to establish the
presumption, according to the statute. The presumption, the
subsection continues, may be used by miners employed in
other than underground mines where the Labor Department
finds that the employment conditions "were substantially
similar to conditions in an underground mine." Unlike the
earlier presumptions that appear in the law (411(c) (1) (2)
and (3)), the 1972 addition specifies how the presumptions
may be rebutted. To do so requires establishing that the
miner does not or did not have pneumoconiosis or proving

116 Presumptions & Evidence

that the respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise
out of or in connection with coal mine employment. The
presumption was to be available only in old cases, where all
15 years or more of employment ended by July 1, 1971, and
with certain limits on filing imposed by a statute of limita
tion. These time rules were dropped in the 1977 amendments
and are therefore not considered here. July 1, 1971 was the
date that certain, more restrictive dust standards went into
effect under the coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.
The newer presumption must be understood as being a
significant extension of the intent of 411(c) (2), which ap
plied only in death claims. It created an entitlement in living
(former) miner claims for "presumptive pneumoconiosis."
In death cases it went well beyond 411(c) (2) in widening
eligibility since the earlier presumption required death due to
a respiratory or pulmonary disease. Under 411(c) (4), the
deceased miner with 15 years or more of coal mine employ
ment could have died of any cause at all. For example, even
if a miner died in an automobile accident, the presumption
could be invoked to show that the miner was totally disabled
from pneumoconiosis at the time of death, thereby creating
an entitlement for his survivors.
For living claimants, this presumption cannot be used un
til it has been shown that the miner had a totally disabling,
chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease. To do this, the liv
ing miner claimant must present some medical evidence of
the existence of the disease, not solely lay testimony. 9 This
requirement could be satisfied by the medical conclusion of
at least one examining physician. In contrast to the living
miner claim, lay evidence alone can establish that the miner
was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis at the time of
death. Evidence such as a surviving spouse's affidavit is suf
ficient to trigger the presumption, where no other evidence
exists or is brought forward to shed light on the claim. That
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the Congress intended this to be the case was clear. It was ac
complished by explicitly providing that such an affidavit
could not be used by itself to establish the presumption in liv
ing miner claims. The implications of this provision were
that such an affidavit could be used in conjunction with
other supportive evidence in living miner claims, and that it
could be sufficient by itself where the miner was deceased.
The rather minimal need for evidence to invoke 41 l(c) (4) in
deceased miner claims became extremely controversial. Pro
ponents argued, however, that survivors ought not to be
denied benefits where the worker did have pneumoconiosis,
but died at a time when there was little or no concern about
establishing proper medical evidence.
The claimant must show, in order to use the presumption,
that the miner is totally disabled, was totally disabled at the
time of death, or died due to pneumoconiosis. Evidence that
the miner died of a myocardial infarction and that he worked
full-time without being "carried" by his co-workers until the
mine closed prior to his death, would cause the Benefits
Review Board to deny the survivor/claimant the use of the
411(c) (4) presumption. 10 The Board would find the miner
not to have been totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, nor
to have died because of it.
As with 411(c) (2), there has been an inconsistent pattern
of decisions involving lung cancer under 411(c) (4). In a re
cent decision, a survivor was permitted to invoke 411(c) (4)
since lung cancer was a "totally disabling respiratory or
pulmonary impairment.'* 11
The two lines of argument that can be used to rebut
411(c) (4) are that the claimant does not or did not have
pneumoconiosis, or that the impairment did not arise out of
coal mine employment. Negative X-rays alone cannot be us
ed as evidence of the absence of disease. Pulmonary function
tests that do not meet the standards for total disability are
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not adequate to rebut the presumption. Negative X-rays and
pulmonary function tests may be used to form a reasoned
medical opinion that the disease is not present and,
therefore, rebut the presumption. 12 An autopsy may also
provide evidence of the absence of pneumoconiosis and per
mit the presumption to be rebutted. This leads to a con
siderable burden on the government or the employer to
prove that there is no pneumoconiosis present.
Proving that the impairment did not arise out of coal mine
employment can be difficult also. Even where a miner ex
perienced a 30-year interval between his last coal mine
employment and his initial effort to seek medical treatment
for a lung condition, the employer was unable to rebut the
presumption. 13 A number of cases exist where the employer
failed to rebut on grounds that the impairment did not arise
out of coal mine employment since there was no reasonable
degree of medical certainty that the miner's emphysema was
due to his cigarette smoking. 14
The law allows surface miners to invoke 411(c) (4) where
there is environmental comparability with an underground
mine. The burden of proving comparable working condi
tions, which rests with the claimant, is discussed later in this
section. However, an aboveground miner working at an
underground mine is considered for these purposes to be an
underground miner. Such a miner can use the presumption
without having to show any appropriate dust exposure.
Following the 1972 amendments, black lung supporters in
the Congress sought to extend entitlements even beyond the
existing presumptions. They had recognized the enormous
leverage that presumptions provided to claimants. Yet, they
remained dissatisfied with the rate of claims approvals, so
that they considered other presumptions to include in the
law. Particularly attractive in this regard were presumptions
that were made irrebuttable or, even more attractive,
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benefits based solely on the number of years employed in the
mines. Numerous efforts were made to push through such
broadened entitlements. In doing so, supporters of a more
liberalized approach often gave up even the sheerest pretense
that this was a disability or compensation scheme and, in
stead, in some instances manifested their preference for a
straight pension scheme. A few examples of these are noted:
1. HR 8 was introduced by Congressman Dent and signed
by Congressmen Perkins, Flood, et al. on January 14,
1975. Among other things, it provided that if a miner
was employed for 25 years or more in underground
mines, there was a rebuttable presumption that he was
totally disabled, or at the time of his death was totally
disabled, or his death was due to pneumoconiosis. Fur
ther, with 35 years or more in underground coal
employment, there would be an irrebuttable presump
tion of total disability or death due to pneumoconiosis.
2. In February 1975, 17 congressmen introduced HR
2913, which would have created an irrebuttable
presumption that a miner is totally disabled or has died
due to pneumoconiosis after 15 years employment in
underground coal mining. It would be applicable to
surface miners who had worked in conditions substan
tially similar to underground miners.
3. HR 10760 was introduced much later in the first ses
sion of the same 94th Congress, November 14, 1975.
Sponsored by Congressmen Dent, Flood, Perkins,
Burton, et al., it provided that benefits be paid to
miners or survivors after 30 years of underground
employment; if the work was in anthracite mines, the
period was shortened to 25 years. The familiar passage
about substantially similar conditions would have
brought many surface miners in under these proposed
entitlements. The reasons for the position were spelled
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out in the House Report that accompanied the bill
from Perkin's Committee:
On June 23, 1973, pursuant to growing complaints
regarding eligibility determination inequities, the
Subcommittee conducted an oversight hearing in
Eastern Kentucky, a major coal-producing area,
and received testimony from more than 100 miners
and widows who generally alleged wrongful denials
of the benefit claims. Virtually all who appeared
testified with regard to claims involving coal min
ing work exposures well in excess of 30 years. It was
immediately apparent to the Subcommittee that the
greatest number of the miner witnesses were severe
ly and dramatically handicapped by respiratory dif
ficulties. And it was equally apparent that the
widows were testifying about the disabilities of
husbands arising out of work experiences identical
to those of the miners who appeared before the
Subcommittee. Subsequent investigation revealed
that the Eastern Kentucky universe was not unique
in that respect; indeed, that many seemingly
allowable claims involving miners with extended
coal mining work experiences were curiously being
denied. The justifications given in individual cases
more often turned on disputed or unavailable
medical evidence; and proved ultimately un
satisfactory to the Subcommittee, and thereafter to
the full Committee as well. 15
Having explained the source of their discontent, the Com
mittee explained their proposed remedy:
In recognition of the historically demonstrated and
exceedingly high probability of total disability
(80.89 %), and out of concern for an equally prob
able risk of error in the remaining cases, an objec-
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tive test was established to simply provide part B
benefits payments to all claimants whose claims
had been denied and who could demonstrate 30 or
more years of underground coal mining experience.
This assertedly rational and reasonable approach
was elected over discretely restructuring the
eligibility determination process in order to reach
such legitimate and compelling cases: a restructur
ing, incidentally, which would have produced a
complex, unmanageable, and enormously costly
approach to ascertaining benefit entitlements. 16
In short, the committee was expressing its anger with the
executive branch's handling of black lung claims. (The 80.89
percent was the approval rate under Part B as of 1975.)
Evidence that deserving miners and survivors were not being
compensated was based on personal observation during the
course of hearings held in Congressman Perkins' district. By
limiting the presumption, at that point at least, to Part B
claims, the higher program costs would have fallen on the
U.S. Treasury, and not on the mine operators. Clearly, even
411(c) (4) had not gone far enough to suit the supporters of
enlarged entitlements during this period.
Considerable resistance was encountered to adding any
presumptions that would have conferred entitlement solely
on the basis of years worked in coal mining. To have done
this would have stripped away any semblance of a disabilitybased compensation program. The 1975 legislation (HR
10760) cleared the House by only 27 votes and no accom
modation with the Senate could be worked out. Sensitive to
this, Congressman Dent spoke on both sides of the issue in
his testimony on the 1977 amendments:
Now I am hoping that we will not get into the ques
tion of carelessly saying only because of the
number of years that this person worked in a mine,
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that person is totally disabled.We cannot simply
write that as a principle of law. When we establish
ed the 30 years, we did it on the basis of very
thorough research. 17
The presumption that was added in the 1977 amendments
was 411(c) (5). It dealt only with miners who had worked 25
or more years prior to June 30, 1971 (the date that stricter
coal mine dust standards went into effect), and who died on
or before March 1, 1978, the effective date of the new law.
For such miners, the survivor claimant would receive
benefits unless it could be proven that at the time of death
the miner was not partially or totally disabled due to
pneumoconiosis. It is notable that this is the only instance in
the law's history where partial disability is compensable—though the level of benefits is no different from that
awarded if death was due to pneumoconiosis.
The rationale for this presumption can be found in the
Legislative History:
Widows have perhaps been more adversely and
wrongfully affected by black lung claim denials
than living miners, for in all too many instances the
probative value of the widow's evidence submitted
in support of a claim is not good. It is not her fault.
Medical records may have been lost or destroyed.
The miner may have been lost forever in an
underground mine explosion. He may have died so
long ago that clinical knowledge of the day did not
include pneumoconiosis—the cause of death was
simplistically attributed to "heart failure." For
these and other reasons the committee believes that
concerns for the welfare of these widows, whose
husbands gave their physical strength, their bodies
and their lives to this most difficult occupation,
should override any professed need to demonstrate
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a clinically precise association between years work
ed and totally disabling lung disease. 18
Since partial disability became an issue under 411(c) (5),
defining it became necessary. This was done in the Labor
Department's regulations. Partial disability was said to exist
where the miner had a reduced ability to engage in his usual
coal mine work or comparable and gainful work. 19
In order to make use of this presumption, the survivor
needed only to show that the miner was employed for 25
years or more in coal mining—underground or other
wise—prior to June 30, 1971, and that the miner died on or
before March 1, 1978. The claimant was obliged to make
available any existing medical evidence, but did not need to
show that the miner was partially or totally disabled at the
time of death. Instead, it was the other party's burden to
prove that partial or total disability did not exist. Actually,
there are three possible rebuttals to the presumption:
1. The miner did not have pneumoconiosis.
2. The miner was not partially or totally disabled due to
pneumoconiosis.
3. The miner's partial or total disability was not caused
by pneumoconiosis.
The regulations spelled out four types of evidence that,
alone, would be insufficient to rebut the presumptions: 20
1. Evidence that the deceased was employed in the mines
at the time of his death.
2. Evidence pertaining to the deceased's level of earnings.
3. An X-ray that is negative.
4. A death certificate that contains no reference to
pneumoconiosis.
However, the Benefits Review Board decided that two or
more of these may be sufficient to rebut the 25-year
presumption. 21
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The sixth presumption created under the law is essentially
different from the ones noted above. Its focus is primarily on
coverage under the act. It bears directly on 411(c) (1-5),
however, as it may be used to determine whether or not these
presumptions are applicable. The 1977 amendments con
sidered a person who worked in coal mine construction or
transportation as a miner "to the extent such individual was
exposed to coal dust as a result of such employment." 22 It
also differs from each of the presumptions described above
since only this one was promulgated by regulation. The
Secretary of Labor created a rebuttable presumption that
"such individual was exposed to coal mine dust during all
periods of such employment occurring in or around a coal
mine or coal preparation facility. . . ," 23
The presumption can be rebutted in two ways, according
to the regulations. The employer or government must prove
either that the miner was not regularly exposed to coal dust
during the employment, or that the individual was not
employed in or around a coal mine or preparation facility.
The final set of presumptions examined here is the socalled interim presumptions. The evolution of these stan
dards for evaluating claims has already been described in this
study. It is sufficient to observe here that they were
developed by SSA in response to the 1972 amendments and
the intense pressure from certain congressmen and senators
to raise the approval rate under Part B claims. This result
was accomplished through the implementation of the interim
presumptions. The Labor Department sought to use these
presumptions as well in administering Part C claims, but was
prevented from doing so by the legality that prevented the
Secretary of Labor from establishing the medical standards
for purposes of determining the outcome of claims.
As an ultimate irony, by 1977 the Labor Department had
become convinced that the interim presumptions that SSA
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continued to use were not medically sound, erring on the side
of awarding benefits when that was unwarranted. However,
the congressional mood in 1977 was to have the program fur
ther liberalized and, in particular, to raise the claims ap
proval rate in the Labor Department. The House version of
the bill would have imposed the application of the interim
presumptions to all claims, forthcoming and previously filed
but denied or pending that were to be reviewed again under
the new criteria. The Senate version of the bill allowed the
Secretary of Labor to draw up his own medical standards.
The compromise that emerged from the Conference Com
mittee imposed the application of criteria that were not more
restrictive than the interim presumptions on the Labor
Department for all reviewed claims (see Section 401 (f) (2)),
until that time that the Department promulgated a new set of
standards. Claims filed until that time would be evaluated
under the interim presumptions.
In August of 1978, the Labor Department published
regulations implementing the criteria imposed on it by the
1977 law. 24 Basically, the presumptions are invoked where
the miner had 10 or more years of coal mine employment
and any one of five types of evidence are established:
1. A chest X-ray, biopsy or autopsy establishes the ex
istence of pneumoconiosis.
2. Ventilatory studies establish the presence of a chronic
respiratory or pulmonary disease.
3. Blood gas studies demonstrate impairment in the
transfer of oxygen from the lung alveoli to the blood.
4. "Other medical evidence*' establishes the presence of a
totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment.
This can include the documented opinion of a physi
cian using reasoned medical judgment.
5. Where the miner is deceased and where no other
medical evidence is available, the affidavit of the sur-
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vivor or other persons with knowledge of the condition
can demonstrate the presence of a totally disabling
pulmonary or respiratory impairment.
Where any of these five conditions is found alongside 10
or more years of coal mine employment, the miner "will be
presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or to
have been totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis at the time
of death, or death will be presumed to be due to
pneumoconiosis, arising out of that employment. . . .""
This served to presume three critical elements for claimants:
total disability, the presence of pneumoconiosis, and the
disease having arisen out of coal mining employment. One of
the keys to the presumptions was the ventilatory standards,
which were set so high that many claimants would now be
considered impaired and thereby able to invoke the presump
tions. The use of "other medical evidence" and the widow's
affidavit were also extremely important in aiding claimants.
There were four ways to rebut the interim presumptions:
1. Where the evidence establishes that the miner is doing
his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful
work.
2. Where, in the light of all evidence, it is established that
the individual is able to do his usual coal mine work or
comparable and gainful work.
3. Where the evidence establishes that the total disability
or death of the miner did not arise in whole or in part
out of coal mine employment.
4. Where the evidence establishes that the miner does not
or did not have pneumoconiosis.
Solomons discusses the controversy that developed within
the Congress over the application of the interim presump
tions by the Labor Department. He suggests that SSA had
treated the presumptions de facto as irrebuttable, and that
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some, such as Senator Javits, insisted that this not be done
by the Labor Department. Moreover, there was the related
issue of whether the entire medical record should be con
sidered by the administrative law judge in permitting the
presumption to be invoked. The Department's position can
be seen in Secretary Marshall's letter to President Carter,
recommending that he sign the 1977 amendments:
We are opposed to provisions making the use of the
"interim standards" mandatory for the determina
tion of total disability under Part C. . . . While we
still believe the "interim standards" are inap
propriate, the limitation of their use to reviewed
and pending claims in conjunction with the require
ment that all other relevant evidence be considered
reduces our concerns substantially. 26
The regulations that the Department issued subsequently
were consistent with Marshall's concerns: "In adjudicating a
claim under this subpart, all relevant medical evidence shall
be considered." 27 The implication of this is that the interim
presumptions were administered in a manner somewhat
more restrictive than that of SSA. Nevertheless, the interim
presumptions under either Parts B or C made many
claimants' positions far simpler to sustain than had the pre
existing presumptions.
The publication of the Secretary of Labor's regulations on
February 29, 1980 (effective date 3-31-80) meant that the in
terim presumptions could not be invoked in claims filed
thereafter. In the 1981 amendments, the three other most
controversial presumptions were dropped from the law:
411(c) (2) (10 years coal mine employment—death from
respiratory-pulmonary cause presumed black lung);
411(c)(4) (15 years coal mine employment—presumptive
pneumoconiosis if evidence of totally disabling respiratorypulmonary disease); and 411(c) (5) (25 years coal mine
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employment—survivors presumption unless proven that par
tial or totally disabling pneumoconiosis not present).28
The presumptions under black lung are significant for
several reasons. They provide a precise record of the extent
to which Congress, SSA and the Labor Department sought
to aid claimants. Second, the presumptions appear to have
been the most pronounced feature of this federal program,
at least among people involved with state workers' compen
sation systems. No other elements of the law seem to have
deviated as much from existing practices under established
state systems. Treated collectively, the presumptions under
black lung have been widely viewed as the epitome of
political manipulation of the pork barrel process, under the
guise of operating a workers' compensation scheme.

Evidence
With hundreds of thousands of claims for benefits under
the black lung program, SSA and the Department of Labor
were forced to wrestle with numerous issues regarding the
type and quality of evidence they would accept. It was one
thing to set certain standards for determining whether a
miner was disabled due to pneumoconiosis, but quite
another to have the evidence to allow the determination to be
made. If it was not clear in 1969, it became totally apparent
by 1972, and certainly by 1977, that Congress did not wish to
place major burdens of proof on the claimants. Consequent
ly, the evidence required of claimants would be of a less
demanding character than one could expect to find under
typical state workers' compensation programs or in the SSDI
program.
To highlight some of these issues, it is useful to separate
claims that came from living miners from those of survivors.
In the case of living miners, SSA basically followed the
system that was familiar to it. Many claimants had had

Presumptions & Evidence 129

previous dealings with SSA, having applied for disability,
retirement, or survivor benefits, and the agency had access to
and used these data sources. SSA also sought and received
access to state workers' compensation claims files, and it
also used data from the Welfare and Retirement Fund of the
United Mine Workers of America. 29 These steps permitted
"a large number" of claims to be allowed with no need to
obtain new evidence from applicants. Where miners did need
to obtain medical examinations or reports, SSA either reim
bursed applicants or paid the providers directly. Where the
existing records were inadequate for SSA to make an assess
ment, the state agencies used for SSDI purposes were used
also for black lung. These agencies arranged to have
claimants examined by physicians and qualified facilities
close to the claimants' residence. Unlike the situation in
SSDI, this presented unusual problems for the agency
because the claimants were so concentrated in a few areas,
generally far removed from urban locations with their
greater number of health care specialists and facilities. For
example, over two-thirds of all pulmonary function tests
scheduled for SSA applicants in the first 15 months of the
program were in three states: Pennsylvania, West Virginia,
and Kentucky. 30 The use of local providers was continued by
the Labor Department when it took over the administration
of the program.
In developing evidence to determine whether living
claimants were totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, a
substantial set of obstacles was encountered. Some of the
testing of pulmonary function involves physical exertion by
the claimant. For some of these people, they and/or their
physicians believed that such effort could not be safely
undertaken due to the claimant's condition. Other tests
depended on the individual's complete cooperation. Half
hearted effort could lead to test results similar to those found
where there was severely impaired lung function.
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Blood gas testing has remained a problem over much of
the life of the program. Facilities that could accurately assess
the ability of the individual to move oxygen from the lungs
to the blood were scarce or unavailable in many of the mine
regions. The inability to administer this test to many ap
plicants was given as one reason why ventilatory function
test standards should be set at liberal levels, i.e., allowing
larger numbers of applicants to be compensated.
The most critical issue of evidence dealt with the X-rays
used to determine the presence of pneumoconiosis. It was
noted earlier that substantial problems arose due both to the
poor quality of many of the X-rays used and to the inter
pretation of the X-rays. The "B" reader program developed
by Johns Hopkins University and NIOSH was designed to
overcome these difficulties. Routinely, X-rays that had been
interpreted by physicians in the field were sent to "B"
readers for a rereading. These "B" readers found very large
numbers of errors, based on misreadings by field readers or
readings of such poor quality films that no interpretation
was possible. (See table 3.1.)
While this sort of scrutiny could be considered laudable
under most circumstances where it did not substantially
delay the process, it created special difficulties in the black
lung program. The overwhelming type of error found by the
"B" readers was one where the field readers incorrectly
reported the presence of pneumoconiosis. Though Congress
had reduced the significance of the negative X-ray in the
1972 amendments, positive X-ray evidence of the presence of
pneumoconiosis was extremely helpful to claimants,
especially after 1972. Program supporters were angered to
learn that the "B" readers were undermining claimants who
might have been told by a local physician that their X-rays
demonstrated the presence of pneumoconiosis. Presumably,
some miners had had their expectations raised that they
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would be entitled to benefits, only to have them cruelly dash
ed by some distant unknown "B" reader.
The Senate and House chose to take somewhat different
routes in dealing with the rereading problem. At the time of
the 1977 amendments, the House bill required the Secretary
of Labor to accept the opinion of the claimant's physician
regarding the miner's X-ray, unless the Secretary had good
cause to believe that the X-ray was of unreadable quality or
was being fraudulently represented. It is noteworthy that this
could have caused some claimants to be denied compensa
tion in those rather rare instances where the "B" reader,
unlike the initial reader, found pneumoconiosis present. It
also seems striking that the House version did not impose
any type of quality control on the claimant's physician, that
is, the local doctor could have been a dermatologist by
specialty or without any special training in any field of
medicine, much less in radiology or chest diseases.
The Senate version provided that where a miner had work
ed 25 years or more in the mines, and where other evidence
existed of pulmonary or respiratory impairment, the
Secretary of Labor was required to accept the interpreta
tion of the X-ray given by a board-certified or board-eligible
radiologist, if the X-ray was of adequate quality and was
taken by a qualified individual, and if there was no reason to
believe that the claim was fraudulently misrepresented. The
Senate version of this provision was adopted. However, the
House conferees were able to drop the Senate's requirement
that eliminated the rereading only in cases where miners had
worked 25 years or more. (Section413(b).)
This amendment essentially eliminated the role played by
the "B" readers where there was "other evidence" that a
miner had a pulmonary or respiratory impairment. The con
ferees actually went beyond that by inserting in their report:
"In the case of X-rays read by a board-certified or board-
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eligible radiologist, it is the intention of the conferees that
the Secretary shall accept, for whatever evidentiary value
X-rays generally may have, the evaluation of such X-rays
read by a board-certified or board-eligible radiologist
without submitting them to a further rereading." 31 The new
administration supported the principle of rereading X-rays,
but the Congress simply rode roughshod over the position
taken by Donald Elisburg, the Assistant Secretary for
Employment Standards in the Labor Department. 32
Though substantially reduced, the role of the "B" reader
was not fully eliminated by the 1977 amendments. Before an
X-ray report was used as evidence in a claim, a "B" reader
had to determine that it met evidentiary standards. The
claims examiner in the Labor Department had to accept the
"B'* reader's findings as to the acceptable quality of the
film. If the film was of acceptable quality, taken by a
registered radiographic technician (as of March 31,1980 and
later, but waived for X-rays taken before that date), and
read by a board certified or board-eligible radiologist, the in
terpretation had to be accepted as valid X-ray evidence.
When the "B" reader evaluated film quality, he was permit
ted to read the X-ray, but if there was a conflict in interpreta
tion, the one most favorable to the claimant was to be used. 33
Where there were multiple X-ray reports and some were in
conflict, doubt was resolved in favor of the claimants. A
responsible coal mine operator was free to challenge the
X-ray finding and to ask for additional X-ray examination.
As a matter of practice, the administrative law judge plac
ed greater weight on the X-ray most recently taken. In claims
involving the Trust Fund, there was no challenge to X-ray
evidence presented by claimants where the film was judged
to be of acceptable quality by the "B" reader. Section 413(b)
was changed in the 1981 amendments so that the prohibition
on rereading of X-ray films was removed, except for claims
filed before the effective date of the law, January 1, 1982.
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When the Labor Department determines that medical
evidence is needed to determine the compensability of a
claim, the miner is sent a letter with the name of a local doc
tor who is to examine him. The claimant can use this doctor
if he wishes, but has the right to request that his own physi
cian be used. The Labor Department is not required to per
mit the latter doctor to conduct the physical or X-ray ex
amination, but it generally has allowed this. Individual
physicians in the mining areas soon developed reputations as
being sympathetic to or tough on claimants. With some
choice in the matter and with the predilection of some physi
cians well known, the quality of physician reporting has been
suspect throughout the life of the program.
Where doctors are thought to be biased, the Labor
Department's procedures allow it to order an independent
examination. In practice, such independent review has not
been utilized by the Department.
The role of the examining physician is extremely impor
tant in determining the outcome of the claim: "The reasoned
opinion of a physician exercising sound medical judgement
carries great weight as medical evidence in a claim. A
doctor's reasoned opinion can establish the presence of
pneumoconiosis (CWP), total disability due to
pneumoconiosis (based on medical criteria), and causal rela
tionships of pneumoconiosis to CME (coal mine employ
ment)." 34 The Labor Department's manual spells out what
the physician must do to establish the presence of disease
where the X-ray evidence is negative. The physician need on
ly state that he is aware that the X-ray is negative, describe
the symptoms and the test results, demonstrate a knowledge
of the worker's employment and medical history, and rule
out other causes for the miner's condition.This suggests that
physicians sympathetic to the position of the claimant can
play very instrumental roles in helping the applicant. Where
there is a responsible coal mine operator to challenge this
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position with conflicting medical testimony, the claimant
may have some difficulty in winning compensation. Where
the responsible operator does not vigorously challenge a
claim, or where no challenge exists, as in Trust Fund cases
after 1977, the claimant*s doctor's evidence is likely to go un
challenged.
Early in 1982, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
issued a report that evaluated the Labor Department's deci
sions based upon a sample of 450 claims. 33 The GAO found
that 205 claims (45 percent) had been approved. It argued
that only 33 claims had provided adequate medical evidence
to allow a positive determination of disability or death due to
pneumoconiosis. Virtually all the claims had been submitted
prior to the permanent standards being imposed by the
Labor Department in 1980. Only 7 of the 172 claims that the
Labor Department accepted based upon evidence described
as inadequate by the GAO were successful because of the
opinion of physicians. GAO does not provide data on the
number of other successful claims where evidence was found
to be inadequate and where a physician's opinion existed
alongside some other medical evidence. In its report on
SSA's re-review of denied claims after 1977, GAO reported
no instances where physician opinion by itself was sufficient
to permit benefits to be awarded. 36
A number of other sticky issues arose in claims from sur
vivors. A recurring problem that appeared very early in the
life of the program was one of survivors being unable to ob
tain evidence useful to their claims. The problem was
especially severe in older cases, since, prior to 1969, few doc
tors in the United States appeared to diagnose or report the
presence of CWP or to attribute death to it. The 10-year
presumption (section 411(c) (2)) was partially helpful to sur
vivors, but some survivors apparently found it difficult to
establish their claims. As of December 31, 1971, SSA had
allowed 71,400 "widows" claims and denied 38,000 others. 37
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To ease the burden of proof for survivors, the 1972
amendments added: "In determining the validity of claims
under this part, all relevant evidence shall be considered, in
cluding, where relevant... his wife's affidavits, and in the
case of a deceased miner, other appropriate affidavits of per
sons with knowledge of the miner's physical condition, and
other supportive material." (Section 413(b).)
The intent of this section apparently escaped both SSA
and the Labor Department, who rejected claims routinely if
there was no other support for them except such affidavits.
In the 1977 amendments, Congress clarified what it wanted,
which was to strengthen the hand of claimants. The House
version provided flatly that where no relevant medical
evidence existed in the case of a deceased miner, affidavits
were to be considered sufficient to establish eligibility. The
Senate version was somewhat less munificent and the Con
ference Committee settled on: "Where there is no medical or
other relevant evidence in the case of a deceased miner, such
affidavits shall be considered to be sufficient to establish that
the miner was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or that
his death or her death was due to pneumoconiosis." 38 By ad
ding "or other" to the House version, the Conference Com
mittee provided some opportunity to challenge a claim that
was based solely on affidavits where no medical evidence was
available. The extent to which challenges arose depended on
whether or not a responsible coal mine operator was iden
tified. The Trust Fund was far less likely to challenge sur
vivor claimants than were the mine operators.
The GAO found that affidavits were particularly impor
tant in SSA's re-review of previously denied claims after the
1977 amendments. 39 In its sample of 131 survivor awards, 78
claims had disability established solely by affidavits. In 43 of
these 78 awarded claims, the length of coal mine employ
ment was also established by affidavits. According to GAO,
in 68 of the 78 cases, the person signing the statement about
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the miner's impairment was the party filing the claim and
seeking the benefits. In its study of Labor Department
claims, however, GAO reported that only 7 claims were
awarded benefits based solely on affidavits. The study does
not provide information on the instances where affidavits
were supported by other evidence, such as a personal physi
cian's letter, that itself might be regarded as soft or ques
tionable evidence.
The 1981 amendments tightened up this provision of the
law. Beginning January 1, 1982, affidavits from parties with
a financial interest in a claim (survivors) are not sufficient to
establish that the miner was either totally disabled or died
due to pneumoconiosis. The impact of this change was prob
ably quite small, however, since most of the claims involving
death had been filed by the effective date of the 1981 amend
ments. Moreover, in cases involving more recent deaths,
medical evidence was more likely to exist. Additionally, even
if a widow's affidavit was no longer determining, friends or
fellow workers of the miner or of the survivor who would be
willing to supply a supportive affidavit would not be difficult
to find.
The 1977 amendments also strengthened the position of
survivors in another respect. Section 413(b), emerging from
the House bill, required the agencies to accept autopsy
reports concerning both the presence of pneumoconiosis and
the stage of its advancement, unless there was good cause to
believe that it was inaccurate or fraudulently misrepresented.
In fact, this was not the way the law has been administered,
nor did Congress mean what the amendment said. If taken
literally, a negative report by a pathologist would leave the
agencies no choice but to deny a claim. In fact, where an
autopsy report did not find that pneumoconiosis was present
at the time of death, the claim could still have been approved
if other supportive evidence was forthcoming. By contrast,
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where pneumoconiosis was said to have been present, the
agency was obliged to accept the finding, unless fraud or
misrepresentation were evident.
Dr. W. Keith Morgan, a critic of the black lung program,
has testified: "It has been my experience, moreover, that cer
tain pathologists indeed regularly record the presence of
complicated coal workers' pneumoconiosis when other
pathologists with wider and broader experience have been
unable to be certain that the histological specimens come
from a coal miner." 40 At a minimum, Morgan's charge in
dicates something about the lack of certainty inherent in
autopsy evidence. Beyond that, it suggests strongly that the
integrity of some pathologists is open to serious question.
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Coverage and Administration
Coverage
The black lung legislation sought to provide protection to
disabled miners or their survivors. Supporters of the law
consistently argued that they had left the primary respon
sibility for compensation of victims of occupational illnesses
or injuries to state workers' compensation agencies except
for one disease, and the single occupational group—miners.
Yet, consistent with the other changes that led to expanding
the scope of the law from 1969 to 1981, the meaning of the
term "miner" took on broader meaning from 1969 forward.
Coverage under the 1969 act was limited explicitly to
underground coal miners or their survivors. In large
measure, this reflected the view that coal workers'
pneumoconiosis was a disease caused by exposure to dust
within the mines. In the deliberations prior to the passage of
HR 9212 in 1972, Representative Michel (R-Illinois) in
troduced an amendment to strike the reference in the 1969
law to "underground." Michel argued in the floor debate in
the House on November 10, 1971
. . . the fact of the matter is that we have no idea
whether or not those who work only in surface
mines can contract the disabling disease. While the
very limited prevalence studies conducted by the
Public Health Service have shown little incidence of
pneumoconiosis among surface miners generally,
141
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and no evidence of it among those miners who had
worked exclusively above ground, no one has ven
tured to contend that strip miners are not subject to
the disease. On the contrary, it would seem
reasonable to assume that those strip miners who
have worked in extremely dusty situations—at the
tipple, for example—for long periods of time,
might be subjected to conditions similar to those
which result in the development of black lung
among underground miners. 1
Speaking in favor of the Michel amendment, Represen
tative Railsback, another Illinois Republican, explained: "1
know that (Michel) has many strip miners in the district
which he represents. There are also many in the 19th Con
gressional District, which I represent and which happens to
be contiguous to that of (Michel). Such strip miners deserve
to be protected. " 2
John Erlenborn also spoke in favor of the amendment.
His support of it symbolizes the basic dilemma in evaluating
its justification. On one side, it is difficult to argue that vic
tims of black lung ought not be compensated simply because
their exposure to coal did not arise in underground coal
mines. Yet support of the amendment on these grounds
quickly leads one to support compensating black lung vic
tims who were employed anywhere that coal dust is found,
or for that matter, any person suffering from disabling, oc
cupational diseases generally. The other side of the argu
ment, however, is that black lung disease was rarely, if ever,
a consequence of dust exposure outside the underground
mines. To the extent that a variety of claimant-supportive
rules and presumptions enabled persons to receive compen
sation where benefits could easily have been denied other
wise, this extension of coverage enlarged the pool of poten
tial applicants far beyond the pool of those who actually had
been damaged by the disease.
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In 1977, Fairman et al. published a paper describing the
incidence of pneumoconiosis in 1,438 surface coal miners in
8 surface mines based on U.S. Public Health Service surveys
in 1972-1973. 3 Of these, 59 persons (4 percent) showed roentgenographic evidence of some degree of pneumoconiosis,
and only 7 (.005 percent) had films classified as category 2 or
higher. Five of the 7 showed large opacities consistent with
complicated pneumoconiosis. Of the 7, 5 had considerable
work experience in underground mines, 1 worker had
pulmonary tuberculosis, and one with no underground ex
perience had worked previously in a coal preparation plant.
The incidence of bronchitis was relatively high, but signifi
cant airway obstruction was uncommon (below 7 percent) in
the nonsmoking miners. In summary, complicated
pneumoconiosis was extremely rare in surface miners and
virtually nonexistent if one credits the few cases found to the
miners* previous work in underground mining or (in one
case) in a coal preparation plant. Simple pneumoconiosis
was also found to be quite uncommon, especially category 2
or 3. Moreover, the previous work histories of those with
simple pneumoconiosis were not described.
That coal workers' pneumoconiosis is rare among those
with only surface mining exposures is not surprising. Dust
levels in surface mining operations are less than one-half of
those found in underground mines. 4
The distinction between surface and underground mining
also appeared in the presumptions. One of the presumptions
established by the 1972 amendments, and described in detail
in chapter 4, was the 15-year rule, i.e., where the miner has
or had disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, but
where the X-ray evidence is negative, there is a rebuttable
presumption of pneumoconiosis where the miner was
employed 15 years or more in underground mining.
However, the 15-year presumption could be employed by
claimant surface miners or their survivors, if the miner's
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employment was "substantially similar" to conditions in an
underground mine, i.e., some exposure existed to coal dust
(see sec. 411(c) (4)). Clearly, Congress chose to maintain a
line separating the underground miners from those employed
in surface mining. The line was obviously very thin,
however.
From 1972 until the passage of the 1977 amendments, con
siderable controversy swirled around the parties who ad
ministered the law regarding the extent of coverage under the
act. Section 402(d) defined a miner as any individual who is
or was employed in a coal mine. The regulations added that a
miner performed functions in extracting coal or preparing
the coal so extracted.' This led to a two-pronged test of
eligibility that examined the issues of situs and of function.
The situs matter itself involved two separate questions: Was
there a common law employer/employee relationship and
was the employment in a coal mine? Where no
employer/employee relationship was found, coverage did
not exist. Since self-employed miners or independent con
tractors were deemed not to be employees, they were not
covered by the law during this period. Where a claimant leas
ed a mine from the government, compensation was denied,
in part, because he was not an employee. 6 The other question
involving situs depended on the miner having worked in a
coal mine. The regulations treated the term coal mine in a
manner that was identical to the definition found in the
original law.
The second test was based on regulations requiring that a
miner be someone who performed a function in extracting or
preparing coal. Was the employee's activity an integral part
of the coal extraction or coal preparation process? The
following are examples of functions that the Benefits Review
Board has found met this test. Where an employee:
—worked in a mine operator's foundry molding replace
ment parts for mining machinery;
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—was a mechanic repairing and maintaining strip mining
equipment;
—supervised a prospecting team;
—was a draftsman;
—was a weightmaster in an office and was required to
make occasional visits to the tipple;
—was a federal mine inspector;
—operated a grader maintaining haulage roads at a strip
mine.
Claims that were denied by the Benefit Review Board prior
to the 1977 amendments, because the work was judged not to
be integral to coal extraction or coal preparation, involved
work as:
—a training specialist preparing audio-visual material and
giving lectures on mine safety;
—a negotiator for mineral rights and as a title searcher;
—a truck driver hauling coal from the tipple to private
customers;
—a grocery clerk in a mine store located on the town's
main street, one mile from the mine. (The Department
of Labor had supported compensation in this case.)
The 1977 amendments to the law extended the scope of
coverage considerably beyond the 1972 amendments. First,
in defining the word "miner" (sec. 402(d)), "any individual
who is or was employed in a coal mine" the term
"employed" was replaced by "works or has worked."
Through this seemingly minor change, coverage was extend
ed beyond employees, to include the self-employed and in
dependent contractors.
In the 1977 amendments, "in a coal mine" was replaced
by "in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility in
the extraction or preparation of coal." The addition of coal
preparation facility simply codified what had been included
by the Department of Labor in its regulations and practices.
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The "in or around" language, however, represented a
significant extension of coverage under the law. Further, the
definition was expanded so as to provide coverage to
workers involved with coal mine construction or transporta
tion in or around a mine. Clearly, Congress sought to extend
protection under the law on a much broader scale to cover
anyone exposed to coal dust in or near the mines.
As a consequence of the 1977 amendments, five types of
work became covered under the law; extraction, prepara
tion, mine maintenance, construction and transportation.
Persons performing such work and those who provide
necessary support functions and performing work which
bears a reasonable and necessary relationship to the overall
process are covered. As a measure of the sweep of coverage,
the regulations add: "An individual employed by a coal mine
operator, regardless of the nature of such individual's
employment, shall be considered a miner unless such in
dividual was not employed in or around a coal mine or coal
preparation facility:." 7
The Department of Labor deals with the "in or around"
provision by adding:
... in or around a coal mine or coal preparation
facility includes, in addition to mines and coal
preparation plants, the mine or plant offices,
storehouses, repair facilities located on, or adjacent
to or in the vicinity of the mine property, access
roads, refuse banks or dumps resulting from the ex
traction and/or processing of coal at the site on or
near the mine property, adjacent railroad or dock
ing facilities providing access to the mine or
preparation plant, and may extend to structures
and facilities located at some distance from the ac
tual place of extraction or preparation provided
such structures or facilities are used in the extrac-
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tion or preparation of coal or are intended to be us
ed in or result from such processes. 8
The coverage since 1977 of transportation and construc
tion workers has led the Department of Labor to insert its
own presumption into the regulations it issued. Before then,
presumptions had emerged directly in the legislation, but in
the August 1978 regulations to implement the 1977 amend
ments, the Secretary of Labor added one other presumption.
A rebuttable presumption was created that coal mine con
struction or transportation workers were exposed to coal
mine dust during all periods of employment in or around a
coal mine or a preparation facility. The burden of proving
exposure to coal mine dust thereby shifted from the worker.
The responsible coal mine operator or the Trust Fund can
rebut this only by showing either that the worker was not
regularly employed in or around a mine or preparation facili
ty or was not regularly exposed to coal mine dust in the
course of such employment.
In summary, a law designed to provide benefits for coal
miners and their families began with coverage limited to
underground miners. By legislation and regulation, the con
cept of what a miner is has been extended well beyond
workers in underground mines. That coverage would be ex
tended beyond the form that it took in 1969 is hardly surpris
ing, in retrospect. Carl Perkins made it perfectly evident in
the floor debate in 1969 that he would eventually extend it.
In late October 1969, speaking of the black lung provisions,
he said:
My only reservations about the provisions in the
bill go to what is now obvious from the debate and
that is—we have not provided broad enough
coverage for those miners who have serious
respiratory diseases—nor are the benefits adequate
for the miner and his dependents. I fully intend that
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the Education and Labor Committee will continue
to study this problem and the administration of
these provisions to assure that they are effective in
meeting the needs. 9
It is clear that Perkins meant these remarks seriously and
that coverage, in several senses of the term as he used it,
would be widened eventually. The line has been drawn,
however, at that point where the finished coal product, that
is, after extraction and preparation, has been shipped to the
ultimate customer. Thus, a maintainer of a railroad line run
ning out from a mine was compensated on the grounds that
his work was an ancillary activity necessary to the extraction
or preparation of coal. 10 Benefits were denied, however,
where a claimant was exposed to coal dust while employed
for a coke producer. 11 Another claimant was awarded
benefits by an administrative law judge in the Labor Depart
ment in 1977, based on his exposure while crushing coal for a
cement manufacturer. On appeal, the claim was denied. 12

Claims Administration
Social Security Administration
The passage of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act forc
ed SSA to develop and place into operation with virtually no
lead time procedures to administer an entirely new entitle
ment program. While the Labor Department had over 3.5
years before it was to receive its first claim, SSA had almost
no opportunity to plan how it would operate such a scheme.
The advantages that SSA had, however, were that it did have
its massive field system in place, and that for a number of
years it had administered a disability program, Social Securi
ty Disability Insurance. An enormous problem for the agen
cy, however, was the inability to guess how much claims ac
tivity might develop under the law and what the pace of the
flow of claims would be.
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The initial burst of claims was not short of amazing. In the
first two weeks of the program, 45,000 claims were filed.
During the first seven months of 1970, 190,000 claims were
received from miners or their survivors by SSA. As a conse
quence of the 1972 amendments that extended the time under
the Part B program and delayed the time of the Labor
Department's Part C program responsibilities, SSA con
tinued to be the recipient of new claims until July 1, 1973.
Even after this date, SSA handled new claims in two cir
cumstances. If a miner died prior to January 1, 1974, SSA
would process any claim filed within six months of the date
of death. Second, SSA handled claims filed by survivors of
those who had successfully filed as living miners under Part
B, where the survivors filed within six months of the date of
death.
Claims filed with SSA could be made at any of the nation
wide offices of SSA. 13 The claims process was broadly
similar to that used in the disability insurance program. The
claim was initially dealt with by a claims or hearing ex
aminer. At this level there was an "initial determination"
which could result in the claim being granted or denied. If
the claimant was dissatisfied with the initial determination,
there would be a "reconsideration" based upon reexamination of the existing administrative record by a different in
dividual from the one making the initial determination. If
the claimant was still not satisfied, the next level was a hear
ing conducted by an administrative law judge. The decision
at that level could be reviewed by an Appeals Council which
had the discretion to grant or deny a review. The next step of
the appeal process, which was rarely employed, was U.S.
federal district court.
The claims process at SSA differs in one very special
respect from the one found in state workers' compensation
systems or in some of the Part C cases. The process used in
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Part B claims is nonadversarial. The employer plays virtually
no role in the case and the claimant need not be prepared to
assert his claim against a party seeking to block the entitle
ment to benefits. As such, the United Mine Workers of
America (UMWA) consistently maintained a preference for
the Part B approach to claims over that of Part C, which
might involve the presence of a responsible mine operator.
The union expressed considerable dissatisfaction with
aspects of SSA's administration of its program, but it viewed
the adversary process in Part C claims with even more
distaste.
Appeals of the initial determination were made by
claimants only, and not by the agency. In correspondence
with Carl Perkins, Secretary Califano wrote in 1977, "I want
to inform you that the Department does not, and has not in
the past, appealed approved black lung claims at the initial
reconsideration level, and do not plan to do so in the future.
However, we will reconsider this course of action if we find
over time that hearing decisions contain an excessive number
of errors.'* 14
Claims processing in SSA eventually was handled speedily.
One estimate in 1974 was that claims were processed from
filing to completion in approximately 10-12 weeks.
Department of Labor
The Labor Department was not involved in handling black
lung claims until mid-1973. A task force set up within the
Department to plan for the assumption of responsibilities for
the program had projected that the average time needed to
process a claim would be 90 days. Later, that estimate would
be revised upwards to 180 days. This proved to be completely
unrealistic as well. In 1976, another departmental task force
reported that a survey of 10,000 claims had found that the
average time in processing a case was 630 days. 15
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There were several reasons why the Labor Department
found it so difficult to respond to claimants in any
reasonable amount of time. Much of the problem was said
by the Labor Department to be caused by improper or inade
quate claims development by the local SSA offices where the
claimants went to file their claims. Much of the time in the
630 days was spent securing the needed medical evidence to
allow an initial determination to be made. The task force
report should have, but did not place any of the responsibili
ty for the problem on the quality of the staff assigned to
operate the program, or on its lack of experience in ad
ministering an entitlements program.
Some of the Labor Department's difficulties can be traced
specifically to the period immediately after the 1972
presidential election. The newly reelected President Nixon
requested that all political appointees make available their
resignations to the White House and promptly shocked the
Labor Department by accepting almost all of them. The in
security of the very few remaining appointees was under
standable and served as a backdrop to other events related
specifically to black lung.
Somewhat earlier, the Labor Department had delivered its
request to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for
new positions to staff the program. OMB personnel ruthless
ly cut the request, primarily due to its displeasure with the
quality of Labor's justification. OMB's goal was not to cut
the request as fully as it had, but to force the Department to
better justify its request. OMB was prepared to restore
much, though not all, of the original request, once Labor
made its case more convincing. OMB and Labor Department
personnel even met to work out this familiar bureaucratic
game. The argument was then prepared by Labor Depart
ment staff. However, the Department's surviving leadership,
with a view toward currying favor with the White House in
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its campaign to rein in federal spending, chose not to for
ward the appeal to OMB. Indeed as the weeks passed OMB
was put into the peculiar position of asking where the
Department's appeal of its decision was. However, DOL did
not make the appeal and the black lung program began with
a skeletal staff.
Aside from these difficulties, the Labor Department
discovered that, beginning in January 1,1974, it had run into
a buzz saw in dealing with employers. Unlike the SSA pro
gram and the Department's transition program that ended
December 31, 1973, here was a situation where employers
had to be identified as responsible operators, if possible, and
liability assessed against them. This proved to be no easy
task.
By December 31, 1976, the Department had approved
3,801 claims where a responsible operator had been iden
tified, yet only 123 of these were being paid. The balance
were being controverted by the employer, a testimonial to
the reluctance of employers to accept the Labor
Department's handling of cases.
The Department's sorry record of administration in terms
of the prompt resolution of claims eventually caused it to
press for a major personnel commitment from Congress and
the Carter White House. The Department's argument was
strengthened by the massive task handed it with the 1977
amendments—primarily, the need to re-review the pending
and denied claims under Part C and some of those under
Part B. When Assistant Secretary Elisburg made a request
for a supplemental appropriation to raise his black lung staff
from 185 to 843 positions, this represented a massive jump
for a single program in one of the smallest cabinet agencies.
(Actually, the Department had had authorization to fill 270
positions, but 85 had been unfilled for budget reasons.) This
would have added about 350 more claims examiners, 75 new
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administrative law judges (over the 22 on staff) and 26 new
attorneys to an existing staff of 9. Congress granted the full
measure of Elisburg's request and in August 1978, President
Carter signed the supplemental appropriation giving the
Department the funding for the 564 new positions.
At the same time, the Department yielded to the miners
and the congressional pressures and established eight district
offices and 33 satellite offices, with the bulk of these and the
jobs they created, in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, West Virginia
and Ohio. Eventually, all claims would be processed in one
of these district offices. This, also, created the need for more
personnel to process claims.
Focusing on the delays and huge backlog of claims in the
Labor Department in 1974-76 is not to expose a poorly
managed public program. Instead, it is to serve as a basis for
understanding the reaction by Congress and the Department
itself to the difficulties involved with the program in the first
years.
The Claims Process. Individuals seeking benefits under
the Part C portion of the law may file a claim at any of the
various Labor Department field stations or district offices or
with a local SSA office. Initially, that claim is placed under
the control of a deputy commissioner (DC). The DC is a
supervisory claims examiner, who is empowered to delegate
most of his responsibilities to a claims examiner. The DC has
the authority to make "initial findings" concerning en
titlements to compensation and medical treatment, to order
medical tests, to determine the identity of the responsible
operator (RO), to determine the fact of disability or death
due to pneumoconiosis, to preside at conferences (see below)
and to execute orders for the payment or denial of benefits.
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The claims examiner (CE) takes the evidence submitted
and develops it where necessary with a view toward
establishing whether five criteria are met:
1. The claimant has filed a valid and timely claim.
2. The claimant must have been a coal miner or a survivor
of one.
3. The claimant must have or have had pneumoconiosis.
4. The claimant must be totally disabled or the miner
have died due to pneumoconiosis.
5. The pneumoconiosis must have arisen out of coal mine
employment.
If all five of these criteria are met, in fact or presumptive
ly, the CE must determine the date from which benefits are
payable, the amount and to whom benefits are payable, and
who is responsible for payment.
Miners submitting claims are eligible to receive complete
pulmonary examinations at no cost. Appointments are
scheduled for consenting miners with physicians located
within 50 miles of the miner's home. While reluctant to de
pend upon the miner's personal physician, the Labor
Department will pay for examinations by such doctors,
depending upon the physician's specialty and location.
The DC or CE is supposed to notify the potential responsi
ble operator who may be liable as soon as the claim is filed.
Where a claim that was denied prior to March 1,1978 was rereviewed under section 435, the operator was notified at the
time an initial finding was made. The operator has 30 days in
which to respond. If the operator accepts identification as
the potentially liable operator, it must develop its evidence
promptly. The operator has the right to have the claimant ex
amined by a physician it chooses, and the miner must
cooperate in the operator's efforts to develop evidence. In
practice, the operator may not have scheduled the physical
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examination until after an initial finding in the claimant's
favor, partly as a way to avoid incurring an unnecessary
medical expense.
If the initial finding is that there is an entitlement and the
responsible operator is identified, the operator has three
possible responses. The operator may (1) send the Labor
Department an agreement to pay, (2) provide a notice of
first payment, or (3) choose to controvert. If the operator
does choose to controvert and begins to develop evidence,
the claimant may also add evidence to the file to support the
claim. When both sides have submitted their evidence, the
DC has three options available. The DC may schedule a con
ference for the parties in order to resolve the issues in
dispute. This is usually done within 60 days of the submis
sion of all evidence. If the DC believes the conference will
not serve a useful purpose, he may simply approve the claim
and issue an "initial determination." Finally, the claim may
be denied by the DC and a proposed "decision and order" is
issued.
The DC presides over the informal conference. No
transcript is prepared and the DC aims to have the parties
reach a voluntary resolution of the issues. If the claimant is
not represented, the DC must advise the miner or survivor of
their rights under law. New evidence usually is not introduc
ed at such conferences.
The "initial determination" is significant inasmuch as the
1977 amendments required that benefits must be paid to the
claimant within 30 days of the initial determination. If the
responsible operator does not agree to make such payment,
the Trust Fund must do so, possibly to be reimbursed at a
later time by the RO, with an interest penalty as well. If the
claim is denied by the DC, reasons for that are given to the
claimant. The miner or survivor has 60 days in which to re
spond to the denial.
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Subsequent to the DC's decision on the claim, either party
may request a formal hearing. A request for such a hearing
cannot be denied. The formal hearing is conducted by an ad
ministrative law judge (ALJ). Each hearing is de novo and
the DC's findings on contested issues are not considered.
The ALJ has the sole authority to determine the issues to be
considered and the evidence to be admitted. Within 20 days
after the hearings end, the ALJ issues a "decision and
order," giving findings and an order. The "decision and
order" becomes final within 30 days of its issuance unless it
is appealed. The appeal may be either a motion to reconsider
or an appeal directly to the Benefits Review Board (BRB).
Unless the ALJ's decision is stayed pending the appeal, the
responsible operator must begin payments—if found
liable—even as the appeal awaits action by the BRB.
Any party in interest dissatisfied with the ALJ's "decision
and order" may appeal to the BRB, which derives its
authority from section 21(b) (3) of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Act. This section authorizes the BRB to
hear and determine appeals on matters that raise a substan
tial question of law or of fact. It reviews the case record as
well as briefs and memoranda submitted by the parties. No
new evidence is introduced and no testimony is heard. The
BRB is able to find facts as well as to consider questions of
constitutionality. 16 A party adversely affected by the BRB
may seek review in the U.S. Circuit Court with jurisdiction
for the area where the miner was last employed. As of
mid-1981, the average time between a filed appeal with BRB
and a decision was about two and one-half years.
In approved claims involving alleged responsible
operators, the controversion rate was estimated to be about
90-95 percent during most years of the Part C program.
Reasons for the high rate of controversion can be found at
several levels. In a Labor Department survey of 10,000
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claims, the four principal reasons why cases were referred to
ALJ's were disputes over:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The
The
The
The

existence of pneumoconiosis.
causal relationship.
issue of total disability.
named employer as the responsible operator. 17

At a different level, reasons for the high controversion
rate by employers were enumerated by John Kilcullen, an at
torney for several large mine operators, in his testimony on
behalf of the National Independent Coal Operator's
Association. 18 First, he argued that the 550 pages of ad
ministrative regulations issued regarding black lung made
controversy a likely outcome. Some of his clients were first
notified of claims made against them in 1973 or 1974 as late
as 1977. Frequently, he argued, the employers' first notice
that there was a claim involving them might have occurred
after an initial determination was made (and payment
begun). This matter was contested and in 1979, the Fifth Cir
cuit Court upheld the procedures whereby the Department
had notified the responsible operator only after the claim
had been developed and an initial determination of entitle
ment had been made. 19 The court found that the Depart
ment's procedure did not violate the operators' due process
rights.
According to Kilcullen, some operators were forced to
controvert as the only way for them to obtain any informa
tion about the claim or the basis for the granting of benefits.
These employers might then wait months or even a year or
more to learn that the matter had been referred to a hearing
officer. But Kilcullen also implied that many employers con
troverted what they regarded as the unjustified granting of
benefits to persons not disabled due to pneumoconiosis.
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Finally, employers could have resisted paying claims so
long as the constitutionality of various portions of the law
was in doubt. To do otherwise might have meant making
payments to miners and survivors that would not have been
recoverable, effectively, at a later time.
The success rate of operators in appealing claims is
unclear. Various estimates exist, generally ranging in the 10
percent range, of the operator appeals upheld by ALJ's. In a
prepared statement by the United Mine Workers at public
hearings in 1981, it was estimated that 10-15 percent of the
cases controverted by RO's were overturned and that claims
controverted through the AL J level resulted in employers be
ing successful about 30 percent of the time. 20 These estimates
were immediately disputed by Mark Solomons, a former
Labor Department attorney who had become a defense at
torney retained by some coal mine operators. According to
him, an appropriate range for reversals obtained by RO's
was about 35-60 percent. "One major coal mine operator
has a reversal rate of 78 percent." 21
One rather direct, if not arbitrary and potentially un
constitutional, manner for dealing with employer controversion appeared in the House version of the 1977 amendments.
It provided, quite directly, that no coal mine operator could
participate in the adjudication of any claim. The provision
was not retained by the Conference Committee.
In contrast to the claims where liability was assigned to an
operator, claims were not appealed by the Trust Fund. In
deed, it is the Secretary of Labor only, and neither the Trust
Fund nor an employer, who can defend a claim that involves
the Trust Fund. In practice, where a claim was granted at
any stage of the claim process, initially or on appeal, there
would be no appeal by the Secretary to seek to deny benefits,
comparable to the practice in SSA under the Part B pro
gram. In the light of the employers' ability to successfully
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controvert initial findings or initial determinations, the
absence of appeals by the Secretary or the Trust Fund was
especially disturbing to some, including John Erlenborn. Yet
the Reagan administration explicitly rejected as unnecessary
giving the Trust Fund the right of participation and appeal,
arguing that the claims approval rate by late 1981 had fallen
to the range of 10-12 percent. 22 Moreover, Secretary Collyer
forecast that the proposed amendments would cut this accep
tance rate in half, further reducing the need for the Trust
Fund to defend itself. The point remains, however, that an
active defense by or of the Trust Fund between 1978 and
1981 would have obtained some reversals of entitlements
likely in the same general range that operators were being
successful in their appeals of claims. Indeed, knowing that
claims involving the Trust Fund would not be appealed,
while those involving responsible operators probably would
be challenged, the Labor Department staff might have been
somewhat more lenient in claims involving the Trust Fund.
Aside from the strong likelihood that some benefits were
awarded where a defense of the Trust Fund would have led
to denials, there were several other costly aspects of the
Department's method of administering claims. For one
thing, the Department found it difficult to identify where
other offsettable payments were being made to beneficiaries.
As such, it was widely understood that overpayments were
being made to miners and survivors who did not notify the
Labor Department of their circumstances. On this point,
John Erlenborn testified: "I asked the General Accounting
Office some years ago to examine how many workers may be
drawing state as well as federal black lung benefits. The
answer was that nobody had ever looked, neither social
security nor the Department of Labor, and they were not cer
tain that they had a method to find out who was drawing il
legally these double benefits." 23
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Additionally, a very large problem revolved about the
payments to claimants where an operator's appeal led to a
subsequent denial of the claim. Since many of these claims
might have involved benefits to be paid as of a much earlier
date, a large payment would have been made shortly after an
initial determination of entitlement. Lump sum retroactive
benefits of $10,000 or more were commonplace. The practice
and amounts became especially significant when denied or
pending claims were re-reviewed because of the 1977 amend
ments. Many of these were first filed years earlier, and
retroactive benefits were paid if the claim eventually was ap
proved. The essential problem was that once a payment was
made, the Department was hard-pressed to recover the
money if the claim was subsequently denied. In practice, the
Department made very little effort to recover these moneys
until recent years, putting virtually no staff into the process.
The Department of Labor had few options as to how it
would deal with the problem. It was being subjected to con
siderable public criticism regarding the delays in its process
ing of claims. Congressmen from the mining regions were
swamping the Department with inquiries regarding the status
and circumstances of constituents' claims. Once an initial
determination was made, the appeals process could drag on
for months or years. Claimants were unable to understand
why the granting of a claim left anything to be resolved, par
ticularly since Part B had not involved any such delays or
subsequent dispute. The 1977 statute required that prompt
payment be made after initial determination of entitlement,
though the Labor Department might have been able to delay
making initial determinations in the process itself. Where the
Labor Department made some efforts to recover payments
due to claims reversals, errors in benefits computation,
duplicate payments, or the death of a miner or change in
someone's entitlement status, complaints to Congress
followed. In turn, the Department was accused of harassing
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widows and disabled miners. Simply in terms of the
pressures coming from the legislative branch, the Depart
ment had no incentive to seek vigorously to recover over
payments. Moreover, it was easy to rationalize such practices
by arguing that the money had already been spent and could
not be recovered, no matter how energetically the matter was
pursued.
Aside from the revenue implications, this practice weaken
ed the integrity of the claims process. There was a view that
ALJs might be reluctant to reverse decisions where benefits
had been granted and paid already. To do so, it was argued,
would have been simply pro forma, as the money was not
recoverable. Moreover, that would have left the Trust Fund
with the payment since the responsible operator's appeal had
been successful. The Department, however, has denied that
the appeals process was affected by the payments procedure.
The 1981 amendments sought to end the practice. The
Trust Fund is no longer obligated to pay retroactive lump
sum benefits where an initial determination of entitlement is
made but where the operator contests the award.
An evaluation of the performance of the Labor Depart
ment in administering the black lung program depends both
on the criteria employed and the vantage point of the
evaluator. The Department has received very harsh criticism
from both the employer and the labor sides, with additional
displeasure registered by Congress, the GAO and even
groups inside the Department.
The basis for much of the criticism has been described
above. In the earlier years of the program, the delays and
enormous backlog were the single most visible aspect of the
program to the critics. Promptness of payment or claim re
jection, long a bellwether of well-managed workers' com
pensation programs, was a test that the Labor Department
badly failed, whatever the ultimate source of the difficulty.
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From the vantage point of the miners and their
spokesmen, the Labor Department was seen as too strict and
unsympathetic an administrator. Testifying in 1978, a UMWA official said that the union had preferred never to have
the black lung program move out of SSA and to the Labor
Department. In part, this was because it made the program
too much like a workers' compensation program and sub
jected claimants to an adversary process. Beyond this,
however, was the Labor Department's handling of the claim.
"The DOL thus far has administered the black lung program
with a restrictive vengeance rarely encountered elsewhere. It
is punitive to require more than 600 days for processing a
claim." 24
Prior to the enactment of the 1977 amendments, Con
gressman Perkins described the Labor Department's ad
ministrative procedures as "outright discrimination" against
the claimants. 23 His assertion was in response to a witness'
description of the adversary process employed in Part C
claims.
For the administration that ran the Labor Department
from 1977 through 1980, the goal was to reduce the enor
mous disparity between claims entering the system and case
closings. This has been spelled out unhesitatingly and
without equivocation by Department spokesmen: "It is im
portant to point out here that part of what the Department
of Labor has been trying to do the last two years is to get out
of this enormous backlog of cases. In less than two years, we
have decided over 300,000 cases, and we process them at
something close to 3,000 decisions a week to get this
monstrous backlog which has been clogging this system for
over a decade into a manageable process. I think we are do
ing that, and that is why you see cases moving into the
system and into the Trust Fund process." 26
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The obvious question that follows is, to what extent did
this very large movement of claims come at the expense of er
rors in claims outcomes? A report issued in September 1981
by the Labor Department's Inspector General's Office
addresses this directly:
We recognize that program personnel have been at
tempting to resolve an extremely large backlog of
claims, generated by recent changes to the enabling
legislation. However due to the fact that so many
of the identified losses could have been easily
detected and prevented, without extensive or
sophisticated technical resources, we contend that
there is clearly a need for better balance between
program production and program integrity.
We stress that although substantial loss and loss
vulnerabilities within the payment systems have
been identified, our greater concern related to the
Division of Coal Miners' Workers' Compensation
almost total lack of historical interest in and com
mitment of resources to the prevention of losses,
and causal factors and implications of such inade
quacy.
In our view, since the passage of the Black Lung
Benefits Reform Act of 1977, the Employment
Standards Administration and Division of Coal
Miners' Workers' Compensation Management
have treated the rapid processing of claims and the
efficient, responsible management of financial
resources as mutually exclusive objectives, and
have focused available resources on the processing
of claims and delivery of payments.
Finally, the Inspector General cited the agency's
failure to move expeditiously to correct known
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problems in finding, ". . . major historical and
continuing overpayments generated by faulty and
inadequately designed and implemented payment
procedures and systems, is a clear failure to fulfill
elementary management responsibilities. 27

Responsible Operators
At the beginning of 1974, coal mine operators assumed
financial liabilities for miners who were disabled or deceased
due to black lung. For a variety of reasons, identification of
responsible operators was no simple matter for the Depart
ment of Labor. First, the nature of the industry's labor
market is such that workers frequently change jobs. Com
pounding this was the reality that so many claims under Part
C stemmed from mine employment that ended many years
earlier. A further complexity was the frequent turnover of
ownership of particular mines, along with the leasing of
mines from owners who did not operate the mine or employ
any miners. Self-employment of miners complicated matters
further. It is not surprising that by the time of the 1977
amendments, DOL was unable to identify a responsible
operator in 75-80 percent of the claims filed under Part C of
the law.
The 1977 amendments that created the Black Lung
Disability Trust Fund helped to clarify, if not eliminate,
some of these issues for DOL. Our focus here is on the iden
tification of the liable party since 1978. Responsibility for
identifying a particular employer as the responsible operator
rests with the claims examiner. Where the claims examiner
encounters any difficulty in making this identification, the
matter is passed on to a "Responsible Operator Section"
that makes extensive use of state regulatory agency records,
Bureau of Mines Legal Identity Reports or private sector
market sources such as Dun and Bradstreet.
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The Trust Fund takes liability in claims where a miner's
last coal mine employment ended prior to January 1, 1970.
This represented a significant change in the law inasmuch as
financial responsibility for claims was previously based on
the date the claim was filed and not on the date of last
employment. The Trust Fund also takes liability for claims
involving employment subsequent to January 1, 1970 where
the DOL does not identify a responsible employer. Thus, the
government was able to shift some financial liability to the
coal industry, which was paying for the Trust Fund, and
away from itself, even where it could not place the burden on
a specific employer.
In defining a responsible operator, DOL extends several
tests. First, it defines a coal miner operator as:
. . . any owner, lessee or other person who
operates, controls, or supervises a coal mine or any
independent contractor performing services or con
struction at such mine. In accordance with Sections
402(d) and 422(b) of the Act, certain other
employers, including those engaged in coal mine
construction, maintenance, and transportation,
may also be considered to be operators for pur
poses of this part. An independent contractor or
self-employed miner, construction worker, coal
preparation worker, or transportation worker may
also be considered a coal mine operator. Any
employer of a miner may be considered a coal mine
operator, based on the circumstances in the par
ticular case. 28
For a coal mine operator to be deemed a responsible
operator, a variety of conditions must be met. First, the
miner's disability or death must have occurred, in part at
least, as a result of employment by that operator. In a situa
tion where a claimant was employed by a coal mine operator
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(and other tests are met), there is a rebuttable presumption
that the employee was regularly and continuously exposed to
dust during his employment with the employer. 29 An
employer may successfully rebut this by proving the
employee was not exposed to coal dust for significant
periods during his employment. 30 An employer was able to
rebut this presumption, thereby avoiding liability, by show
ing that the claimant suffered from complicated
pneumoconiosis prior to his first employment with the
employer. 31
A second necessary condition to be established is that the
employer must have operated a coal mine after June 30,
1973, the period when the interim Part C program began.
Where this condition is not met by the operator, DOL must
identify another responsible operator or assign liability to
the Trust Fund.
A third test consists of two parts. The employee must have
been employed by the (potential) responsible operator for at
least one year. By regulation, DOL has determined that one
year means 125 days of work. Further, the one year can have
occurred over any period of time, e.g., only 25 days
employed each year for the past five years. Aside from the
one-year minimum employment criterion, the miner also
must have worked for the operator at least one day after
December 31, 1969.
A final criterion for designating an employer as the
responsible operator is that the employer must be capable of
assuming liability. According to the regulations, this can be
established where there is insurance, including selfinsurance, where the firm has sufficient assets to assume
potential costs of liability, or even where the operator has an
existing business. If none of these is demonstrated, the
operator may avoid being identified as the responsible
operator, but may be subject to penalties for failure to insure
under the act.
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The criteria listed above could conceivably be met by more
than a single operator in a specific claim. The Labor Depart
ment's practice is to assign liability to the most recent of the
employers meeting these essential qualifications. Generally,
if the mine ownership changes hands, which appears to occur
frequently in this industry, liability moves with it to the suc
cessor operator. The 1977 amendments changed this in one
respect. Where a mine operator, assuming all other criteria
are met, sells the mine where the disabled or deceased miner
was employed, liability is retained by that operator if the
employer remains as an operator in the coal mining industry.
Where that condition is not met, the successor operator is
liable for the costs of the claim.
Identifying a responsible operator may involve some dif
ficulties for the DOL in establishing the facts involved. For
example, to find a cumulative year of employment may re
quire delving into some ancient history. Further, the respon
sible operator may not sit still while being so designated, par
ticularly when another operator may be shifting the burden
away from itself. The temptation for the agency is to shift
the liability to the Trust Fund, avoiding the controversy but
not jeopardizing the claimant's rights to compensation. In
deed, the claimant will face less of an adversary situation
where the Trust Fund has potential liability than where a
mine operator (or its insurance carrier) is the potential source
of benefits. While the temptation may be strong to pursue
this path of least resistance, the DOL has made it clear to its
Deputy Commissioners that "it is the intent of Congress that
liability for payment of benefits be assigned to a coal mine
operator whenever possible." 32
The lines demarcating the liability of a responsible
operator (and its insurer), the Trust Fund, and the U.S.
Treasury through either Social Security under Part B or
DOL for some Part C claims were not always clear. Aside
from the obvious confusion that this generated for all the
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parties concerned, the 1977 amendments created a subse
quent furor with a seemingly innocuous change in the law.
The 1977 law forced a review of all previously pending or
denied claims. This included claims filed between January 1,
1970 and June 30, 1973, which were, of course, claims filed
under Part B for benefits from SSA. The 1977 amendments
caused the date of application for reopening to be considered
as the filing date of the claim. As such, this made these
former Part B claims to be Part C claims and the respon
sibility of mine operators and their insurers or the Trust
Fund. Of course, mine operators were liable only if the
criteria described above were met, including the one
stipulating that the claimant be employed for at least one day
after January 1, 1970. Approximately 8,000-10,000
claimants who were awarded benefits under this review, had
been turned down originally under Part B, and now became
the burden of responsible operators.
Congressman Perkins introduced HR 7745 in the second
session of the 96th Congress to shift these claims to the Trust
Fund. Congressman Erlenborn expressed suspicion that the
motive behind the Perkins move was that the Trust Fund was
less likely to controvert a claim than was a private employer.
Not surprisingly, the UMWA was a major supporter of the
bill. When the Act was amended in 1981 the insurance in
dustry effectively rallied behind this provision, and benefits
were made the liability of the Trust Fund and not of the in
dividual operators—and their insurers.
This change ended a potentially nasty battle that was
brewing over who had liability in these cases. Insurers had no
intention of paying claims against their insureds when they
had collected no premiums for this. 33 Mine operators were
not readily prepared to accept financial responsibility fully
and let insurers off the hook. Ultimately, as a Trust Fund
liability, the coal industry had to pay, even though the claims
originally had been the responsibility of the federal govern
ment.
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Statutes of Limitation
One of the serious barriers to compensation for victims of
occupational disease can be a statute of limitation. In state
workers' compensation laws, a variety of such rules has serv
ed to deny potential claimants an opportunity to be compen
sated. 34 The three most common types of these barriers are
the recent exposure rule, the minimum exposure rule, and
the filing date-disability rule. The first such limit bars certain
classes of claims, often involving pulmonary-respiratory ill
nesses, where the employee has had no occupational ex
posure to the hazard in question for some period of time.
The minimum exposure rule requires that the worker has
spent sufficient time—usually measured in years or shifts of
work—being exposed to the hazard in question. Short of
meeting this minimum, the claim would be barred. The last
rule stipulates that the claim for compensation must be filed
within some time period after the disability began, or after
the worker knew or should have known of the disability, or
some variation of this.
Statutes of limitation or other time-related barriers to fil
ing claims can pose serious difficulties for the claimant, par
ticularly in the case of long-latent diseases. Under the black
lung law, however, minimum exposure and recent exposure
concepts do not serve to bar any claims. Instead, where they
are found (as for example in sections 411(c) (1), (2), (4) and
(5)), they serve as criteria for allowing the claimant to invoke
presumptions that ease the burden of proof. As such, the re
cent exposure or minimum exposure usage under black lung
is not similar to the application found in certain state laws.
The 1969 law, which was unchanged in this respect in the
1972 amendments, did contain a restrictive statute of limita
tion. Specifically, it required that any claim for benefits
under Part C be filed within three years of the discovery of
total disability due to pneumoconiosis or, in the case of a
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death claim, within three years of that occurrence. (Given
the temporary character of Part B, there was no need for a
statute of limitation under the Social Security Administra
tion portion of the law.) The law created a special difficulty
for widows in some of the older cases that were filed as Part
C claims. The Department of Labor estimated in 1977 that
90 percent of the survivors' claims denied until then had been
barred by this statute of limitation, and not by any review of
substantive evidence. 35 In fact, the statute of limitation was
probably more important even than this record of denials
suggests, since some widows probably submitted no claims
due to this barrier.
The 1977 amendments made three significant changes in
the law with respect to the time limitation on the filing of
claims. First, the three-year time limit on filing for survivors
was eliminated. Thus, there is no longer any statute of
limitation in death claims. Second, in the case of claims by
living miners, a more liberal rule was enacted allowing claims
to be filed within three years of a medical determination of
total disability due to pneumoconiosis, or within three years
of the effective date of the amendments (March 1, 1978),
whichever was later. As such, no claim filed by a living miner
until after March 1, 1981 could be barred by a statute of
limitation.
The final change in the 1977 amendments eliminated a
specific time-based barrier to miners or survivors seeking to
invoke the section 411(c) (4) presumption (the 15-year
presumption). This change simply widened the applicability
of the presumption.
The Department of Labor regulations, as adapted from
section 20 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, establish a rebuttable presumption that
every claim for black lung benefits is timely filed. (See 20
CFR 725.308(c).) The regulation adds, however, that the
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time limits on filing are mandatory and cannot be waived.
The import of these two rules is that where any dispute oc
curs regarding a possible late filing, the burden of proof rests
with the Trust Fund or the responsible operator to show that
the claim is not timely.

Attorney Fees
The manner and substance of employee representation
under the black lung law have not been without controversy.
Some attorneys and other worker representatives, including
officials of Black Lung Associations, have purportedly made
very large sums of money under the program. Some inter
views with persons close to the program reveal a view that
for little more work than preparing claim forms for miners
or their survivors, and by doing this in volume, some in
dividual representatives have collected hundreds of
thousands of dollars in fees per year. This section describes
the process of setting and paying legal fees for claimant
representation. There are no special procedures in place with
respect to fees for defense representation.
There is no requirement that a claimant's representative be
an attorney. Where the representative is not an attorney, the
adjudication officer, where one is involved, must give ap
proval of the individual designated. Fees to representatives
are set by the appropriate adjudication officer (or by the
Benefits Review Board). Any prior agreement or contract
between the claimant and the representative regarding fees is
not valid since the fee is set by the adjudication officer when
the claim is resolved. Fees are awarded only where a claim
has been prosecuted successfully. The claimant will not pay a
fee for legal services where a claim is rejected and there are
no benefits granted.
In the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Har
bor Workers' Compensation Act, Congress adopted the
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principle that the attorney's fee could be added on to the
claimant's award. 36 In terms of representation, those provi
sions have been incorporated into the administration of the
black lung program. Thus, there are circumstances where the
representative's fee is paid by the employer, over and above
the benefits payable to the black lung claimant. Essentially,
where the employer declines to pay any benefits within 30
days after receipt of written notice of liability, the subse
quent fees incurred by the successful claimant are the defen
dant's liability.
Where the claimant's representative is not an attorney in a
controverted case, the fee must be paid out of the claimant's
award. The reason for this special treatment of such
representatives is that the Department of Labor believes that
the language of the Longshore Act imposes it.
Where an attorney's fee for services is set by an adjudica
tion officer, it becomes a lien against the claimant's award
unless it is the defendant's responsibility. Where the
representative of the claimant is not an attorney, no lien is
made against the benefits award. Again, DOL's belief is that
the Longshore Act would not allow such a procedure in the
latter situation.
At the time the regulations were approved by DOL in
August 1978, it was the Department's opinion that the Black
Lung Disability Trust Fund was not able legally to pay a
claimant's legal fees. This practice has been changed, so that
where the Fund does controvert a claim and benefits are
subsequently awarded, the Fund is liable for the attorney
fees, over and above the claimant's award.
On what basis is the claimant's representation fee set? The
regulations provide the following guidelines:
Any fee approved under . . . this section shall be
reasonably commensurate with the necessary work
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done and shall take into account the quality of the
representation, the qualifications of the represen
tative, the complexity of the legal issues involved,
the level of proceedings to which the claim was rais
ed, the level at which the representative entered the
proceedings, and any other information, which
may be relevant to the amount of fee requested. 37
The DOL acknowledges the policy that rates are not to be
set so low as to drive competent attorneys from the field. The
adjudication officer may take into account the risk taken by
the attorney in representing a claimant where no fee at all
would be paid if there are no benefits awarded. Lay
representatives of claimants are to receive lower hourly rates
than are attorneys. Attorneys experienced and familiar with
black lung claims procedures may receive higher hourly rates
than those who are less experienced. 38
Representation fees have been a continuing source of con
flict involving DOL, attorneys and employers. In 1980,
about 40 percent of the appeals of black lung claims to the
Benefits Review Board involved the matter of attorneys
fees. 39 It has been the single issue most frequently appealed
at this level. Employers and insurers have appealed
"add-on** awards to attorneys that they regard as excessive,
and the attorneys have been active in appealing claims where
DOL has cut the fee the attorney sought to charge.
The attorney fee allowed by DOL is discretionary. If the
employer challenges the award, it has the burden of
demonstrating that the assessment "is arbitrary, capricious
or an abuse of discretion.*'40 If the employer fails to object
to the fee application before the adjudicating officer, the
Benefits Review Board has held that the employer cannot
later object or appeal.
Where the attorney's fee is substantially reduced from the
requested amount, the adjudication officer must provide suf-
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ficient reasoning to support the reduction. If the reasoning is
insufficient, the Benefits Review Board will vacate the deci
sion and remand the case for more specific findings. The fee
can be reduced through either of two means. First, the
amount of time for services may be viewed as excessive. The
attorney is required to provide some detail to the ad
judicating officer on the hours of each of the services provid
ed. Second, the adjudicating officer may find the hourly rate
to be unacceptable, and reduce it. Either or both of these
methods have been employed frequently by DOL to reduce
fees, and have often been appealed by the dissatisfied at
torney. The matter appears to have occupied considerable
time and energy of parties in the hearings and appellate pro
cesses.
Insurance Arrangements
In order to understand the black lung program, one needs
to be sensitive to the ambitious goal set by Congress that pro
vided for private insurance arrangements. Probably aiming
at a close replication of existing state workers' compensation
laws and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, the
Congress permitted coal mine operators to privately insure
themselves against claims for black lung. In allowing the
operators to choose the method of insurance they wished,
Congress opened the door to yet another interest group that
could be expected to develop a stake in the program. It also
meant that a tangled web of relationships emerged among in
surers, state agencies, mine operators, miner representatives
and federal authorities.
The Part C program initially made individual mine
operators the principal source of money to support benefit
payments. With one significant exception, the operators
were required to be insured for worthy black lung claims,
should they be designated as the responsible operator. In
surance could be secured in one of two ways. First, upon ap-
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proval of the Secretary of Labor, a mine operator could selfinsure. Group self-insurance was also permitted. Alter
natively, the operator could purchase black lung insurance in
the market place, either from a private carrier licensed by the
state to sell workers' compensation in that jurisdiction, or, if
available, from a state insurance fund. Operators that did
not secure themselves in one of these ways could be subject
to a civil action with fines of up to $1,000 for each day of
noncompliance, and possible criminal action.
The significant exception to the insurance requirement in
volved those employers in either the coal transportation or
construction sectors. While the law made such employers
potentially responsible to pay black lung claims, they are not
coal mine operators. As such DOL has no requirement that
they maintain black lung insurance, except that they must
secure the payments of benefits for specific claims against
them at the time they incur a liability.
A recent DOL annual report describing the black lung pro
gram summarizes the existing insurance arrangements under
the law. 41 There are approximately 4,500 coal mine operators
required by the law to maintain insurance. About 90 percent
of these operators had secured insurance through either
private carriers or a state fund. Ninety-six applications had
been authorized for self-insurance covering approximately
200 companies. In calendar 1981, 14 applications were made
to self-insure, of which 4 were approved, 2 denied and the re
mainder were pending at the end of the year.
The provision of black lung insurance has been highly con
centrated in the insurance industry. In 1978, a single private
carrier, Old Republic Insurance Company, wrote 31 percent
of all the insurance policies for black lung written in that
year. The next largest private carrier was the Travelers In
surance Company with 7 percent of the policies sold. 42
Almost 90 percent of the coal mine operators that are in-
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sured purchase their coverage from only 12 carriers. 43 In
Ohio and West Virginia, exclusive state fund states, workers'
compensation cannot be sold by private insurance carriers.
Rate-making for black lung is especially complicated
because of the multiple sources of benefits. More specifical
ly, the rate applied to the payroll of coal mine operators in
different states will reflect the likelihood that a disabled
miner or survivor will file a claim initially at the state level
and subsequently at the federal level, or in one jurisdiction
only. In several instances at the state level, compensation for
dust diseases may be partly or fully the liability of a state
fund and, hence, not reflected in the premiums paid under a
workers' compensation black lung policy. Since benefits
paid by such a fund will reduce the operator's individual
liability, the premium paid by the operator will be lower, all
other things being equal. Since state benefits remain at a con
stant level once benefits payments have begun, but the
federal benefit level is indexed to federal employee salary
levels, persons drawing only state benefits or state and
federal benefits are expected to depend increasingly in the
future on federal payments, raising the potential liability of
mine operators and their insurers.44
It has been noted that rates on insurance purchased from
private carriers vary because of different state practices, e.g.,
the provision of some or all state benefits through a special
state fund, and because of decisions by state insurance com
missions in rate filings. Yet another reason for differences is
that the rate reflects an estimate of the number of compensable responsible operator claims in the state related to the
total number of actived miners in the state. Thus, rates will
be higher, all other things held constant, where employment
in earlier years was higher—or current levels of mine
employment are now depressed relative to former times.
Also, rates will be higher where there have been more ac-
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cepted claims on responsible operators. Numerous claims for
black lung involving private insurers have been accepted by
the states of Pennsylvania, Kentucky and Virginia, the latter
being the only state which typically compensates for partial
disability due to black lung. By contrast, Colorado, Illinois
and Indiana have regularly rejected most state claims for
black lung.45 The customary policy provided is simply a
black lung compensation endorsement attached to a
workers' compensation policy. Such a policy protects the
operator from claims brought in either the state or federal
jurisdiction.
Why did the insurance industry decide to write policies for
black lung insurance? In several respects the decision to do
so was not a simple one. The industry had virtually no ex
perience in dealing with such a phenomenon as black lung,
where the determination of eligibility for benefits was sub
ject to such a high degree of variability, based on shifting
policies and politics involving both the executive and
legislative branches of government. Further, future benefits
under black lung were indexed both in new claims and where
benefits had already been established, creating uncertainties
as to appropriate reserve practices and rates. And quite
unlike virtually all forms of conventional insurance, the in
surers were covering a condition that had already existed for
many of the prospective claimants. The contingency for
which insurance was being sold was not the development of
disabling or killing disease, since in most cases these events
had already occurred. Instead, the event that was being in
sured was that a claim would be filed and benefits granted by
DOL. This clearly represented an unconventional, insurable
risk.
The decision to provide black lung insurance reveals a good
deal about the industry's concerns at that time. One industry
source who has been very close to this program has explained
it in this way:
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First, and perhaps foremost, the federal govern
ment was playing a very active role in evaluating
workers' compensation in 1972. Considerable
discussion of federal standards for state laws under
the threat of federal intervention was prevalent in
1972. We all know of the 19 essential recommenda
tions of the National Commission that set
minimum standards for state laws and caused much
state legislative action in the 1970's. The industry
was looking for a chance to prove its usefulness and
cooperate with the federal government. We were
not anxious to see the federal government continue
as providers of insurance in any form. 46
The threat to the insurance industry from federal en
croachment into state workers' compensation programs may
or may not have been real, but Congress had considered the
creation of a federal insurance fund. Indeed, the 1977
amendments created the authority for DOL to establish such
a fund should it find that insurance was not available at
reasonable cost to coal mine operators. At that time the con
gressional conferees made it clear that such a fund was not to
become a pool for high risk operators, as some state funds
appeared to have become under workers' compensation. If
such a fund were to be created, it was to charge rates consis
tent with accepted actuarial practices. A federal black lung
insurance fund would have been viewed with concern by the
insurance industry, primarily as it might serve as the vehicle
to expand beyond black lung into other lines of coverage.
Two additional reasons were given for the industry's will
ingness to underwrite black lung insurance. The industry
thought that the vast bulk of the old claims had been dealt
with under the Part B program, and that they were insuring,
effectively, those miners still employed. Further, the in
dustry believed that rates would be adequate to deal with
eventual claims. "We had the liberty of charging a substan-
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tially high rate with a large margin for error. A 40% load
was included in the initial rate to handle contingencies. The
rates exceeded $25 per $100 of payroll in some states, surely
that would be enough.'*47
The process of rate-setting for black lung appears to have
been far more complicated than for state workers' compen
sation schemes. First, while benefits and eligibility criteria
are set federally, rates are generally subject to approval by
the individual state insurance commissioners. The varying
degrees of success in having proposed rates approved by
these agencies partly explains the very large interstate dif
ferences in the black lung rates being paid by the mine
operators.
Table 5.1
Occupational Disease Premium Rates
by Major Coal Producing States, Underground Exposure,
per $100 Payroll, Selective Periods

Initial rate Rate Jan. 1
1980
July 1, 1973
Alabama
Colorado
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Kentucky
"Ohio
*Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Utah
Virginia
*West Virginia

Rate Dec. 31
1981

$25.49
17.33
26.47
26.16
None

$16.20
16.15
26.47
16.68
12.12

$16.20
16.15
26.47
16.68

6.30
3.61
25.41
28.60
23.89
7.15

6.41
7.88
16.00
19.49
16.74
7.15

6.30
24.72
16.00
28.60
16.74
7.15

18.50 (prospective)
34. 87 (retroactive)

SOURCE: Cols. 1 and 2, DOL Annual Report for 1979, p. 37, and Col. 3 from DOL An
nual Report for 1981, p. 4.
'Federal black lung increment only.
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As noted above, historic data were of no use in the initial
rate-making efforts in 1973. By way of reducing the risks im
posed on the insurance industry, the 40 percent surcharge
was imposed. To further reduce the risks of any single car
rier, the bulk of the insurance was placed in reinsurance
pools. Estimates of the potential for claims were based in
part on NIOSH studies of the incidence of black lung
disease.
From 1974 until the end of the decade, insurers found this
line of business to be highly profitable. Because of delays in
claim processing, along with employer resistance when
designated as responsible operators, very few black lung
benefits were actually paid to claimants. As Table 5.1
demonstrates, from July 1, 1973 until 1980, the majority of
the major coal producing states actually reduced their rates.
The industry's windfall ended suddenly in 1979-80 for two
reasons, First, the enormous backlog of unresolved claims
that had built up in DOL since 1974 had been processed.
Partly because of the 1977 amendments liberalizing eligibili
ty for benefits, a significant share of these were accepted and
became the responsibility of an insurer. Second, the 1977
amendments allowed for a review of all previously denied
claims under Part B and C, swelling further the applicant
pool. Many of these claims eventually resulted in
employer/insurer liability.
Making matters even worse was the inability of the in
dustry to obtain up-to-date and reliable data on claims and
awards, due largely to DOL's inability to develop an effec
tive information system. Operating in the dark, the industry
was hard-pressed to evaluate the dimensions of the liabilities
it faced. Further, inadequate data meant that evidence could
not be developed so as to obtain adequate rate increases in all
the various states in which they operated. The industry
would have had little problem with a growing liability for
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black lung, had it developed gradually and in a manner that
allowed rates to be adjusted accordingly. Moreover, the
earlier experience of considerable profitability from this line
may have made the industry's plight less compelling to state
insurance commissions.
As noted elsewhere, the industry was also embroiled in a
controversy with both DOL and some employers over those
reviewed claims that had been initially filed prior to July 1,
1973. While these claims were originally denied under Part
B, they became the potential liability of responsible
operators after the 1977 amendments. The industry argued
that no premiums had ever been paid to provide insurance
for these applicants.
The result of the 1977 amendments and the DOL's speed
in moving claims was a suddenly dismal condition for the in
dustry. The culmination of all this was two widely circulated
reported by a securities analyst spelling out the industry's
plight. 48 Emanating from an insurance specialist operating
from Hartford, the later report estimated that the industry
was seriously under-reserved. Specifically, it estimated that
the insurance pool held only $520 million in reserves as com
pared to a present value of reserves required of from $599
million to $999 million based on a projection of successful
claims reported through 1980 (using a discount rate of 3-1/2
percent). On this basis, the pool was under-reserved by
somewhere between $79 million and $479 million—in present
value terms—which Conning calculated as being 0.6 to 3.4
percent of all earned premiums for workers' compensation
in 1980. Conning's report described how this situation had
developed so suddenly by pointing out that DOL had ap
proved, overall, 59,425 claims from July 1,1973 until March
14,1980, of which 21,919 claims were approved between Oc
tober 19, 1979 and mid-March of 1980. As opposed to a
gradual and easily recognized growth of claims to which the
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industry (and rates) could adjust, black lung insurers instead
were overwhelmed by a tidal wave of claims. The industry's
response was to push vigorously for higher rates and to lob
by for legislative relief culminating in the 1981 amendments.

The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund
Background
For a variety of reasons, a coalition of the interest groups
formed around the concept of a Trust Fund to pay benefits
under the Part C program. Legislatively, the origin of such a
fund was HR 10760, in the 94th Congress, which passed in
the House of Representatives in 1975. This version created
an insurance trust with coal operators serving as trustees of
the fund. In 1976, the Senate studied a somewhat different
version than the one approved in the House in 1975 that used
a tax mechanism to support such a fund. The end of the ses
sion arrived before the Senate took any final action on the
bill.
In the 95th Congress, a Trust Fund bill, HR 4544 cleared
the House. A similar bill with a different type of tax from the
one approved by the House cleared the Senate in S 2538
resulting, ultimately, in Public Law 95-227, the Black Lung
Benefits Revenue Act of 1977.
As noted, support for a trust fund emerged from several
sources. In testimony before the House Committee on
Education and Labor, Arnold Miller, President of the UMWA, endorsed a trust fund approach and urged that all new
black lung claims, where worthy, be compensated from such
a fund. 49 His preference for a trust fund approach stemmed
from his displeasure with the adversarial approach taken by
most of the coal mine operators who were named in specific
claims as responsible operators. Miller's aim, quite openly,
was to replace the adversarial process by one device or
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another, and the trust fund would be an acceptable means to
accomplish that.
Carl Bagge, president of the National Coal Association,
testified at the same set of hearings as Miller and, while not
endorsing the trust fund approach, he made precise recom
mendations as to how the fund should be financed. John J.
Kilcullen, speaking for the National Independent Coal
Operators Association, endorsed the trust fund as an accept
able alternative, // there had to be a federal black lung pro
gram. Kilcullen argued that the fund should be used solely
where no responsible operator was identified. He also warn
ed that unless approvals for payments were made by fund
trustees, presumably coal mine operator representatives,
DOL's Office of Workers' Compensation programs would
err on the side of excessive generosity in approving payouts
from the fund.
The coal mine operators who supported a trust fund
believed it allowed for greater certainty or predictability in
terms of their costs. From their vantage point, claims had
been assigned to individual operators on an almost
haphazard basis.
Donald Elisburg, only recently confirmed as Assistant
Secretary for Employment Standards in the DOL, testified in
favor of using a trust fund. He argued, with Arnold Miller
and with Rep. Perkins, that the adversary process was
detrimental to the administration of the program, and he
seemed to support the possibility of eliminating it entirely.
Overall then, the UMWA and the new Carter administra
tion endorsed some type of trust fund approach, as did at
least some significant portions of the coal mine operator
community. Additionally, with Perkins solidly behind the
idea, and with little opposition save for some warnings by
Erlenborn about the potential for abuse, the success of the
legislative initiative was assured.
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Trust Fund Responsibilities
The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund created under the
1977 legislation was primarily responsible for paying benefits
(both medical expenses and cash compensation) to eligible
miners and their dependents in two situations. First, it was
the source of funds in Part C claims where DOL was unable
to identify a responsible operator. Up until then, these
claims had been paid out of general revenues; as of April 1,
1978 they would be paid out of the Trust Fund. Second, the
Trust Fund was to pay for worthy claims where the last coal
mine employment occurred prior to January 1, 1970, i.e.,
before the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act took effect.
With many such old claims still being filed with DOL, along
with many others pending determination as to entitlement or
liability at the time the bill was enacted, it is clear that these
old cases constituted a sizable potential expense for the Trust
Fund.
Prior to the 1977 law, Part C claims were to be the liability
of responsible operators, where they existed and could be
identified, even when the last coal mine employment occur
red before 1970. Only a tiny handful of these claims were ac
tually being paid by the operators, who controverted virtual
ly all such claims for old cases. Given the delays in DOL and
the Benefits Review Board in adjudicating such claims,
claimants were paid by DOL and not by the coal mine
operators, at least until liability was resolved on a case by
case basis. Since the 1977 law now made the Trust Fund the
source of payment for claims based on last coal mine
employment prior to 1970, it made sense to no longer extract
continuing payment from the few operators who were paying
such claims at the time of the amendments. Instead, the law
had the Trust Fund reimburse those few operators who
already had incurred some expenses in paying for these
claims.
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The Trust Fund's other financial responsibility was to
reimburse the government for payments made under Part C
claims between January 1, 1974 and March 31, 1978, along
with the administrative expenses incurred by the agency.
Based upon these charges and the reimbursement of the coal
mine operators who paid claims where the last employment
preceded January 1, 1970, the Trust Fund incurred an im
mediate, one-shot expense of over $90 million, about 30 per
cent of which represented a repayment of government ad
ministrative expenses.
The 1977 amendments required a review of thousands of
claims that were pending at that time or had been denied
previously by DOL and SSA. Where a Part C claim was
found worthy upon review and originated from a last coal
mine employment that preceded 1970, this was to be a liabili
ty of the Trust Fund. Since such benefits were payable as of
the date of filing the claim or January 1, 1974—whichever
was later—many of the reviewed claims that were accepted
involved sizable retroactive benefit payments in lump-sums
to miners of dependents.
A final responsibility of the Trust Fund was the obligation
to pay interest charges on any advances from the U.S.
Treasury, if and when revenues proved inadequate to meet
fund obligations. This, along with the less significant but
symbolic charge to the Trust Fund of expenses incurred in
program administration, revealed the interest by Congress in
pushing as much of the cost of black lung onto the coal in
dustry as possible. To some extent, it reflected congressional
anger over the industry's earlier reluctance to accept the
financial burdens of the program in the period 1974 to 1977.

Trust Fund Revenues
The decision to create a trust fund that was to be fully paid
for by the coal industry must be viewed as a political expe-

186 Coverage & Administration

dient. If the decision had been instead to tap general
revenues, political reaction to the program generally, and the
liberalizing amendments of 1977 in particular, would have
been more difficult to overcome. By appearing to place the
direct burden on the coal industry, Congress seemed to
satisfy the traditional conservative goal of "internalizing" to
the industry the social costs that emerged from coal produc
tion. It also seemed to promote the notion that individual
operators might operate less dusty and hazardous mines in
order to keep future Trust Fund obligations lower. The Trust
Fund satisfied an even vaguer notion that, since the industry
had profited in the past from operating disease-producing
mines, some punitive action of this sort could be justified.
A variety of problems are involved with each of these
views. Yet, the Trust Fund concept, based on a charge to
mine operators, can be defended on the most significant
grounds of all, that is, in 1977 it was a politically acceptable
scheme to fund benefits. In a search for someone to pay for
claims emerging from pre-1970 coal mine employment or in
the absence of any identifiable responsible operator, the coal
industry was an available source of "deep pockets." The in
dustry bore sufficient guilt in the public mind for permitting
the disease, and its uncooperative approach until 1977 did
little to cast it in a more favorable light.
What are the major objections to a trust fund based on
coal industry funding? First, the coal industry of 1978, or of
subsequent years, is not the industry of 1969 or of earlier
decades. In theory, internalizing costs would force a pro
ducer to bear the social as well as the private costs of produc
tion. In turn, product prices would reflect the full costs of
production, both public and private costs, thereby encourag
ing users to purchase alternative products that are now
relatively cheaper.
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These conventional arguments have been used to justify
workers' compensation insurance systems. 30 Where they
have merit is in cases involving injuries due to accidents. The
theory is not acceptable, however, when applied to longlatent occupational diseases that are derived from hazardous
exposures of earlier periods. One cannot justify internalizing
a cost today, except perhaps in a punitive sense, for a pro
duct that was priced and sold 5, 10, or 20 years ago.
As a punitive or socially vindictive approach, the coal in
dustry's responsibility to be the sole source of support for
the Trust Fund is equally hard to justify. Many of the coal
mine operators of 1978 had not been in the industry at the
time that earlier exposures to dust were causing black lung.
Many of those operators who had been responsible for
dustry or hazardous mines were long since removed from the
coal scene. Profits made as a consequence of such practices
years or decades ago could hardly be tracked down and
reclaimed for such a trust fund. Some of those profits had
been distributed to stockholders with little or no long-term
commitment to the shares of ownership that they held at one
time. Higher profits conceivably helped fuel demands by
miners for higher wages and benefits, making them partial
beneficiaries of practices that enlarged the profits of earlier
coal mine operators. Additionally, if unhealthy mines per
mitted coal to be sold at lower prices than would have occur
red if sanitary and healthful conditions had been maintain
ed, then benefits from such practices also accrued to coal
users in the form of lower prices for electrical or heating ser
vices, as well as steel and other coal-using products. The
failure to internalize coal costs in earlier years when miners
were being exposed to coal mine dust meant that the public,
consisting of individuals and businesses outside of the coal
industry, in those years were beneficiaries also. As such, it
seems difficult to justify limiting the financial supporters of
the Trust Fund to the existing coal industry of 1978 and
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beyond, except on the grounds that it would be acceptable
politically.
In theory, once the coal industry is identified as the source
of funds, there are three possible types of taxes that could be
levied. The nature of the coal business is such that there are
enormous intraindustry effects of the different types of tax
selected.
One approach could have involved a payroll type of tax,
with some limited justification based on the notion that the
more employees there are in a mine, the higher the potential
source of future claimants. This would have moved the fund
ing mechanism somewhat into line with the basis for
workers' compensation benefits. Such a tax would be most
costly to labor-intensive mining operations, putting them at
a competitive disadvantage with more capital-intensive pro
ducers. The more labor-intensive mines tended to be in Appalachia, where considerable disemployment had been oc
curring already, and were also in the areas that were most
unionized. Such an approach could be expected to hasten the
substitution of capital for labor in the labor-intensive mines
or to simply shut them down, a circumstance that was unac
ceptable both to members of Congress from underground
mining regions and to mine workers' unions.
The other two approaches to an industry tax could involve
a levy on the sales price of coal, or a tax on the coal tonnage
sold. In 1977, the Senate bill provided for the former while
the House version created a tax based on the latter. A ton
nage tax had a type of precedent with the UMWA health and
pension plans having been funded, through collective
bargaining, with a tonnage charge.
The significance of each of these approaches derives from
the large price differences that exist for coal. Strip mine coal
and western coal usually sell for considerably less than do
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underground mined coal and eastern coal. Coal burned by
utilities is of different quality and price than metallurgical
coal. Thus the form of the tax can differentially impact
various parts of the industry. Examples of this are evident
from table 5.2.
Table 5.2
1979 Average Prices, FOB Mine,
per Ton, Excluding Lignite
Source
Surface
Deep
Total
* Metallurgical
*Steam

East
$22.93
33.36
28.42
42.58
17.49

Region
West

U.S.

$10.44
23.53
11.97

$18.66
32.76
24.73

SOURCE: Provided by the Department of Energy, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Ways and Means, House of Representatives, July 27, September 28, 1981, Serial 97-32,
1981.
*1978

The congressional conferees settled on a hybrid tax that
represented something of a compromise in the positions of
the two houses. The 1977 act provided for a fixed tax per ton
of coal sold, with the rates set so that underground mines
paid $.50 per ton while strip miners paid only $.25 per ton.
Additionally, if these rates resulted in a tax that would ex
ceed 2 percent of the sales price of the coal, the 2 percent rate
would apply.
Another consideration in the method of taxation selected
by the Congress involved the nature of sales contracts in the
industry. Some coal is sold under long-term contracts to ma
jor consumers. An excise tax levied on the sale is (initially)
paid by the consumer, while a tonnage tax is paid by the
seller. Economists know that the ultimate incidence of the
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tax may fall on either or both parties to the transaction ac
cording to underlying conditions of the supply of and de
mand for coal. Where there are long-term contracts in place
however, and there is no renegotiation of them, a tonnage
tax will fall entirely on the coal supplier and not on the pur
chaser. The mine operator whose coal tended to be sold
under these long-term contracts preferred an excise tax ap
proach, but the idea was unacceptable to Congress. The
legislators wanted the tax to fall, and appear to fall, squarely
on the coal mine operators.
At the time that Congress was considering a change in the
Trust Fund coal tax in 1981, one industry spokesman gave
the following demonstration of the differential impact of the
1977 tax. Martin White, vice president and general manager
of the Western Energy Company, a Montana surface mining
company, pointed to the following: for the second calendar
quarter of 1981, underground mines produced 10.2
tons/man-day; at $.50/ton, they paid $5.10 tax/man-day. 31
On average, surface miners produced 35.2 tons/man-day
and at a rate of $.25/ton, paid $8.80 tax/man-day. In Mon
tana, average surface mining production was 119.6
tons/man-day, at $.25/ton, or a Trust Fund tax of $29.90
tax/man-day. Thus, the Montana operator paid almost six
times the tax rate per worker that an average underground
operator did, despite the fact that the health risks of
underground mining were considerably greater than of sur
face operations."
Trust Fund Adequacy
In the light of the earlier experience under the black lung
program, it was hardly surprising that the Trust Fund's
needs were very badly underestimated and, therefore, under
financed. The Trust Fund's inadequacy stemmed from
several sources. The volume of new incoming claims was
underestimated, as was the forecast rate of acceptance of
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new and reviewed claims by DOL. Interest payments to the
Treasury to repay advances were required by the statute to be
based on market interest rates, and these became quite high
after 1977. 33 More important, they were considerably higher
than the 6 percent rate charged to coal mine operators who
were required to repay the Fund for payments to a claimant.
The 6 percent rate was set by DOL regulation. 54 Further,
benefits paid by the Fund were indexed and rose somewhat
with the inflation rate. The tax, however, being a flat-level
tonnage tax, was unaffected by inflation (except as the 2 per
cent of selling price maximum was affected) and varied only
with coal output. Even the absence of recession in 1980-81
would have found the Trust Fund in difficulty, but the
economic circumstances of the industry totally undermined
the original approach.
The actual experience of the Trust Fund is indicated in
table 5.3.
Table 5.3
Black Lung Disability Trust Fund
Fiscal Year 1978-81
(in millions)
Type of obligation
and revenue
Monthly benefits
Hospital and
medical benefits
Administrative cost
Interest charges
Total obligations
Total revenues
Treasury advances
Cumulative debt

1978

1979

1980

1981

$119.9

$574.4

$707.0

$ 623.2

35.3
0
155.3
93.2
18.9
18.9

8.7
32.1
7.7
623.0
221.7
400.8
419.7

9.5
34.2
52.5
813.2
272.3
535.8
955.6

37.4
35.6
109.5
805.6
236.6
554.8
1,510.3

SOURCES: Adapted from Black Lung Benefits Act, Annual Report on Administration of
the Act during Calendar Year 1981, U.S. Department of Labor, Table 4, and Background
Material and Dates on Major Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways
and Means, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, February 18, 1982, p. 241.
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The table shows that the Trust Fund was very badly under
financed in each of the years it existed and that it rapidly in
curred a cumulative debt to the Treasury of over $1.5 billion.
During this relatively short time period, the Fund had taken
in from taxes under $825 million and had expenses of over
$2.3 billion. By the end of FY 1981, the Fund was paying
almost $110 million/year in interest expenses (roughly 40
percent of revenues) on the debt it had accumulated in under
four years of operation. By early 1981, sources in DOL were
estimating the future liability of the Trust Fund to be in ex
cess of $6 billion, and there were some private actuarial
estimates that were twice as large. Even the smaller number
was well in excess of original cost projections. It was clear
that steps had to be taken, but the administration chose to
delay any move until after the election in November 1980.
A serious issue that the Trust Fund faced was its ap
propriate role in claims processing. The law creating the
Trust Fund gave it no role in challenging Labor Department
determinations. Its role had been simply to pay any claim in
volving Trust Fund liability approved by DOL. Conser
vatives in Congress, including John Erlenborn, and coal in
dustry representatives urged that the Fund play a larger role
than given to it in 1977, that is, to defend itself against
claims. Yet liberal support for the Trust Fund and that from
the UMWA developed primarily because it avoided an
adversarial process for claimants. The worthiness of claims
involving the Trust Fund was to be evaluated by DOL, serv
ing as both a fact finder and as a judge. The Trust Fund's
financial inadequacy was so overwhelming that no
reasonable degree of defense against claims could have kept
it out of debt. It is likely, however, that its financial position
would have been strengthened, could it have disputed DOL
determinations that resulted in obligations for the Fund.
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1981 Amendments
The Reagan administration's 1981 amendments to the
black lung law contained several important changes involv
ing the Trust Fund. First, as of January 1,1982, the tax rates
were all doubled, i.e., a tax per ton set at $.50 for surface
mines, at $1.00 for underground mines, and a 4 percent max
imum based on sales price. The increase has been described
as interim, since the tax is scheduled to revert to pre-1981
rates on January 1,1996 or sooner if the Trust Fund pays off
all its cumulative debt to the Treasury. It was anticipated
that advances from the Treasury would no longer be needed
by FY 1984 and that the debt to the Treasury would be
repaid entirely by FY 1993. 55 Another source forecast that
the Trust Fund would have to continue to borrow until at
least 1987. 56
Whether the tax increase will prove sufficient is not
known, but the prognosis is unfavorable. 57 Virtually all pro
jections associated with this program have been badly flaw
ed. Most projections have tended to underestimate future
program utilization and costs. A possible exception to this,
bearing directly on the Trust Fund, was Assistant Secretary
Elisburg's testimony in late 1980 where he forecast that the
Fund's costs over its first 20 years would be $20-22 billion,
with a Trust Fund cumulative debt of $9.2 billion by 1995. 58
In contrast to these DOL projections, Congressman Perkins
and a UMWA official agreed in conversation that the Fund
would "come out of the red within the next year and
especially two or three years from today, the Trust Fund
would be, I would say, within five years, the Trust Fund
could easily be solvent, so no one knows for certain, but that
could easily be the case with the increased production of
coal." 39 This has proven to be unusually wide of the mark in
the first 2-3 years of the new tax.
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Aside from doubling the tax in 1981, the amendments pro
vided that interest rates charged to operators by the Fund be
based on market conditions. This made the rates consistent
with those paid by the Fund on its debt to the Treasury.
The 1981 amendments also shifted to the Trust Fund
10,200 accepted cases that previously had been the respon
sibility of the individual operators and their insurers. These
cases, described in more detail earlier, were claims that were
initially denied and then approved upon review resulting
from the 1977 amendments. The Congressional Budget Of
fice estimated that these cases would increase the Trust
Fund's expenditures by over $120 million between FY 1982
and FY 1986, exclusive of the debt service generated by this
new obligation. An insurance industry trade association
testified in 1981 that the present value of the 10,200 cases, as
of that time, was $1.5 billion. 60

State Laws
The original concept of the black lung legislation was to
have the federal government accept the existing pool of
potential cases of death or disability due to CWP and, after a
transition period, turn claims for currently developing cases
over to the states. Subject then only to certain federal stan
dards, the states would incorporate such claims into their
own workers' compensation laws.
The state's role in administering and paying for black lung
claims was not solely limited to the post-transition period.
Section 413(c) of the 1969 law mandated that no claims were
to be considered under Part B unless the claimant also had
filed a claim under the applicable state's workers' compensa
tion law prior to or at the same time the federal claim was fil
ed. An exception to the requirement was that no state claim
had to be made where the filing was clearly a futile matter.
Such a case would occur for several reasons, including that
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the state did not provide for such benefits, or that the timing
in the case exceeded some statute of limitation making the
particular filing futile.
The plan did not appear to be unreasonable in 1969 or in
1972 in light of what Congress had been led to believe. First,
the greatest expense of compensating for black lung derived
from disabilities and fatalities that had occurred already and
would be paid under Part B of the program. By the time Part
C became effective, these claims were to have been resolved
and payments made on them by SSA. The view that Part C
would not involve many claims was strengthened by a hope
that the post-1969 federal dust standards would lead to a
lower incidence of pneumoconiosis. Second, most parties in
volved with state workers' compensation laws, i.e., state ad
ministrators, insurers, employers, some health providers,
were known to want to retain program administration at the
state level. Organized labor was an exception to this, but not
uniformly or emphatically so. A federally administered pro
gram for compensating an occupational disease was a threat
to state sovereignty over such programs, as it represented a
possible model for further federal control. Turning such a
federal program back to the states appeared consistent with
the national movement from a Great Society to a New
Federalism, where the latter entailed a return to the states of
control that had previously been moved to the central
government.
The Secretary of Labor was responsible for certifying that
the states met the federal standards so as to move program
administration from Washington back to state agencies. Sec
tion 421(b) (2) spelled out the criteria by which the Secretary
would evaluate state laws so as to assure that they provided
"adequate coverage for pneumoconiosis." Essentially, these
provisions required that the cash benefits be "substantially
equivalent to or greater" than federally provided benefits
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under Part B, and that the criteria used to determine eligibili
ty be "substantially equivalent" to the federal ones that had
been legislated and established through regulation by the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
A number of states made some movements to receive such
certification. In 1973, four states—Kentucky, Maryland,
Virginia, and West Virginia—submitted plans to the
Secretary of Labor. Ultimately, certification was not given,
the plans were withdrawn, and the program never was
returned to the states. The impediment to carrying out this
transfer of responsibility from DOL to state workers' com
pensation agencies was the requirement that even those new
ly filed claims based on last employment prior to state
assumption be a state's responsibility. Thousands of claims
continued to pour into DOL based on last employment dates
prior to July 1, 1973, and in many cases ymuch earlier than
that, and these would have to be dealt with by state agencies.
In many cases, no employer would be found to pay such
claims, resulting in a need for the states to raise sizable funds
to do so. Ultimately, these "old" cases kept the plan for the
assumption of responsibility by the states from succeeding.
The intent of Congress to have the federal government get
out of the business of running the black lung program was
expressed again in the 1977 amendments. Section
421(b) (2) (A) was amended to allow the Secretary of Labor
to certify a state law's compliance with the federal standards
where benefits are provided for death or disability due to
pneumoconiosis, except that "such law shall not be required
to provide such benefits where the miner's last employment
in a coal mine terminated before the Secretary's approval of
the state law pursuant to this section."
This amendment did not absolve the mine operator of
liability for claims where the last employment had occurred
prior to the Secretary of Labor's certification. It meant that
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these earlier cases would be administered by DOL and paid
for by either a designated responsible operator or the Trust
Fund. The coal mine operator was still required to obtain in
surance under the federal scheme and be subject to the ton
nage tax that supported the Trust Fund. The 1977 amend
ment did not succeed in having states seek certification.
In 1981, Deputy Undersecretary of Labor Robert Collyer
was asked by Senator Nickels whether the Reagan ad
ministration would seek to turn black lung back to the states,
in conformance with the original concept of the law and as
John Erlenborn continued to urge. 61 Collyer said the ad
ministration opposed such a move on grounds that the states
had had the opportunity to pass acceptable black lung
legislation and had not done so. As such, black lung had
become a permanent federal program and should be
operated as such.
Though the states had lost any enthusiasm for assuming
the black lung program, they did not entirely neglect the
issue. It goes beyond the scope of this study to describe the
various activities by each of the states with regard to their
compensation programs for disabled miners or their sur
vivors." Yet some of the state programs had a substantial
impact on the federal program, in part because of the offset
issue. They also had an impact on rate making procedures
for insurance carriers providing coverage to coal mine
operators. An example of this can be found in Kentucky's
activity. 63 Between January 1,1973 and June 30,1976 miners
totally disabled with black lung or survivors were eligible for
cash benefits of $60 to $877week. Benefit payments were
limited to 425 weeks. A Special Fund paid 75 percent of these
benefits; the balance was the responsibility of the mine
operator or an insurer. There was no requirement that the
claimant also file for federal benefits, which were generally
lower than state benefits. The statute of limitation in Ken
tucky forced some claimants to seek only federal benefits.
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From July 1, 1976 until July 14, 1980, state benefits rang
ed from $87 to $13I/week for totaly disability or death due
to pneumoconiosis. Benefits became payable for the miner's
lifetime and were not limited to a maximum of 425 weeks.
Another significant change required the claimant to file for
benefits under the federal black lung program and make a
good faith effort to obtain such compensation. Such federal
benefits would initially be fully or largely offset so that only
state benefits were provided. However, given the escalation
built into the federal benefits, and the unindexed nature of
state payments, federal payments would eventually begin
and gradually represent an increasing and significant frac
tion of the miner's total benefits. During this period, 80 per
cent of the benefits paid in Kentucky were paid by state
funds (40 percent from the Special Fund, 40 percent from a
CWP Fund created by amendments in 1976). The remaining
20 percent of the benefits paid under Kentucky law was the
responsibility of the coal operator or insurer.
After July 14, 1980, the Special Fund paid 75 percent of
the benefits while the employer or insurer paid 25 percent.
(The CWP Fund was rolled into the Special Fund.) Benefits
paid to disabled miners were $2177week unless federal
benefits were being obtained, in which case the benefit was
reduced to $163/week. (Note that this effectively represented
a state offset against a federal benefit that itself offsets
against the state benefit.) According to the estimates of the
National Council on Compensation Insurance, the present
value of reserves needed in a Kentucky claim resulted in costs
split 51 percent to the Special Fund and 49 percent to the
responsible operator. 64
While the Kentucky law requires that beneficiaries under
the state law apply for benefits under the federal law, not all
persons have done so. Some individuals have benefits solely
from the federal program after having been denied at the
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state level, or because of some barrier to pursuing a state
claim such as a statute of limitation. A survey of the leading
coal mine insurers in Kentucky revealed that among benefit
recipients, about 20 percent receive only state benefits and 10
percent receive only federal benefits." The remaining 70 per
cent initially receive state benefits and will receive sup
plemental federal benefits subsequently.
To summarize, some states, including Kentucky, Virginia,
West Virginia and Pennsylvania, have made considerable ef
forts to build black lung into their state workers' compensa
tion programs. They have not supplanted what has become a
permanent federal black lung program under Part C, despite
the original vision that this would be a temporary federal
role. State benefits are interwoven with federal benefits,
creating complications for those setting insurance rates for
black lung, or those attempting to evaluate the component
costs of the black lung program.
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Dimensions of the Program
Benefits
Benefits are conferred under the law in three basic cir
cumstances. First, benefits can be paid where the living
miner is determined to be totally disabled due to
pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment. Sec
ond, there are survivor benefits where the miner was totally
disabled due to pneumoconiosis at the time of death. This
category of benefits, which was added in 1972, eliminates the
need for the survivor to prove that the cause of death was
associated with coal mine employment or any particular type
of disease. Indeed, the 1977 amendments eliminated the re
quirement that a survivor file a claim where a miner who had
received benefits died. An automatic entitlement is conferred
on eligible survivors. The third category of benefit exists
where a miner's death has resulted from pneumoconiosis
arising out of coal mine employment.
Almost certainly as an oversight, the 1969 law excluded
certain possible survivor beneficiaries, the "double orphan"
issue, and was the initial source of pressure to amend the
1969 act. Conservatives in Congress later expressed anger
that this worthy set of changes in the law was used by the
act's liberal supporters as a way to bring up the law again,
serving to further broaden it through a wide range of amend
ments. In any event, living miners or survivors are entitled to
benefits, which are increased as the number of dependents
205
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rises. Surviving dependents can include not simply spouses
and children, but may extend to dependent parents or sib
lings of the miner. If the surviving widow remarries, she
loses her benefits as a survivor. In the regulations regarding
benefit eligibility, the Labor Department announced that it
would not discriminate because of sex in setting entitlements.
However, surviving spouses are expected to be overwhelm
ingly female for many years. (See the paragraph preceding
the regulation spelled out in 20 CFR 725.201, August 18,
1978.)
In addition to cash benefits, eligible living miners are en
titled to medical benefits for expenses arising out of their
black lung condition. Prior to 1978, eligibility for such
benefits was limited to Part C beneficiaries. The amend
ments of 1977 allowed a Part B miner beneficiary to file a
Part C claim with the Department of Labor and, if allowed,
to collect medical benefits under the program. The 1977
change required the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare to notify all past Part B recipients of their oppor
tunity to seek such benefits under the Part C program, and
that they had up to six months to file such claims. The Labor
Department has essentially accepted all such claims in a pro
forma manner where a Part B claim already has been ac
cepted. 1
There is no benefit for burial expenses under the program.
Awards under Part B or C are tax free. Benefit levels are
changed if any dependent status changes, if the miner's earn
ings change (see section on offsets) or to reflect cost-of-living
changes. Unlike the vast majority of awards under state
workers' compensation laws, past award levels are
automatically increased in this law, albeit somewhat indirect
ly, to reflect price inflation.
Benefits under the Part B program are paid to recipients
from the first day of the month in which the claim was filed
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or the claimant becomes eligible for benefits. No benefits are
paid for the period prior to the date of filing.
Under Part C, benefits are based on the date the claim was
filed or the date of death or total disability due to
pneumoconiosis, whichever is earlier. In no case, however,
are benefits to be paid under Part C for the period prior to
January 1,1974. Accrued benefits are based on the rates that
prevailed at the time that the worker or survivor was
covered. If the Labor Department is unable to establish a
date at which total disability began, the date the claim was
filed is used.
It is possible for a miner to be given a black lung entitle
ment while still in coal mining employment or comparable
work. (The usual case would involve the 411(c) (3) irrebuttable presumption.) Cash benefits, however, are not paid or
are temporarily halted so long as the miner continues or
returns to such type of work. When the work ceases benefits
are reinstated.
In the U.S., though by no means universally, workers*
compensation benefit levels are linked to the disabled or
deceased worker's level of earnings. To do this in the case of
black lung would have been problematic. Some of the poten
tially eligible claimants had ceased coal mine employment or
any employment years earlier. This would have presented a
problem as to what would be the appropriate earnings level
to which one could link benefits. For this reason, there was
little disagreement on the position that a flat benefit payment
be made to recipients that was independent of the level of
previous earnings. The level of compensation was set in 1969
at 50 percent of the minimum monthly payment which a
federal employee of the GS-2, step 1 level, who is totally
disabled and entitled to benefits under the Federal
Employees Compensation Act, would receive.
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There appears to have been little controversy about the ap
propriate level of benefits to be paid under black lung since it
was set into place by the original statute. Of all the different
issues raised since the passage of the act in 1969, the level of
benefits has been remarkably absent from the field of con
flict. Because the basic benefit level is linked to the wage
level of a class of federal employees, periodic increases in
these wage levels automatically lift both new and existing
payments under black lung.
The basic benefit amount paid to an eligible living miner
without dependents is the same as the benefit paid to a sur
viving spouse who has no dependents. Aside from spouses,
other dependent family members of the deceased miner also
can be eligible for survivor's benefits. Table 6.1 lists the level
of benefits paid under the act from 1969 through 1984.
Table 6.1
Basic Black Lung Monthly Benefit Amounts
Parts B and C
Effective
dates
12/69 1/71 1/7210/72 10/73 10/74 10/75 10/76 10/77 10/78 10/79 10/80 10/81 10/82 1/84-

12/70
12/71
9/72
9/73
9/94
9/75
9/76
9/77
9/78
9/79
9/80
9/81
9/82
12/83
12/84

Living miner
or widow
$144.50
153.10
161.50
169.80
177.60
187.40
196.80
205.40
219.90
232.00
254.00
279.80
293.20
304.90
317.10

Beneficiary combination
+ 3 dependents
+ 1 dependent
or more
$216.70
229.60
242.20
254.70
266.40
281.10
295.20
308.10
329.80
348.00
381.00
419.60
439.80
457.40
475.60

$288.90
306.10
322.90
339.50
355.20
374.80
393.50
410.80
439.70
463.90
508.00
559.50
586.40
609.80
634.20

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor Program Manual and Annual Reports.
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The basic benefit amount, paid to the living miner or sur
viving spouse without dependents, is increased by 50 percent
with one dependent, by 75 percent with two dependents,
e.g., a living miner, his wife and one child present, and by
100 percent with three or more dependents.
Table 6.2 shows the actual average monthly sums paid to
individual recipients from 1970 to 1984.
Table 6.2
Average Monthly Benefits Paid
Black Lung Program Part B

December

Total

Miners*

Widows and
other survivors'5

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

$181.90
188.50
199.40
224.30
235.40
247.70
257.40
274.70
289.40
313.20
342.50
356.20
367.70
364.80
376.40

$200.10
212.80
225.20
252.80
266.70
281.70
294.30
316.90
337.80
368.70
406.10
425.10
441.90
441.40
458.00

$149.80
160.60
169.60
187.70
196.00
207.30
216.40
231.20
243.40
264.20
290.40
303.70
315.20
314.60
326.70

SOURCE: Social Security Bulletin, August 1985, p. 80.
a. Includes benefits for dependent wife and/or child.
b. Includes benefits for dependent child of widow, surviving child, parent, brother and
sister.

One way to roughly gauge the generosity of the payments
under the black lung program is to compare them to other
transfer payment programs of the same time period. Table
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6.3 lists average actual monthly payments under the retire
ment and disability portions of OASDHI and a welfare pro
gram. Benefits paid under the black lung program appear to
be in line with social security benefits, though growing at a
slower rate than OASDHI, and well above benefits paid
under the old age assistance welfare program (SSI since
1974). Moreover, the President's Commission on Coal
estimated in 1980 that a miner receiving black lung benefits
plus a miner's pension and social security retirement benefits
could earn up to $1,000 per month, most of it in tax free in
come. 2
By an alternative measure, black lung benefits do not look
particularly generous. Table 6.4 shows the benefits available
under state workers' compensation laws in the seven major
beneficiary states for two years of the program compared
with black lung benefits. While direct comparisons are dif
ficult, the table indicates that in almost all cases, in all of the
seven states, workers would have been better off receiving
state legislated benefits, assuming they could have collected
them. The state and federal benefits are indicated for claims
involving death or permanent and total disability. In most
state workers' compensation laws, such cases would involve
compensating workers or survivors at two-thirds of the
workers' previous wages, subject to a benefit minimum and
maximum. Typically, these benefits can be paid for the
workers' lifetime or that of the survivor, except where there
is remarriage. For purposes of comparison, all benefit levels
in table 6.4 are based on the assumption that there are no
dependents. Federal black lung benefits are larger than the
minimum benefits in three states (Kentucky, Virginia,
Alabama) in 1982 and above the minimum in those three and
Pennsylvania and West Virginia in 1976. However, the
federal benefit is consistently far below the maximum benefit
levels in all these states in both years. Where miners were
working regularly, their wages would have made most of

Table 63
Average Monthly Benefits-Current Payment Status
OASDHI and SSI Programs

Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

Retired-worker families
Worker and
(Male) worker
wife
only
$128.70
143.70
177.00
180.10
204.20
225.50
245.10
265.90
288.90
324.00
377.10
N.A.
465.60
490.00

$198.90
222.30
275.20
276.70
312.30
343.90
373.10
404.40
437.50
488.60
566.60
N.A.
702.50
742.90

Disabled worker families
Worker and
(Male) worker
only
spouse
$136.30
152.69
188.20
192.80
217.80
240.00
261.40
283.80
308.50
343.60
396.20
N.A.
474.20
490.90

SOURCE: Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1984-85, tables 108 and 167.

$199.20
221.60
274.20
278.60
314.00
344.00
377.00
407.50
443.00
497.10
573.00
N.A.
690.70
716.20

Old age
assistance
SSI
$ 77.65
77.50
79.95
76.15
92.30
90.90
94.37
96.62
100.43
122.67
128.20
137.81
145.69
157.80

O
"-b

•a

212 Dimensions of the Program

them eligible for maximum, or near maximum, benefits
under the state workers' compensation programs.
Table 6.4
Minimum and Maximum Weekly Benefits
State Workers' Compensation Programs
Seven Coal Mining States and Federal Black Lung

Jurisdiction
Alabama
Illinois
Kentucky
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Virginia
West Virginia
Federal black lung

January 1, 1976
Permanent
total
Death8
disability1*

January 1, 1982
Permanent
total
Death8
disability"

$ 38- 77
103-305
32- 80
93-186
94- 95
37-149
45-173

$ 38-102
103-205
32- 96
93-186
62-187
37-149
45-173

$ 60-161
151-403
51-127
149-298
142-284
58-231
92-276

$ 60-161
151-403
51-254
149-248
142-284
58-231
92-276

68- 68

68- 68

45- 45

45- 45

SOURCES: Analysis of Workers' Compensation Laws, 1976 and 1982 editions, prepared
by U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Federal black lung, see table 6.2
a. Spouse only,
b. No dependents.

Miners or survivors were eligible to collect retroactive
benefits in several instances under black lung. Under Part C,
if the death or disability preceded the date the claim was fil
ed, the earlier of the two was the entitlement date, but not
prior to January 1,1974. In a case where a claim was initially
denied but later was determined to be compensable, a long
time gap may have been involved. This was particularly im
portant where the law forced SSA and the Labor Depart
ment to re-review claims previously denied. For example,
where a miner's claim was made between January 1, 1970
and December 31, 1973, where there were three dependents,
and where the claim was accepted as of January 1, 1979, the
miner received $24,000 in retroactive benefits along with his

Dimensions of the Program 213

first monthly check. In 1979, a year many previously denied
claims were re-reviewed and awarded, the average retroac
tive benefit, including those for new Part C claims, was
about $14,000 per claim. During FY 1981, about one-half of
all Part C benefits paid were retroactive payments.
Thus far, benefits under the program have been con
sidered in terms of monthly or annual sums. An alternative
way to view the value of a successful black lung claim is as
the value of the future stream of benefits, appropriately dis
counted and taking consideration of future benefit level
changes. A 1980 actuarial estimate was that a successful
claim would be worth $106,000-176,000 using a 3.5 discount
rate. Undiscounted, a successful claim would be valued be
tween $150,000-250,000 (a point estimate of $210,000),
assuming a 17-year life expectancy and a 7 percent annual
escalation factor. 3 An unpublished estimate in 1982, using
Virginia as the state of residence, a 6 percent annual escala
tion factor and a 3.5 percent discount rate estimated the pre
sent value of a claim that year as $215,000. 4
The disbursement of benefits on an interstate basis clearly
reflects the uneven distribution of beneficiaries nationally.
There are several ways of demonstrating this. Column one of
table 6.5 is the portion of total payments made to recipients
in different states on a monthly basis, in December 1981
under the Part B program. On this basis, recipients in two
states, Pennsylvania and West Virginia, received almost half
the payments made and persons from five states received
about 70 percent of the funds disbursed. Under the Part C
program about 60 percent of past benefits went to recipients
from five states.
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Table 6.5
Benefit Payments Under Black Lung
Selective States

State
Pennsylvania ..........
West Virginia ..........
Kentucky .............
Illinois ................
Ohio .................
Virginia. ..............
Alabama ..............
Tennessee .............

Proportion of total payments
2
1
(Percent)
(Percent)
30
17
11
6
6
6
4
3

24
14
7
5
9
5
3
2

Column 1. Monthly Benefits Paid, December 1981. Social Security Bulletin, Annual
Statistical Supplement, 1981, p. 246 (Part B only).
Column 2. Benefits paid July 1, 1973-December 31, 1981, cumulative, except responsible
operator payments. Black Lung Benefits Act, Annual Report for 1981, Employment Stan
dards Administration, p. 19 (Part C only).

That benefit payments under the black lung program were
so highly concentrated in a few states is not surprising. In
1960, 1965, and 1970, between 88 percent and 95 percent of
all bituminous coal employment in the U.S. was in the seven
states shown in table 6.5. (See table 6.6.) Although com
parable data are not available for West Virginia for 1950 and
1955, it seems likely that these seven states accounted for ap
proximately 90 percent or more of the bituminous coal
employment in those years. Within these seven states, the
three that are clearly most important are Pennsylvania, West
Virginia and Kentucky. Table 6.6 also indicates the earlier
importance of Pennsylvania's anthracite mining employ
ment and its phenomenal decline from 1950 to 1970. Recall
that the evidence seems clearly to indicate a higher incidence
of complicated and simple CWP in anthracite miners than in
bituminous miners. For both reasons, Pennsylvania's
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predominance over West Virginia and Kentucky in terms of
beneficiary payments in table 6.5 is reasonable.
Table 6.6
Employment in Bituminous and Lignite Coal Mining
The U.S., Selected States, Selected Years
(In thousands)

State
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania8
West Virginia
Kentucky
Illinois
Ohio
Virginia
Alabama

U.S.

1950

1955

Years
1960

85.1 (23)
75.1
N.A.
51.4(14)b
28.2 (8)
18.8 (5)
18.7 (5)
16.4 (4)

49.7 (23)
30.9
N.A.
31.6(14)
13.0 (6)
11.0 (5)
12.3 (6)
9.2 (4)

31.2(18)
14.9
51.0(30)
26.5 (16)
9.7 (6)
9.3 (5)
13.8 (8)
8.1 (5)

368

219

169

1965
24.7
9.5
42.4
23.1
8.6
7.6
11.5
5.5

(19)
(32)
(18)
(7)
(6)
(9)
(4)

132

1970
24.1
5.5
45.3
22.7
9.9
9.3
12.1
5.3

(17)
(32)
(16)
(7)
(7)
(9)
(4)

140

SOURCES: Employment and Earnings, States and Areas, 1939-74, U.S. BLS, Bulletin
1370-11, and Employment and Earnings, U.S., 1909-75, U.S. BLS, Bulletin 1312-10.
NOTE: Figures in parentheses are employment in bituminous and lignite coal mining in the
state as a percentage of U.S. total employment in bituminous and lignite coal mining,
a. Anthracite coal employment,
b. 1951 data.

Offsets
The black lung program is an exceedingly complicated
one. There is probably no more challenging portion of it to
describe than the treatment of offsets. While there is an easy
temptation to neglect this issue entirely, to succumb to it
would be a mistake. An examination of how offsets have
been treated reveals a great deal about this law, including the
evolving legislative sympathy for the act. The treatment of
the offset forces the government to evaluate the context of
benefits provided, and to confront the fundamental problem
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of overlapping private and public programs available
through different levels of government and other providers,
to say nothing of the role of the tax system.
Describing the offset issue in black lung is particularly
complicated for several reasons. First, the issue has been
treated quite differently under the Part B and Part C pro
grams. Second, each amendment to the 1969 law brought
changes to the matter. Third, the extent of the offset, if any,
may vary under either Part B or Part C in any single year due
to the following variables: the miner's age, the source of the
income, the type of dependent involved, the nature of the
disability, to name only a few. Yet one thing is at least very
clear; the offset has been a very significant issue in every in
stance when Congress acted in this area.
Part B Benefits
In the original law, Part B benefits paid to miners or
dependents were to be reduced for income from workers'
compensation programs, unemployment insurance and
disability insurance provided under state law (only five states
provided for such benefits). Additionally, benefits for black
lung were reduced to the extent the beneficiary had income
exceeding the "excess earnings" amount under section 203
of the Social Security Act. This provision paralleled the earn
ings test for elderly workers seeking old age benefits under
the Social Security Act.
The controversial element under Part B developed out of
section 224 of the Social Security Act, wherein miners eligi
ble for benefits both for black lung and for social security
disability (SSDI) could have the former used to offset the lat
ter. According to this provision, which preceded the Black
Lung Act, persons disabled after June 1, 1965 who are 62
years of age or younger will have any workers' compensation
benefits added to SSDI so as to not exceed a maximum level
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of benefits. For a person receiving both benefits, the max
imum was set at 80 percent of average current earnings prior
to disability, or 100 percent of the amount of total family
benefits under SSDI, whichever is higher. Where the com
bined payments would exceed this, SSDI benefits are reduc
ed. While representatives of the miners expressed dissatisfac
tion with all of the various offsets, the sharpest criticisms
were reserved for the SSDI offset. Part B benefits were not
workers' compensation, they argued, and the 1965 SSDI off
set provision was inapplicable. Thus, the offset forced the
issue of explicating the precise purposes of and reasons for
the Part B program.
In the 1972 amendments, the SSDI offset was removed by
adding the explicit language that Part B "shall not be con
sidered a workmen's compensation law or plan for purposes
of section 224" of the Social Security Act. The Senatebacked version of the 1972 amendments represented a com
promise of sorts, retaining an offset but only where benefits
exceeded 100 percent of the worker's previous earnings. The
House version, which succeeded in the Conference Commit
tee, simply eliminated the offset by defining the Part B pro
gram so as to be exempt from it. This method also allowed
Congress to achieve its end without having to amend the
Social Security Act itself. Thus, matters could be left with
Congressman Perkins rather than going to some other House
committee.
Opponents of this change in the law pointed to the seem
ingly perverse outcome that the change meant for states pro
viding workers' compensation benefits for miners with
CWP. Assume that a miner with a wife and dependent child
earns $390/month and is entitled to $244/month in SSDI
benefits based on his earnings. Assume that miner A comes
from a state that enables him to collect $200/month in
workers' compensation for his respiratory illness. Since there
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is an 80 percent maximum based on his previous earnings of
$390/month, the miner can expect to receive $312/month.
Because state workers' compensation provides $200/month,
the miner would receive only $112 from SSDI, the other
$132/month offset against state workers' compensation
benefits. Since the miner receives $200/month through the
state, and the Part B benefits at this time were below this
level, and offsettable against them, there are no black lung
benefits. Worker B, with a similar family situation and earn
ings record comes from a state where no workers' compensa
tion benefits are provided. He receives the $244/month for
SSDI and $153 for black lung under Part B for a total of
$397/month, $85/month more than worker A. Aside from
the lack of equal treatment, critics of the law argued that it
punished workers from the more progressive states with bet
ter workers' compensation laws.
The 1972 amendments provided that workers could be
found to be totally disabled under the law while still being
employed. 3 As such the earnings of the miner under Part B
were considered in setting his benefit level just as if he were
seeking retirement benefits under social security. In 1972,
this meant that the first $l,680/year in earnings were ex
empted, subsequent earnings of $2 meant a $1 loss in
benefits, but where earnings exceeded $2,880/year, there was
a $1 benefit reduction for each added $1 in earnings.
In summary, by 1972 recipients of Part B benefits were
subject to offsets for payments from state workers' compen
sation, unemployment insurance, state disability insurance
and "excess earnings." An exception to the latter offset was
that dependent widows and children (but not miners, depen
dent siblings or parents) were not subject to the excess earn
ings test. This variety of offsets, combined with the inconsis
tent treatment of benefits under the separate programs
created an incentive for beneficiaries under the Part B pro-

Dimensions of the Program 219

gram to supplement benefits under the Part C program. By
applying to DOL under Part C, benefits lost to various off
sets applied under Part B were then paid to the beneficiary,
bringing many back to the maximum level of benefits,
regardless of their other sources of income.
The 1977 amendments further liberalized the handling of
the Part B offsets. Spokesmen for the miners objected to the
application of the offset for benefits paid under state
workers' compensation laws when the disability was not due
to a respiratory disease arising out of coal mine employment.
Given the dangers of employment in mining, many miners
were receiving workers' compensation for bodily injuries at
the same time that they were seeking black lung benefits.
This argument would appear to be more potent if Part B
were expressly a workers' compensation program. The 1977
amendments eliminated the offset in such cases. Part B
benefits to miners are reduced where the miner receives
benefits under a state program for disability due to
pneumoconiosis. However, where death from
pneumoconiosis occurs and triggers a state benefit, there is
no corresponding offset of benefits for widows or dependent
children in the Part B program. (It is offset under Part C.)
When John Erlenborn testified on the administration bill
in December 1981 he reported that there were a considerable
number of Part B beneficiaries that were drawing multiple
benefits from SSA without any offset. 6 At the time, he
reported that 91,000 beneficiaries under Part B were also
drawing OASDHI benefits. Specifically, 63,000 were receiv
ing retirement or survivor's benefits, and 28,000 others were
getting SSDI benefits alongside Part B.

Part C Benefits
Offsets under the DOL program have been simpler and
there is less contention about them than about those under
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Part B. The only offsets under Part C have been for workers'
compensation benefits under state or federal (including Part
B) programs and, until 1981, an "excess earnings" test for
dependent brothers, sisters or parents of miners. Only
workers' compensation for pneumoconiosis from coal mine
employment was offset even in the original law. As expressly
a workers' compensation program, there has been only
limited objection to the SSDI offset against Part C benefits.
At the time of the 1972 amendments, when Congress
eliminated the SSDI offset under Part B, the matter was
debated and left intact. Later, Congressman Perkins in
troduced legislation to end this offset and to pay retroactive
benefits to those who had lost benefits due to the SSDI offset
of Part C benefits. The effort was apparently not a serious
one. Objections have also been raised by miners' represen
tatives and Black Lung Associations regarding the "double
offset," such that a miner receiving state workers' compen
sation benefits can have this used to reduce both Part C
benefits and SSDI. In some cases, this could result in lower
total payments than if there were no state payments at all.
The 1981 amendments significantly changed the offset
under Part C by applying a social security type "excess earn
ings" test to miners or their dependent survivors. The com
promise that was worked out applies the new rule only to
those Part C beneficiaries who filed a claim after December
31, 1981. The large majority of current beneficiaries are
unaffected by the change. As of January 1, 1982, exempted
earnings were $4,400/year for miners under age 65, $6,000
for miners 65-71 years, and no excess earnings test for miners
aged 72 and over. By January 1, 1983, the age to which the
earnings test applied dropped to 70. A miner's "excess earn
ings" are charged to the primary benefit and to the benefits
of all other augmentees entitled under that account. The off
set is $1 lost for every $2 in earnings above the exempted
amount. By contrast, surviving dependents' "excess earn-
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ings" are charged only against their own benefits and not
those of the other dependents (such as dependent children in
the household). These changes brought Part C beneficiaries
into conformity with Part B beneficiaries in terms of an ear
nings test. The 1981 amendments left other existing offsets
intact.
Questions have been raised on several occasions about the
rigor with which SSA or DOL actually monitored the receipt
of potentially offsettable benefits from state sources. Earlier
we noted Erlenborn's testimony in 1981 before a Senate
committee where he reported that neither SSA nor the Labor
Department were rigorously seeking to identify recipients of
state benefits for purposes of offsetting federal payments.
Pennsylvania had provided benefits to miners with
pneumoconiosis prior to the enactment of the 1969 law.
Benefits were paid from general revenues of the state, and
were, therefore, not considered to be workers' compensation
benefits. In July 1970 the state amended its law so as to
reduce or end payments for workers receiving federal black
lung benefits. At that point the Social Security Administra
tion restored benefits that were subject to offset for Penn
sylvania payments. Part C benefits were never reduced for
miners receiving Pennsylvania benefits under that state pro
gram.
In summary, the complexity of offset provisions applying
to black lung is impressive. It serves to illustrate the variety
and overlapping nature of many transfer payment programs
and the difficulty of integrating these with various sources of
earnings. Black lung is only worse than other areas because
of the existence and separate evolution of the Parts B and C.
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Supplementary Income
Benefits under the black lung program are not very
generous, but they should not be viewed as the sole source of
support for miners or their survivors. There are a variety of
public disability or retirement programs that may supple
ment these benefits, only some of which involve the offset of
benefits from one source or the other. In addition to these,
there may be privately provided income, a significant source
being the United Mine Workers of America Health and
Retirement Funds. These funds are obtained through collec
tive bargaining between the UMWA and signatory
employers.
There are two basic retirement-disability pension plans for
miners covered under these funds. The first is the so-called
1950 Pension Plan and Trust covering miners entitled to
benefits on or before December 6, 1974, or who last worked
in classified jobs for signatory employers on or after
December 31, 1975 (or became disabled on or after
December 6,1974). The second plan is the 1974 Pension Plan
and Trust covering miners who became disabled or retired
after the coverage period of the 1950 plan expired.
A discussion of details of the two plans is beyond the
scope of this study. 7 There are several notable features,
however, of each plan. Under the 1950 plan, eligibility for
retirement benefits required that the miner be 55 years of age
and have 20 years of credited service (a variable number of
which must be with a signatory employer) or 10 years of
credited signatory service beginning on or after May 29,
1949, three of those years beginning on or after January 1,
1971. Depending upon the year of retirement, benefits under
the 1950 plan were as follows:
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Table 6.7
Monthly Pensions for Mine Workers Who Have
20 Years of Credited Service

Period
December 1974- January 1975
January 1975-December 1975
January 1976-December 1976
January 1977-March 1978
April 1978-

Mine workers who Mine workers who
are receiving black are not receiving
lung benefits black lung benefits
$150
200
215
225
275

$150
200
225
250
275

SOURCE: 1950 Pension Plan-Summary Plan Description, 1978 UMWA Health and
Retirement Funds, p. 13.

For a number of years, the miner's pension benefit was
itself reduced where a black lung benefit was received. Fur
ther, the disability pension under the 1950 and 1974 plans
specifically excluded benefits for miners disabled by black
lung. Disability benefits are limited to miners suffering a
disabling injury in a mine accident that is medically suffi
cient to enable the worker to receive SSDI. Black lung can
not be included in this category.
Under the 1974 plan, normal retirement age is 62 years,
but otherwise eligible miners can begin to draw (actuarially
based) reduced benefits at age 55. The formula to calculate
benefits under this plan is more complicated than the earlier
one and involves a calculation based on the miner's age at
retirement (if between 55 and 62 years), the number of years
in service as well as when those years were, but does not de
pend upon whether or not black lung benefits are being
received. A miner retiring on or after March 27, 1978 at age
62 could, for example, receive $275/month for 20 years ser
vice, $420/month for 30 years service or $570/month for 40
years service.
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Several things must be kept in mind regarding these pen
sion benefits. First, most retired miners or survivors under
the UMWA programs are covered by the earlier plan, but
eventually the 1974 plan will be the dominant one. As of
March 1980, there were 12,400 pension recipients under the
later plan and 72,000 under the 1950 plan, but the number of
beneficiaries under the 1974 program were growing while
those under the 1950 program was declining steadily. Sec
ond, many miners who are not affiliated with the UMWA
may be covered under other pension arrangements, involving
collectively bargained plans or otherwise. Additionally,
many former miners were or are eligible for retirement or
disability pensions based on employment outside the coal
mining industry. It is likely, however, that some miners
employed or retired have no pension benefits assured to
them.
The pension and health programs of the miners under the
UMWA agreements have been known to be in serious finan
cial condition for some time. A report by the President's
Commission on Coal in 1980 estimated the 1950 Pension
Plan's unfunded liability as $1.9 billion.
Annual payments of approximately $2,800 per
underground miner and $6,500 per surface miner
are required under the Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement to meet current payments for pensions
and to provide full funding for past service by the
end of 1986. The pension of a miner under the 1950
plan is $275 per month. That liability will be a con
tinuing source of concern to the parties. Member
companies of the BCOA are concerned about the ex
tent of their individual liability, and the cost of the
1950 plan is a factor in the UMWA's organizing
difficulties. 8
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Problems with adequate funding and apprehension about
the future viability of the pension and health plans are not
new concerns of miners or observers of the coal industry.
The black lung program did not serve simply to supplement
the earnings of miners with retirement or disability pensions.
It allowed private pension benefits to grow less rapidly than
they would have in its absence. It also served to assure some
miners or survivors that supplements to social security
benefits would exist, regardless of the developments in the
pension plan. The problems of funding the health care pro
gram under the UMWA plan have been enormous. As a con
sequence of difficulties and abuses heaped on the scheme
from several sides, the plan had to be reorganized and
benefits curtailed in the mid-1970s. 9
The President's Commission on Coal estimated that a
miner retired under the 1950 or 1974 plans might be receiving
in 1979 the following: $275 per month from their UMWA
pension (1950 plan) or $480 per month (the average) under
the 1974 plan, plus $295 per month for black lung (assumes
one dependent) and $272 per month from their social securi
ty retirement benefit (assumes no dependents). Thus, it was
not uncommon for miners to receive in excess of $1,000 per
month in benefits in 1979 (largely tax free) from three
separate sources.
Between March and May of 1983, Audits and Surveys, a
contractor retained by the Labor Department, conducted
telephone and personal interviews of beneficiaries under the
black lung program. 10 One of the purposes of the study was
to establish the amount and sources of income that were be
ing received by miner and survivor benefit recipients. The
survey provides information solely based on survey
responses and only for calendar year 1982. Miners
represented 47 percent of the sample group, widows were 52
percent, while surviving dependent children were 1 percent
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of the respondents. There were 1,771 completed interviews,
which included 51 partially completed surveys.
In evaluating the income of beneficiaries, it is necessary to
keep in mind that this population is certainly not represen
tative of the U.S. population. A number of factors that set
this group apart from others in U.S. society affect how one
views their earnings. First, most miners and survivors live in
rural areas, where living costs differ (and are likely lower)
than for many others. Second, this group on average has
very low educational attainment levels. Audits and Surveys
reported that only 1 miner in 10 had completed high school
and about 3 out of 4 miners had not attended high school.
Ideally, one would compare incomes of this population to
others in comparable circumstances.
Eighty percent of the miners were 65 years of age or older.
Amongst this subset of the miner sample, only 2 percent
received income solely from black lung benefits and under 1
percent received only black lung benefits and a private pen
sion. Fifty-five percent of those miners aged 65 and older
received both black lung and social security retirement
benefits, while another 40 percent received black lung, social
security and private pension benefits. The private pension
payments came from employer or union retirement plans.
While income from black lung, social security and pen
sions appeared to be very common for miners, there were
relatively few other sources of income that were widely
received. Only 6 percent reported wage and salary income
for the household in the previous year, 9 percent reported in
come from assets, 3 percent received black lung benefits
under state programs, while 2 percent more received other
state workers' compensation payments. Veterans benefits
were received by 5 percent of the respondents. Only 1 percent
of the miner sample had received general assistance, AFDC
or ADC payments or supplemental security income. The
mean total household income of miners in 1982 was $11,740.
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For the sample of widows, 91 percent received social
security benefits in addition to their black lung benefits.
Twenty percent of the widows reported receiving benefits
under a union or employer retirement plan. Approximately 7
percent were in households with incomes from wages and
salaries in 1982. The mean income in 1982 of widows in the
program was $8,170.
It is no simple matter to gauge the adequacy or generosity
of black lung benefits. In 1982 a miner or widow collecting
benefits for the entire year, assuming no offsets, would have
collected over $3,500, while a dependent present could have
raised the benefit to over $5,300 (see table 6.1). Given the
beneficiaries' mean incomes, it is clear that black lung
benefits represented a sizable portion of their overall income
and kept many individuals or families out of the poverty
classification. In 1982, the poverty threshold for unrelated
individuals aged 65 or over was $4,600; it was $5,800 for a
two person household with the head aged 65 or over. 11 In the
entire U.S. in 1982, the median and mean incomes of
unrelated individuals 65 years and older who were female
were $6,128 and $8,604 respectively. 12 The median and mean
incomes nationally for a married couple household, with the
head of the household 65 years or older, were $15,305 and
$20,372 in 1982. 13

Claims Volume
An examination of the data on black lung claims and their
disposition provides some clues as to the program's fortunes.
Perhaps the single most significant aspect of the data is the
impressive number of claims put forward for benefits.
Granted that the concept of coverage was expanded after the
original 1969 law, which meant that surface mining would be
covered, or that "miners" actually meant more than miners
in a conventional sense, black lung was limited to a single oc
cupation and industry and to a single cluster of diseases.
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Moreover, no compensation was paid for temporary or par
tial disability. Despite these limits, the program drew amaz
ing numbers of applicants.
In examining and evaluating the data on black lung
claims, more than the usual cautions need be exercised. All
the data shown in this section are taken from SSA or Labor
Department reports. The Labor Department, particularly,
has had a consistently difficult time in bringing its data
system into order. Various reports show inconsistent
numbers and, even within the same report, errors can be
detected.
A second issue concerns possible double counting of
claims. While some of this can be avoided, at least one prob
lem remains. Some claimants who were denied benefits at
SSA filed claims subsequently at the Labor Department. To
treat each as a separate claim overstates the number of
claimants, though it does not overrepresent the caseload of
the agencies.
Some of the data are defined in ways that are not obvious.
For example, for several years the Labor Department
distinguished between a claim filed and a claim received. The
distinction reflected the Department's sensitivity to its huge
backlogs and the problems it had in receiving claims that
were filed in SSA local offices. This aside, certain claims
received by the Labor Department required virtually no decisionmaking by the Department and ought not be treated as
part of its adjudicatory caseload.
Another issue in understanding the data on claims volume
and disposition is the meaning of the decisions reached on a
year by year basis. Many reported denials eventually became
acceptances based on the re-reviewing processes that the
1972 and 1977 amendments forced SSA and the Labor
Department to undertake.

Dimensions of the Program 229

The data on SSA's experience with Part B are shown in
table 6.8. Possibly the most striking aspect of it is the huge
number of claims by miners or their widows under this pro
gram. In particular, note that about one-quarter of a million
claims were submitted in the first 12 months of the program.
This outpouring of claims emerged from an industry that
had an average daily employment level in 1970 of under
145,000 coal miners.
Table 6.8
SSA Claims Volume and Determinations
Cumulative
claims filed

Cumulative
claims allowed

Cumulative
claims denied

December 31, 1970
April 30, 1971

247,000
286,100

December 31, 1971

347,700

December 31, 1972

432,600

N.A.
125,400
(51%)
163,000
(51%)
N.A.

December 31, 1973

547,200

December 31, 1974

556,200

N.A.
120,400
(49%)
159,500
(49%)
213,100
(62<7o)a
340,000
(64%)
356,600
(64%)

Date

207,200
(36%)
199,200
(36%)

SOURCE: Annual Reports to Congress on the Administration of Part B of the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, SSA.
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are calculated as a percentage of claims decided.
a. Calculated as a percent of claims filed.

Prior to the 1972 amendments that required a re-review of
denied claims along with eased criteria to be used in deciding
these, and pending claims, SSA had approved about onehalf of all claims filed. The 1972 amendments caused 42,000
claims to be allowed by December 31, 1972 that had
previously been denied or were pending. By the end of 1973,
about 108,000 claims had been approved that had been or
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would have been denied, save for the 1972 amendments. By
1973 and 1974, the average approval rate on claims rose to
about 62-64 percent of claims decided over the entire period.
Of claims filed by widows, about 75 percent were approved,
compared to just under 60 percent of living miner claims.
The higher rate of approvals in death cases, many of which
involved fatalities that occurred many years earlier, is consis
tent with the stiffer burden of proof applied to living miners,
where current medical examinations and X-rays could be us
ed in evaluating the claim. About 65 percent of the claims fil
ed by the end of 1974 were from living miners.
At the end of 1974, SSA only had responsibility for paying
the claims it had approved earlier and providing assistance to
the Labor Department as an intake source of claims. SSA's
involvement was reactivated by the 1977 amendments, which
required it to re-review claims it had earlier denied, subject
to the claimant's choice. Previously denied claimants were
given the opportunity to have either the Labor Department
or SSA conduct the review. Further, the law mandated that
denials by SSA on re-review would automatically be sent to
the Labor Department where the claim was to be judged by
that agency. About 80,000 previously denied claims were rereviewed by SSA by June 30,1979, resulting in almost 23,000
newly approved claims. The 28 percent acceptance rate for
these claims was considerably higher than the rate an
ticipated at the time of the 1977 amendments, though it fell
below the proportions accepted by SSA in the re-reviewing
process after the 1972 amendments. This brought the
number of approved claims by SSA to roughly 400,000, with
over 70 percent of all claims being accepted sooner or later.
Approximately 37,000 denied Part B claimants asked to have
the Department of Labor review the claim directly, and
about 47,000 denied Part B claimants waived their rights.
Table 6.9 summarizes the experience under the Labor
Department's program, excluding several categories of
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claims. Column 1 represents the new Part C claims reviewed
during various time periods. Several aspects of it are
noteworthy. First, while there was some bunching of claims
in the first 18 months of the program, the numbers are con
siderably smaller than the explosion of cases that greeted
SSA in January 1970. Moreover, after its initial bubble, the
annual inflow of new claims varied only between about
19,000 and 25,000 during the the next five years, providing a
somewhat stable flow of work. There was a major jump in
claims in 1980, probably a reflection of the somewhat eased
standards of adjudication that began to be applied in 1978
and were ended in 1980. With considerably tougher stan
dards imposed during 1980, the number of claims fell off
sharply in 1981. Miners and survivors had been advised to
submit claims before the interim criteria were replaced in 1980
by the tougher, permanent criteria.
Column 2 of table 6.9 is the number of decisions (initial
determinations) made by the Labor Department during
various years of the program. Two entries are shown in col
umn 2 for each year beginning in 1978. The upper number
refers to decisions made on claims filed on or after March 1,
1978, the effective date of the 1977 amendments. The lower
entry refers to decisions based on claims that were denied or
pending as Part C claims prior to March 1, 1978. Most of
these were claims that were re-reviewed because of the re
quirements imposed by the 1977 amendments. Columns 3
and 4 show the rate of acceptance and denial as a proportion
of decisions made in that year.
There are several striking features in table 6.9. Note the
very large gap between claims received and decisions in the
first 18 months of Labor Department involvement. Follow
ing this, the gap grows even wider with more claims received
than determinations made during 1975 and 1976. A small
whittling down of the backlog occurred in 1977 but 1978

Table 6.9
Department of Labor Oaims Volume and Determinations
Claims
received

PartC
decisions

July 1973 to
December 1974
CY 1975
CY 1976
CY 1977
CY 1978

54,273
25,280
24,934
18,762
20,376

CY 1979

19,544

CY 1980

39,270

CY 1981

12,605

Date

Cumulative

215,000

i

Approvals

Denials

14,508
16,142
22,629
20,527
3,999
3,455a
18,513
48,394a
33,764
67,771 a
31,748
Oa

640 (04%)
1,614 (10%)
1,547 (07%)
1,943 (09%)
3,445 (86%)
3,433 (98%)
6,843 (37%)
24,944 (52%)
9,142 (27%)
22,898 (34%)
5,148 (16%)
0

13,868 (96%)
14,528 (90%)
21,082 (93%)
18,584 (91%)
544 (14%)
22 (02%)
11,670 (63%)
23,450 (48%)
24,622 (73%)
44,873 (66%)
26,600 (84%)
0

210,000
125,299a

78,000 (37%)
56,957 (45%)

132,000 (63%)
68,272 (55%)

SOURCE: Department of Labor Annual Reports, 1974-1982.
a. Claims filed prior to March 1, 1978 that were denied or pending as of that date.
CY is calendar year.
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witnessed a major addition to the inventory of undecided
claims. These backlogs reflected the Department's immense
difficulties in administering the claims and created very con
siderable pressure on the agency to move the cases along. By
the end of 1978, the Department had received 143,625 claims
but made only 77,805 determinations. In the three years
beginning in 1979, the Labor Department succeeded in
deciding a huge volume of claims, leaving less than 5,000
claims pending by 1982.
One cannot sum the numbers in column 2 of table 6.9 to
reach the cumulative number of Part C decisions made
because of double counting. Many of the claims that were
denied prior to March 1, 1978 were considered again and
decided anew after this date. Claims that were appealed
where an initial determination was reversed may show up for
that reason in more than one year. For these reasons, one
also cannot simply sum columns 3 or 4, which reflect the
nature of the determinations made by the Labor Depart
ment.
Overall, the Labor Department approved about 37 percent
of the 210,000 Part C claims that it decided by the end of
1981. Yet, during the first four-and-one-half years of its pro
gram, the approval rate of claims decided was only 7.8 per
cent (5,744 approved of 73,806 claims decided by December
31, 1977). The Labor Department found itself with a large
and growing backlog in 1976 and 1977, a very small propor
tion of claimants being successful, and itself looking par
ticularly harsh when compared to the experience of
claimants under the Part B program, particularly after the
1972 amendments. The watershed for the Department was
the 1977 amendments. Of the 85,000 decisions based on new
claims since March 1, 1978, about 25 percent were approved
or about a three times higher approval rate than before the
amendments.
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The Labor Department was required to re-review almost
120,000 Part C claims because of the 1977 amendments. Of
that group of claims, approximately 43 percent were approv
ed. The data do not allow us to separate the approval rates of
the previously denied from the claims pending in the Labor
Department's backlog on March 1, 1978. The 43 percent
figure, however, is much higher than the 28 percent approval
rate that the Department of Labor had projected in April
1978.
In table 6.10, data are presented on the Part B claims rereviewed after the 1977 amendments by the Labor Depart
ment. Of the 73,000 claims involved, about 27 percent were
approved, also well above the rate forecast for approvals by
the Department of Labor in early 1978. The claims reached
the Labor Department in one of two ways. Some of them
were denied by SSA after a re-review, and then automatically
sent to the Labor Department for its review of the claim. In
those cases, the claimant was permitted to add evidence to
the original file for the Labor Department's review. SSA's
re-review was limited to evaluating the existing file only. A
second set of claims was not reviewed by SSA but went
directly to the Labor Department at the claimant's request.
In either case, these 73,000 claims presented similar degrees
of effort for the Labor Department to administer, as did the
Part C claims re-reviewed after March 1, 1978. In terms of
these decisions, taken together with the Part C claims, the
Labor Department approved over 98,000 black lung claims
(35 percent) out of 283,000 decisions made by it.
In addition to the claims described here, two other sets of
cases are sometimes described as claims. It appears inap
propriate, however, to pool them with cases requiring a deci
sion on compensability for black lung by the Labor Depart
ment. One of these involved the Part B claims that had been
approved by SSA, where the claimant sought medical
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benefits subsequent to the 1977 amendments. Since those
benefits were administered by the Labor Department, an ap
plication was made to recover certain medical expenses. The
basic question of compensability, however, had already been
decided by SSA.
Table 6.10
Part B Denials Reviewed by the Department of Labor
Calendar year

Decisions

1979
1980
1981
Cumulative

22,647
33,068
17,520
73,395

Approvals
7,944
8,027
3,983
19,992

(35%)
(24%)
(23%)
(21%)

Denials
14,703
25,041
13,537
53,403

(65%)
(16%)
(11%)
(13%)

SOURCE: Annual Reports, Department of Labor.

The second set of cases involved claims approved by SSA
subsequent to the 1977 amendments. If approved, the claims
were put into payment status through the Labor Depart
ment, the majority of them involving claims against the
Trust Fund. The Labor Department reported these as claims,
yet they involved little decisionmaking by the Department.
The number of beneficiaries in the program has risen con
siderably under Part C as the Department of Labor eventual
ly reduced its large backlog. In calendar year 1981, there
were 95,135 primary beneficiaries under the DOL program. 14
Of these, 63,000 were living miners, 31,000 were surviving
spouses, and under 2,000 beneficiaries were dependent sur
vivors who were not spouses. SSA's beneficiaries, as of
December 31, 1981 numbered 376,500, of which 111,200
were miners, 146,200 were widows and the balance of
119,100 were dependents.
The data in table 6.11 reflect the extent to which (suc
cessful) claimants were clustered in a few of the coal mining
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Table 6.11
Received (Processed) and Allowed Oaims by State
_______Part B Program as of December 31,1974________
Allowed claims
Processed claims
U.S. total
Pennsylvania
West Virginia
Kentucky
Illinois
Ohio
Alabama
Virginia

555,842 (100%)
163,740 (29) (29%)a
101,583 (18) (47%)
60,294 (11) (58%)
38,160 (07) (65%)
34,270 (06) (71%)
29,396 (05) (76%)
29,132 (05) (81%)

356,642 (100%)
124,014 (35) (35%)a
59,903 (17) (52%)
32,847 (09) (61%)
24,636 (07) (68%)
20,100 (06) (74%)
15,905 (04) (78%)
16,221 (05) (83%)

_______Part C Program as of December 31,1981________
Claims in payment
Received claimsb
12/31/81C
U.S. total
Pennsylvania
West Virginia
Kentucky
Ohio
Virginia
Illinois
Alabama

425,428 (100%)
102,737 (24) (24%)
79,009 (17) (41%)
48,676 (11) (55%)
37,004 (09) (64%)
24,414 (06) (70%)
23,387 (05) (75%)
22,075 (05) (80%)

97,738 (100%)
125,473 (27) (27%)
14,531 (16) (43%)
8,311 (09) (52%)
9,652 (10) (62%)
5,152 (05) (67%)
5,249 (06) (73%)
3,463 (04) (77%)

SOURCES: Part B-Fifth Annual Report to Congress on the Administration of Part
B .... p. 8. Part C-Black Lung Benefits Act: Annual Report on Administration of the Act
During Calendar Year 1981, submitted 1982, table 2.
a. Percentage cumulated.
b. Includes Medical Benefits Only Claims and Transferred SSA Cases.
c. Includes Trust Fund and Responsible Operator Cases.
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states. In the Part B program, 47 percent of all applicants
came from two states (Pennsylvania and West Virginia),
two-thirds of all claimants came from 4 states, and 7 states
were responsible for more than 80 percent of claimants. The
allowed claims were even more concentrated, probably
reflecting the higher proportion of successful claimants that
came from the anthracite regions in Pennsylvania. 15 The
data are not precisely comparable for the Part C program,
but the Labor Department's claims were almost as
geographically concentrated as those in SSA. As of
December 31, 1981, Pennsylvania accounted for about one
of every four claims, and 7 states were responsible for four
out of every five. At that time, payments being made to suc
cessful claimants were largely in four states: Pennsylvania,
West Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio.

Costs
Establishing the costs that have occurred under the black
lung program is no simple matter. Because the program has
been funded by more than one agency, because of the
overlap between private and public sector liabilities, with
consideration for interest payments on borrowing to support
the Trust Fund to name only three complicating factors, it is
not possible to take a single figure (or set of figures) and call
this the program's cost.
In examining the program's history, at least two elements
of program costs are quite clear. First, projections regarding
anticipated costs have typically been quite far from the
mark, with the largest degree of error usually occurring as
members of Congress who supported the law underestimated
what program costs would be. Second, by federal standards
at least, the program initially appeared to be a very low cost
item in the budget, amounting to well under $100 million in
the first year and declining thereafter. The smooth sailing
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that the law's supporters experienced can partly be attributed
to the disinterest that most members of Congress showed
toward this apparently low cost item in the budget. So long
as the bill appeared to be very cheap, and given the very
vigorous support for it from key legislators such as Perkins
and Randolph, the law understandably found easy going.
Errors in projecting costs of federal programs must be ex
pected, especially when new territory is covered. The black
lung area was particularly problematic. First, no one really
knew how large the pool of potential applicants would be.
This issue depended upon a whole series of unknowns, i.e.,
precisely what the disease to be covered was, how widespread
the disease was, the extent to which people would know of
the availability of benefits and submit claims, and the stan
dards of proof imposed by the administering agency. Aside
from these difficult questions, cost projections depended
upon future benefit levels, which themselves were a function
of future inflation rates (since these would trigger pay in
creases for federal employees, the benchmark for benefit
rates). Inflation rates were poorly forecast during the life of
the program. Another variable to be considered in any cost
projection was the expected number of years that benefits
would be paid a claimant. Clearly, this depended on the pro
jected longevity of a group of persons presumably suffering
from totally disabling disease. No good assessment of this
existed in 1969. What was known, however, was that the
Part C program was to terminate by December 30, 1976.
After the Conference Committee had fashioned its version
of Title IV of the 1969 law, a vigorous debate occurred on
the floor of the House of Representatives between the few
foes of the law (that is, the bill that emerged from the con
ference) and its advocates. 16 Erlenborn said that the original
cost estimates had been stated by the law's advocates to be in
the range of $30-40 million a year and had been raised to the

Dimensions of the Program 239

$50-60 million range. Secretary of Interior Walter Hickel
had written to Senator Javits estimating the costs to the U.S.
Treasury of black lung legislation to be in a range from $155
million to $385 million per year, based on the conference
bill. Using existing SSDI disability criteria, Hickel forecast
that 54,400 miners would be eligible for benefits, and assum
ing 1.5 dependents each, at $2,657 each, costing $145 million
per year. In addition to this, the cost of the survivor's benefit
would be about $10 million per year for a total of $155
million, exclusive of any administrative costs.
Assuming a disability standard that was less strict than the
one applied under SSDI, Hickel forecast that there would be
140,200 successful living miner claimants at an annual cost
of $374 million, plus the same $10 million per year for sur
vivor beneficiaries, or a total of up to $385 million per year.
Congressman Perkins charged that these cost estimates were
simply scare tactics by the administration to undermine sup
port for the law. Congressman Burton described the Hickel
letter as an "ignoble effort" and the cost estimates as
"politically motivated." Congressman Dent was the most
colorful in speaking to the issue of costs. 17
Dent estimated that the cost of black lung for living miners
would be $32.3 million per year at a maximum. He based his
estimate on a miner population of 110,000 persons, noting
that only underground miners were susceptible to the
disease. He forecast that 3,300 miners would have the
disease. By contrast, Representative Collins of Texas argued:
"This program will add billions to the federal budget at the
time we are trying to achieve a balanced budget so as to halt
the inflation facing the country," 18
On the Senate side, Harrison Williams estimated that
about 50,000 miners would receive compensation due to the
law. Senator Javits said his estimates for the law were in the
$80-100 million per year range, and certainly no more than
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$120 million. Presumably, the costs would fall thereafter as
recipients died off.
Eugene Mittelman served as Senator Javits staff aide on
the 1969 legislation. He reported that the Conference Com
mittee was aware of estimates in the House of a $40 million
per year program and estimates voiced in the Senate of
$100-120 million per year. 19 According to him, some far
higher estimates were expressed in the Conference Commit
tee, but the issue of costs was largely ignored.
As noted earlier, SSA was sorely criticized by black lung
supporters prior to the 1972 amendments on the grounds
that it was administering the law too severely. Yet, in the
light of some of the cost estimates and projections of usage
that were made in 1969, these criticisms reflect some incon
sistencies or misjudgments by the critics. That is, despite
what program advocates charged was an excessive denial rate
by SSA, SSA benefits were $110 million, $379 million and
$554 million in the first three years of the program. At the
time the 1972 amendments were passed (in May), 365,000
claims had been filed with SSA, of which 171,000 were ap
proved and 20,000 were still pending determination. (Many
of those disallowed claims would later be approved under the
re-review of SSA or the Department of Labor.)
Prior to the passage of the 1972 amendments, the issue of
costs arose again. The major source of increase in federal
costs due to the amendments was the extension of Part B
beyond the original cutoff date. By adding the provision that
X-ray evidence alone could not be used to deny claims, the
House Committee assumed that SSA costs would increase by
about $10 million per year. Opponents of the proposed bill
in the House (HR 9212) argued that the program costs were
excessive already and would be up to $375 million annually
by the end of that fiscal year. (This was itself a substantial
underestimate, as benefits paid in calendar year 1971 had
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already been at this rate; benefits rose by over 46 percent in
calendar year 1972.) Moreover, the lack of reliability of the
cost estimates made in 1969 was held up now by critics of the
attempt to liberalize the law. In response, Congressman Dent
completely disregarded the legislative record of 1969 in
several respects. First, he asserted that no one had estimated
the costs of black lung legislation in 1969. Moreover, he
argued, if an estimate of $40 million had been made, it ap
plied only to complicated pneumoconiosis as proposed in the
House bill. Further,
Even during debate on the conference report, pro
ponents of the compromise version refrained from
making positive statements about the actual cost of
the program. The Chairman of the Committee, Mr.
Perkins, stated then: "This legislation transcends
petty arguments over costs." At the time, I said: "I
do not know what the total costs of this provision
will be. . . ." In my only specific reference to cost,
I was speaking of complicated pneumoconiosis. 20
Dent's memory clearly proved selective. His "chinchilla
coat" argument was made in defense of the Conference
Committee's bill, which had dropped the term "com
plicated" from the earlier House version. Dent's estimates
would prove to be at least as far off the mark in 1972 as they
were in 1969. First, Dent predicted that the number of claims
filed in the first two years of the program, ". . . far and
above might be 90 percent of all claims which will ever be
considered. . ." 21 He also predicted that the costs of the pro
gram would be $190 million in 1972, $135 million in 1973,
$231 million in 1974, and $219 million in 1977. At this point,
Congressman Erlenborn pointed out that these were not the
projected total costs, but one forecast of the incremental in
crease in costs if HR 9212 was adopted. In fact, the estimates
provided by Social Security of the cost implication of HR
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9212 were considerably higher than this. Dent tried to deflect
the estimates of SSA by asserting that they had prepared five
separate, contradictory estimates on the costs of HR 9212,
and he blamed them for his own calculation of $40 million as
the cost per year of the 1969 law. 22
Senator Javits forecast an annual cost to the Treasury of
$900 million for extending the federal program for 18
months. In fact, this estimate proved to be fairly near the
mark.
Table 6.12 contains the estimated cash benefits provided
under the Part B program since its inception. The direct
payments under the program have remained remarkably
stable from 1973 through 1984 at about $1 billion per year.
Since the program was turned over to the Department of
Labor, three basic factors have affected SSA's payments.
First, some re-reviewed cases were subsequently added to its
payment roles. Second, cost of living adjustments annually
tended to increase overall program costs. Third, declines in
the number of beneficiaries due to deaths about balanced off
this increase. Thus, by December 1984, the number of Part B
beneficiaries was 36 percent below the peak reached in the
program in 1974. (See table 6.13.) Most of the decline occur
red among miners, where the number of benefit recipients in
1984 was only one-half the number in 1974. From 1974 to
1984, however, average benefit payments under the social
security program rose from $235 per month to $376 per
month. 23
In addition to the benefits paid by SSA, the agency incur
red certain administrative costs in operating the program. At
its maximum, these costs were approximately $38 million, in
curred in 1973. 24
Payments under the Part C program actually could be
paid in several ways. First, payments could be made by
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employers designated as liable responsible operators. In the
absence of responsible operators, liability could be that of
the Trust Fund established in 1978. Prior to that time, where
no responsible operator was identified, payments were made
by the U.S. Treasury for the Department of Labor. Addi
tional expenses for the government were incurred in the pay
ment of medical expenses.
Table 6.12
Social Security Expenditures • Part B Program8
(In millions)

Calendar year

Benefit! paid

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

$ 110
379
554
1,045
951
948
963
944
965
983
1,032
1,081
1,076
1,063
1,047

Cumulative benefits paid
$

110
489
1,043
2,088
3,039
3,987
4,950
5,894
6,859
7,842
8,874
9,955
11,031
12,094
13,141

SOURCE: Supplied by SSA to the author.
a. Includes lump sum payments made during the year.

Several matters complicate this picture, however. The
Trust Fund or the Treasury have frequently made payments
to beneficiaries where a responsible operator denied any
liability. In some instances, these employers later repaid the
Treasury or the Trust Fund. Further, when the Trust Fund
was created, the Treasury was to be repaid for the expen-

244 Dimensions of the Program

ditures incurred by it, both for benefits paid directly by the
government under Part C and for administrative costs in
operating the program. Since the Trust Fund has been in
operating deficit for its entire existence, however, it has had
to borrow from the U.S. Treasury to stay afloat. The
Treasury has been debiting the Trust Fund's account for in
terest on this borrowing, adding both to the appearance of
near-insolvency that the Fund has lived under since 1978 and
to the costs of the program. However, since the Fund is
presumably the responsibility of the coal industry, ultimate
ly, the costs of the program may not be borne directly by the
U.S. Treasury.
Table 6.13
Number of Beneficiaries • Part B Program
(In thousands)

In December

Total*

Miners

Widows

Dependents

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

112.0
231.7
299.0
461.5
487.2
482.3
469.7
457.4
440.0
418.9
399.5
376.5
354.6
333.4
313.8

43.9
77.2
101.8
159.8
169.1
165.4
158.1
148.7
138.7
129.6
120.2
111.2
102.2
93.7
85.7

24.9
67.4
88.1
124.2
134.7
139.4
143.5
144.5
145.8
146.5
146.6
146.2
144.9
143.0
141.0

43.1
87.2
109.1
177.5
183.4
177.5
169.1
164.1
155.5
142.9
132.6
119.1
107.5
96.7
87.2

SOURCE: Social Security Bulletin, August 1985, table M-34.
'Figures may not sum due to founding.
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The data in table 6.14 reflect payments made for cash and
medical benefits under both the Department of Labor and
the SSA programs. They do not include benefits paid by
mine operators or their insurers, administrative expenses in
curred by either agency, or the rather sizable interest expense
incurred by the Trust Fund due to its borrowing from the
Treasury. Benefit payments do include both regular monthly
payments made during the calendar year, as well as lump
sum payments in that year where retroactive benefits were
awarded. The next to last column of table 6.14 is only one in
dicator of the program's size. Since the Trust Fund is financ
ed (in theory, at least) by a tonnage tax on coal operators,
payments from it cannot be considered a federal obliga
tion—unlike the Part B benefits.
Table 6.14 reveals the very slow start-up of the Part C pro
gram as the huge backlog of claims accumulated in the
Department of Labor. As the agency began to see its role dif
ferently after the 1977 amendments, payments in 1979
jumped by almost 13 times the levels of 1978. Many of these
payouts in 1979 and 1980 involved retroactive awards, one of
the primary reasons that benefits payments declined
thereafter.
An alternative way to focus on some of the costs of the
program can be seen in table 6.15. Columns 1 and 2 are the
combined Parts B and C benefit payouts to disabled miners
and survivors respectively, from 1970 through 1984, ex
clusive of both medical benefits and payments by responsible
operators and their insurers. Benefits to miners peaked
twice, first in 1973 when only the SSA program was making
payments, and again in 1979 and 1980 after the blockage in
the Department of Labor had ended. By contrast, the death
benefit program has tended to grow over time. Column 3 is
the ratio of death payments to disability payments; by 1984,
the ratio hit a peak at over 86 percent. It appears evident that
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the program will soon be as costly in the survivors' area as in
the disability area, at least to those beneficiaries supported
by SSA and the Trust Fund.
The last two columns in table 6.15 are the ratios of black
lung benefit payments from SSA and the Trust Fund as a
fraction of all disability and all survivors' benefits (excluding
federal black lung payments) under workers' compensation
in the United States. Thus, federal black lung payments to
living miners were as high as 28.2 percent of the level of all
disability payments under workers' compensation programs,
excluding black lung in 1973. That proportion fell to 11.2
percent in 1978 but turned upward in 1979 when the Depart
ment of Labor began clearing out its backlog. Since then the
ratio has declined again, in part due to the continuing in
creases in benefits paid out under state workers' compensa
tion programs.
In the last column of table 6.15 is the ratio of survivors'
benefits paid under the federal programs, excluding respon
sible operators, to survivors' benefits paid under all workers'
compensation programs (excluding federal black lung) in
that year. It is notable that in three of the years in the series
(1973, 1974, and 1979) more benefits were paid to survivors
under federal black lung programs than in all (other)
workers' compensation programs in the nation. Indeed,
beginning with 1972, the proportion has never been below 80
percent. At one level it seems incredible that death benefits
for one class of workers, and for a single (set of) disease(s)
should be anywhere near the level of benefits paid for all
death claims under workers' compensation in the entire na
tion. An important ingredient that must be understood,
however, is the cost-of-living adjustment for past awards
that is built into the federal program but does not exist in
most state programs.

Table 6.15
Black Lung Payments, Part B and C
Disability and Death Cases8
Calendar
year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

Cash benefits (in millions)
Survivors
Disability
(2)
(1)
$

77
232
330
650
604
595
598
575
591
1,033
1,077
1,030
916
870
823

$ 33
147
224
395
350
360
380
390
430
665
635
670
705
700
710
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Survivors/
disability
(3)

Disability/
workers'
compensation
disability
(4)

Survivors/
workers'
compensation
survivors
(5)

42.9%
63.3%
67.9%
60.8%
57.9%
60.5%
63.5%
67.8%
72.8%
64.4%
59.0%
65.0%
77.0%
80.5%
86.3%

4.6%
12.6%
16.4%
28.2%
22.0%
18.3%
15.8%
12.8%
11.2%
16.7%
14.9%
12.6%
10.3%
8.9%
N.A.

16.6%
67.7%
93.3%
144.6%
109.4%
98.6%
88.4%
80.4%
80.4%
109.0%
94.8%
91.8%
88.7%
80.5%
N.A.

SOURCES: Adapted from Daniel N. Price, "Workers' Compensation: Coverage, Benefits and Costs, 1982," Social Security Bulletin,
December 1984, table 1; Price, "Workers' Compensation: 1976-80. Benchmark Revision," Social Security Bulletin, July 1984, table 3; and data
supplied to the author by SSA.
NOTES: Column 3 is column 2/column 1. Column 4 is column I/all disability payments made under workers' compensation that year, ex
clusive of black lung. Column 5 is column 2/all death payments made under workers' compensation that year, exclusive of black lung,
a. Excludes medical benefits and responsible operator and their insurer payments.
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As the costs of the black lung program mounted steeply,
some concerns began to be expressed about them. Sup
porters of the program argued that the costs were totally ap
propriate, as they represented a "catchup** for benefits that
ought to have been paid under the state workers* compensa
tion programs. Lorin Kerr argued:
The current annual expenditure of slightly more
than $1 billion is scant recognition of the long years
of neglect the miners have endured. These
payments to living survivors of decades of uncon
trolled dust exposure can never equal workmen's
compensation payments which should have been
initiated in 1943 when Britain first provided such
coverage. 25
A description of the Trust Fund and its activity is found
elsewhere in this study. 26 It is in context here, however, to
note that projected cost estimates regarding the Trust Fund
have also tended to be underestimated. Because the tax was
initially set too low, the rates were raised in the 1981 amend
ments "temporarily.** In fiscal years 1980 and 1981, the
Trust Fund ran a deficit of over one-half billion dollars a
year. In fiscal year 1981, revenue from the coal tonnage tax
was only 87 percent of its size in the previous year, and was
only approximately 36 percent of the size of the benefits paid
that year, to say nothing of coverage for administrative ex
penses and interest repayment on the $1.5 billion in advances
made by the Treasury to the Fund. 27
In 1980, at a hearing before his committee on proposed
amendments, Congressman Carl Perkins downplayed the
Trust Fund*s problems:
(The Trust Fund) will come out of the red within
the next year and especially 2 or 3 years from to
day. ... I would say, within 5 years, the Trust
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Fund could easily be solvent. No one knows for
certain, but that could easily be the case with the in
creased production of coal. 28
At the time of the 1981 amendments, the Department of
Labor forecast the impact of the higher taxes and future
payouts. Their projections called for the Trust Fund to re
quire advances from the Treasury in fiscal years 1982, 1983
and 1984 of $235 million, $62 million and $37 million respec
tively, followed by surpluses that would permit full repay
ment of the accumulated debt, with interest, by 1993.
Needless to say, the projections have been well off the mark.
In fiscal year 1982, the Treasury was forced to advance $283
million, and in fiscal year 1983, it advanced $358 million
more, raising the Trust Fund's accumulated debt to $2.2
billion. Preliminary data for fiscal year 1984 show even a
larger deficit and a larger forecasting error than in 1983. 29
The errors in forecasting occurred as benefit payouts were
underestimated and projected revenues were seriously
overestimated. 30 For fiscal year 1985, coal excise tax collec
tions are in the neighborhood of $576 million, while the
forecast had been for revenues of about $700 million. 31 A
larger gap than this will likely occur between projected and
actual benefit payments.
Data Gaps

The data in tables 6.12 and 6.14 provide only partial
estimates of the costs of the black lung program. Unfor
tunately, hard data do not exist that would permit one to ar
rive at more complete estimates. There are several basic gaps
in the data that ought to be accounted for. First, there are no
available estimates of the extent to which insurers and selfinsured employers are paying benefits under the federal pro
gram. Incredibly, the Labor Department is unable to provide
any data on such payments. There are a few clues, however,
regarding these payments. Prior to the 1977 amendments,
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only an insignificant number of responsible operator claims
were in payment status. Recall that less than 5 percent of
those mine operators who were designated as responsible
operators were actually paying benefits, while the balance
were involved in appeals. Then, some of the claims that were
being paid were transferred to the Trust Fund in 1978. Recall
also that the 10,000 or so claims that were switched over
from responsible operators to the Trust Fund as a result of
the 1981 amendments were probably more than one-half of
all the responsible operator claims in that period, and many
of these were appealed. Finally, a "rough estimate" by a
high level Department of Labor official is that 4 to 6 percent
of all claims in current payment status, subsequent to the
1981 amendments, were being paid by responsible operators.
A second gap exists because it is not possible to calculate
the costs of state workers' compensation program benefits
for black lung. It is useful to recall, however, some evidence
based on the survey of black lung beneficiaries. 32 In 1982,
about 2 percent of the federal black lung beneficiaries receiv
ed some state black lung benefits. 33 About 1.5 percent of
total money income came from state benefits, compared to
39.5 percent which came from the federal black lung pro
gram. However, there is an unknown number of state black
lung beneficiaries who receive no federal benefits due to the
size of the state benefit and the federal offset provision.

NOTES
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Register, 20 CFR 725.701 to 725.711.
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Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980.
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Summary and Findings
The 1981 Amendments
The character of the Black Lung Act was changed con
siderably by the amendments passed in 1981. While the
modifications are less dramatic in their impact than one
might suppose, looking only at the law this action by the
Congress must be considered a significant turning point. At
the very least, the series of steps taken to liberalize the law
after 1969 were set back.
To understand these amendments requires a realization
that a compromise was developed behind the scenes by the
contending parties. For perhaps the first time in the history
of the law, the executive branch played a vital role in shaping
the legislation and served as a counterforce to the program's
supporters in the Congress. The basic parameters of the
political struggle involved a new administration on one side,
pitted against the still influential supporters of the program
on the other side led by Congressman Perkins and Senators
Byrd, Randolph and Ford. In 1981, the supporters feared
that the newly elected president, Ronald Reagan, would seek
to scuttle the entire program. The fear was not wholly un
justified. The new president rode into office on a very high
wave of public support that permitted him some other
significant legislative accomplishments early in his ad
ministration. The Senate was Republican-controlled, and the
support of his programs by some southern Democrats in the
255

256 Summary & Findings

House of Representatives provided him with substantial
strength, if not control, there. Indeed, Congressman John
Erlenborn, Perkins' foe on black lung since the Conference
Committee report in 1969, hoped to turn the entire program
back to the states.
Aside from the fear of Ronald Reagan, the program's ad
vocates were on the defensive in 1981 for other reasons as
well. The GAO report on the Social Security
Administration's handling of the Part B program had receiv
ed considerable publicity and had made the program appear
to be little more than the coal miners' pork barrel. 1 The
GAO was about to issue its report on the Department of
Labor's administration of the Part C program and it promis
ed to be highly critical as well. 2 Further, the program was
proving to be far costlier than had been forecast, weakening
support for it by those outside of the coal-mining states who
had previously seen it as a cheap way to deal with the miners.
The growing obligations of the Trust Fund and the
Treasury's need to continually shore it up dramatized the
unanticipated costliness of the program.
Had the administration tried to push through the abolition
of the program, or at least ceased accepting new claims, it
might have been rebuffed by one or both Houses of Con
gress. The issue clearly was not a customary conflict between
conservatives and liberals or Republicans versus Democrats.
In a power fight, the liberal supporters of the program could
have counted on substantial assistance from Senators and
Representatives from the coal-mining states and areas, some
of whom were supporters of the president on most other
issues. It is likely that the new president did not want to take
on Perkins, Byrd and Randolph in an all-or-nothing conflict.
With both sides uncertain of their strength, and mindful of
the other legislative struggles yet to come, compromise on
this issue seemed both reasonable and inevitable.
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In lining up the compromise, several changes that had oc
curred since the 1977 amendments loomed very large. First,
the 1980 regulations issued by the Department of Labor dur
ing the Carter administration meant that the interim criteria
were no longer to be used. As a result, the approval rate of
claims by the Department was certain to drop substantially
from where it had been since 1978. Thus, many of the
perceived excesses in the program's administration had end
ed by 1981. Very high priority was to be given by the ad
ministration to transferring about 10,000 special cases to the
Trust Fund from what had been the liability of responsible
operators. This turned out to be an easy compromise to
achieve since the United Mine Workers always preferred to
have claimants deal with the Trust Fund rather than with
responsible operators who vigorously defended their cases.
From the perspective of the program's advocates, perhaps
the major change since 1977 was that so many of the old
claims had been filed and approved by 1980 or 1981. In a
sense, they had accomplished so much already that so long as
recipients would not be forced to cease receiving benefits,
they had relatively little to lose. In addition, state programs
had become much more generous to miner and survivor
claimants, in terms both of the likelihood of receiving
workers' compensation and the level of their benefits. Thus,
the federal program became somewhat less significant to
them.
The 1981 amendments consist of two titles. The first is
called the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, and the
second is the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981. The
law was signed by the president on December 29, 1981 to be
effective three days later. Title I deals with the Trust Fund
and is added to the Internal Revenue Code. Primarily, it rais
ed the tax on coal produced. Additionally it transferred the
over 10,000 cases to become the liability of the Trust Fund
and not of the responsible operators or their insurers.
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Title II modified five sections of the law affecting a claim
ant* s opportunity to successfully seek benefits. First, for
claims filed after January 1, 1982, it eliminated the restric
tions on the rereading of X-rays by the government's "B"
readers. (Section 202(a).) Next, section 202(b) eliminated
three presumptions found in section 411(c) of the law, i.e.,
the 20-year presumption (411(c) (2)), the 15-year rule
(411(c) (4)), and the presumption for survivors of miners
who worked 25 years or more in the mines prior to June 30,
1971 (411(c) (5)). The fifth change (section 202(c)) modified
section 413(b), dealing with the widow's affidavit where no
other medical or other evidence existed. It limited the use of
such affidavits to persons not eligible for benefits in the
claim, that is, to nonself-interested parties.
The 1981 amendments made three significant changes in
benefits under the law. First, they limited death benefits in
future cases to those instances where the death was due to
black lung disease. Second, they provided that federal
benefits be offset where the miner had earnings, according to
the social security practice. This provision applies only to
claims filed after January 1,1982 and would bring consisten
cy in the treatment of Part B and future Part C beneficiaries.
Finally, the change eliminated the Trust Fund's obligation to
pay retroactive lump sum benefits in claims where an initial
determination of eligibility had been made, but where the
responsible operator had contested the award.
The compromise bill was supported by the National Coal
Association, representing surface and underground mine
operators in the East and West. It was clear, however, that
the bill was far from the "complete reform" that they would
have liked, thereby causing a split vote by the Association's
Board of Directors. 3 The United Mine Workers testified in
support of the bill as well. 4 Opposition to the bill came from
the Edison Electric Institute, a trade organization of electric
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utility companies who found the reforms inadequate and the
future costs to mine operators unacceptably large. Totally
behind the bill was the insurance industry, eager to get off
the hook for many of the over 10,000 cases that had been
dealt them by the 1977 amendments.
The bill was pushed through Congress in a way that bruis
ed some congressional egos. The bill required unanimous
consent to go directly to the Senate floor from subcommit
tee, so as to be acted on quickly before the session ended.
When the bill was then sent to the House, floor debate was
limited to 20 minutes and no further amendments were per
mitted. The straight up and down vote was to be on the
Senate bill. The only House committee that played a role in
the amendments was Ways and Means,which dealt only with
the tax issues prior to forwarding them to the Senate. Clear
ly, the parties to the compromise had done their homework
and wanted no last minute objections or changes to cause the
deal to become unglued.
Strikingly, the strongest objections came, once again,
from John Erlenborn. Having been forced to swallow the
1969 Conference Committee bill and the equally repugnant
1972 and 1977 amendments, he believed that the 1981
changes were far from adequate to reform the law. 3 His ob
jections, briefly noted here, were directed at:
— the procedures that prevented both adequate debate
and the opportunity to amend, as well as the complete
bypassing of the House Education and Labor Commit
tee.
— the tax changes, which were completely inadequate to
deal with the Trust Fund's financial needs.
— the dropping of the presumptions not applying to the
many thousands of pending cases still to be resolved by
the Department of Labor. Indeed the 25-year presump-
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tion was to be dropped only for those claims filed six
months after the law's effective date.
— the extension of the earnings offset under Part C only
to future claimants, leaving intact the existing arrange
ment for scores of thousands of current beneficiaries.
— the rereading of X-rays not being applied to cases
pending at the time in the Department of Labor.
— the amendment's failing to change the definition of
"total disability" and "pneumoconiosis."
— the transferring of 10,200 claims to the Trust Fund,
which would eliminate most, if not all, defense against
them.
— the elimination of the affidavit by the self-interested
claimant not going far enough. Finding someone else
to swear that the deceased miner had respiratory prob
lems would be a simple matter for most claimants.
— the amendments failure to reverse the rule that a
negative X-ray could not, by itself, be the basis for a
denial of the claim.
Erlenborn's preferences can also be seen in the bill he in
troduced in that session, HR 4387. However, there was no
way he could stand in the way of the compromise that in
cluded the mine operators, the United Mine Workers, the
Reagan administration and Representative Per kins.
Just prior to the vote on the 1981 amendments, Perkins
rose to explain his view of one of the key changes made by
the amendments. In so doing, he sought to establish for the
legislative record the way that the death benefit provision
was to be administered. It also served to reveal the type of
dealing that preceded the compromise:
With respect to the administration's operation of
the program, the Education and Labor Committee
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of the House will continue to monitor it very close
ly to determine the effect of the changes we are
making by the passage of the legislation today. 6
With this warning to the Department of Labor, he
stipulated how the bill was to be administered:
A question has been raised regarding the proper in
terpretation of the provision in the bill relating to
the availability of survivor's benefits in those cases
where the miner's death is unrelated to
pneumoconiosis. We have been very concerned
about the authority in current law to pay survivor's
benefits in those situations; HR 5159, as amended
by the Senate, reflects that concern by eliminating
prospectively the authority to initiate benefit
payments when that happens. The administration
expressed these same concerns. . . .
I want to emphasize, however, that it is not the pur
pose of HR 5159 . . .to deny benefits when com
plications of pneumoconiosis have caused a miner's
death or where pneumoconiosis was a substantially
contributing factor to that death. For example,
pneumoconiosis may have been a substantially con
tributing cause of death in a case where the prin
cipal cause of death was pneumonia.
Of course, survivors would not be eligible for
benefits in those situations where death was caused
by a traumatic injury or an unrelated medical con
dition.
As a procedural matter, a survivor would initially
file a claim for benefits. I understand that the
Labor Department's claims examiners will be in
structed to give all such claims the highest priority
in developing the evidence necessary to reach a fair
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and prompt decision. Once the Labor Department
has received medical evidence establishing that
pneumoconiosis was the cause of death or a
substantially contributing factor to the death, the
survivor will receive benefits unless the weight of
the evidence developed by the Labor Department's
Deputy Commissioner or by a responsible operator
establishes the death was unrelated to
pneumoconiosis. In cases involving a responsible
operator, the burden would, of course, be on it to
present medical evidence to rebut evidence by the
survivor which otherwise would appear to establish
eligibility for benefits.
It is my expectation that the Department of Labor
would administer the new law in accordance with
this explanation of the survivorship provisions. 7
With this, Perkins made it exceedingly plain that the
Department of Labor was to interpret the cause of death
liberally in future survivors' claims. Moreover, for most pur
poses, the burden of proof rested on the defense. This, of
course, meant that either the Labor Department, acting for
the Trust Fund, or the responsible operator stood between
the widow and her award.

The GAO Reports
Following the enactment of the 1977 amendments, the
General Accounting Office (GAO) undertook a review of the
administration of the Black Lung law at the request of John
Erlenborn. In mid-1980, the GAO published its findings on
the administration of the Social Security Administration's
portion of the law. 8 The report was highly unfavorable of
both the legislation and the manner in which the law was ad
ministered by SSA. Most important, the GAO was able to
examine a randomly selected sample of claims files and
report how actual cases were being decided by SSA.
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The GAO study was limited in several respects. It did not
examine rejected claims, for example. As such the report
sheds no light on why claims were being rejected by SSA,
much less whether there was a significant difference between
these cases from those that were being accepted. Since no
new claims for benefits were being filed under Part B at this
time, the study examined cases being re-reviewed as a conse
quence of the 1977 amendments. Until May 1979, when the
sample of 200 files was drawn, SSA had approved 14,789 rereviewed claims.
In auditing these 200 successful claims, GAO examined
the available X-ray evidence, lung function and blood gas
studies as reported in the file, medical statements, death cer
tificates, and autopsy reports. In evaluating the lung func
tion studies, the GAO used the test values that had been
established originally by SSA for the program. Where a
GAO auditor questioned the adequacy of the medical
evidence in the file, a consulting physician examined the file
also, using the same criteria that all the auditors had used.
The GAO's findings are shown below:
Table 7.1
_____________Benefits Paid To_____________
Survivor Living miner
Total

Disability established by
medical evidence
Disability established by
means other than medical
evidence:
Affidavits
Inconclusive medical
evidence
25 years or more of
coal mine employment
Total

15 (11%)

8 (12%)

23 (12%)

78 (60%)

—

78 (39%)

1(1%)

61 (88%)

62 (31%)

—

37 (19%)
200

37 (28%)
131

SOURCE: GAO Report, July 28, 1980, p. 8.

69
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According to the GAO's findings, only 12 percent of the suc
cessful claims were based on "adequate" medical evidence.
It is critical to recognize that this summary finding was not a
reflection of SSA's disregard for the law. Instead, it meant
that by the medical standards used by GAO, the large bulk
of compensated claims lacked medical evidence proving total
disability or death due to pneumoconiosis. For example,
SSA established compensability in 39 percent of all suc
cessful claims (60 percent of the death claims) by accepting
statements from persons with a knowledge of the miner's
condition. In 68 of these 78 claims, the statements were sign
ed by the claimant, that is, by the recipient of the benefits to
be paid under the program. SSA allowed very general or
vague statements about the condition to suffice. Of the 78
claims established by affidavit only, the length of coal mine
employment was established by affidavit as well in 43 of
these cases.
The two examples cited in the GAO report involving the
acceptance of survivors' affidavits are reproduced in toto
below:
— In April 1966, a retired miner died from a coronary oc
clusion at the age of 82—38 years after the last
reported period of coal mine employment. In June
1973, the miner's widow filed a black lung claim
stating that her husband had worked over ten years in
coal mines and had shortness of breath. Twelve years
of coal mining employment was substantiated by a coworker, but there was no medical evidence of disabili
ty. SSA approved the claim in January 1979 based on
ten years of coal mine employment and the widow's
statement of shortness of breath.
The claim had been previously denied twice on the
basis that medical evidence did not establish disability.
However, under SSA's revised criteria for the 1977
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amendments, disability was presumed by affidavit and
the claim approved. The only other evidence in the file
was a statement by a physician several years before
death that the miner's lungs were clear. The widow was
awarded a retroactive payment for black lung benefits
of $12,240.40 plus a monthly allowance of $232. The
retroactive payment was for benefits from January 1,
1974.
In June 1973, a 54-year-old former miner applied for
black lung benefits. On his application he reported 15
years of coal mine employment and listed his disability
as "shortness of breath." SSA substantiated four
years of coal mine employment. In July 1973, the
claimant's physical examination resulted in an X-ray
negative for pneumoconiosis and a lung function study
that showed no disability. On August 31, 1973, the
claimant died of stomach cancer. SSA denied his
living-miner claim on September 11, 1973, because of
the negative X-ray and lung function study.
On September 10, 1973, the claimant's widow filed a
survivor's claim for benefits giving the miner's disabili
ty as "shortness of breath." SSA denied the claim in
January 1974 and again in October 1978 because of the
negative X-ray and lung function study. Although SSA
was able to substantiate only four years of coal mine
employment, SSA approved the claim in March 1979
on the basis of statements that the coal miner had at
least ten years of coal mine employment and had a
chronic lung impairment before he died. The only
evidence in the file to establish disability was the
deceased claimant's and his widow's statements about
"shortness of breath."
On March 5,1979, the day the survivor's claim was ap
proved, the living-miner claim, which had been denied
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in September 1973, was again denied by SSA under the
1977 amended eligibility criteria. The widow received a
retroactive lump-sum payment of $22,007.80 and
monthly benefit payments of $348. 10
According to GAO, 61 of the 69 living miner claims (88
percent) were based upon evidence that was inconclusive. Of
the 61, 56 files (92 percent) contained X-ray evidence of sim
ple pneumoconiosis as determined by the claimant's doctor.
In 23 cases (38 percent) there were physician's comments
about a respiratory or pulmonary disorder, but no other
medical evidence was presented. SSA found that 37 of the 56
X-rays (or 66 percent) did not show evidence of black lung.
Of these 61 claims, 57 (93 percent) had lung function studies
showing no breathing impairment. GAO reports that most
of these claims were accepted on the basis of ten years or
more of coal mine employment, and a positive chest X-ray
for simple pneumoconiosis.
The two claims summaries prepared by GAO involving
living-miner claims are reported below:
— On September 9, 1971, a 58-year-old miner applied for
black lung benefits, reporting over 20 years of coal
mine employment and naming his disability as black
lung. SSA substantiated 13 years of coal mine employ
ment through SSA earning records. On October 6,
1971, the miner had an X-ray taken, which was read
positive for simple pneumoconiosis by one radiologist
and negative by two others. The miner had two more
X-rays taken on February 15,1972, and May 30, 1974.
The radiologist who took the X-rays read both of them
as negative. The miner also had two lung function
studies made, neither of which met SSA's revised stan
dards for establishing disability. A physical examina
tion did not show a chronic respiratory or lung disease.
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SSA denied the claim in November 1971, January
1972, and August 1973 because of the negative medical
evidence. The claim was also denied by an ad
ministrative law judge in December 1974. Never
theless, after the 1977 amendments, the claim was ap
proved because (1) the miner had more than ten years
of coal mine employment, (2) an X-ray showed simple
pneumoconiosis, and (3) the miner said that he had
black lung. The 1977 law precluded SSA from
rereading an X-ray interpreted by a qualified reader as
showing the presence of pneumoconiosis. The miner
received $22,638.90 in a retroactive lump-sum payment
and $348 a month.
On November 10, 1970, a 48-year-old miner applied
for black lung benefits. In his application he alleged 12
years of coal mine employment and described his
disability to include, among others, his lungs and em
physema. SSA substantiated 6-1/2 years of coal mine
employment through employment records. An X-ray
taken in 1971 did not identify pneumoconiosis. An
X-ray taken in 1973 indicated possible
pneumoconiosis. SSA had the X-rays reread in 1974,
and they were identified as negative. Lung function
tests taken in July 1972 and March 1973 indicated no
disability using the revised standards. A blood gas test
taken in March 1973 indicated no disability. Physi
cians' comments during 1971-76, however, indicated
lung impairment.
SSA denied the claim in January 1971 and July 1973
because evidence failed to establish a lung impairment.
Although SSA was able to substantiate only 6-1/2
years of coal mine employment, SSA approved the
claim in April 1979 because the miner states in his
claim that he had been employed in coal mines for at
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least ten years and had a positive X-ray for simple
pneumoconiosis. The claims examiner did not consider
the negative lung function tests. The miner received
$19,404 in a retroactive lump-sum payment and $348 a
month. 11
The final batch of accepted survivor claims involved the
use of the 25-year presumption (section 41 l(c) (5)). Of the 37
claims accepted in accordance with this presumption (28 per
cent of all the accepted survivor claims) 29 (or 78 percent)
had no evidence either of disability or of the presence of
black lung. In seven of the other cases, the claimant's
radiologist found positive X-ray evidence of simple
pneumoconiosis. One claim involved a physician's statement
about the deceased miner's pulmonary-respiratory disorder.
GAO's description of the two cases they summarized is
below:
— On February 10, 1953, a 50-year-old miner was killed
from falling slate while working in a coal mine. On
February 8, 1971, the miner's widow filed a black lung
claim—almost 18 years after the miner died—stating
that the miner had worked 32 years in coal mines and
that she thought he might have had a lung condition.
SSA substantiated 33 years of coal mine employment
from his employer.
SSA denied the claim on April 3, 1971, because the
miner's death was caused by a broken neck resulting
from a mine accident and because the hospital medical
examination failed to reveal the presence of black lung
or a respirable disease. On April 9, 1973, SSA again
denied the claim for the same reasons. The denial was
contested by the widow, and on April 10, 1974, the
claim was again denied by an administrative law judge.
SSA approved the claim on September 8, 1978,
because of the more than 25 years of coal mine
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employment and no rebutting evidence—death
presumed due to black lung. The widow was awarded
an $11,776.40 retroactive lump-sum payment and $232
in monthly payments.
— On April 28, 1962, a 55-year-old miner was killed in a
coal mining accident. On April 9, 1973, the miner's
widow filed a black lung claim stating that the miner
had worked 31 years in coal mine employment and that
he had shortness of breath. SSA substantiated 29 years
of coal mine employment from his employers. SSA
denied the claim on June 21, 1973, because (1) the
miner was killed in a mine accident, (2) no autopsy was
performed, and (3) there was no medical evidence of
complicated pneumoconiosis. After the 1977 amend
ments, SSA approved the claim on August 21, 1978,
because over 25 years of coal mine employment
established disability for the miner and there was no
rebutting evidence. The widow was awarded an
$11,092.50 retroactive lump-sum payment and $219.90
in monthly payments. 12
In evaluating the GAO report, SSA accepted the factual
findings of the report and the conclusion in the report, which
included: "We believe there was little medical evidence that
most of the miners involved in successful awards were totally
disabled by or died from black lung." 13 SSA did contend,
however, that the legislation allowed claims to be approved
without medical evidence of disability or the presence of
disease.
Reaction to the GAO report was predictable along the
lines of program supporters and critics. Congressman
Perkins submitted his views on it for the record. 14 He ex
pressed satisfaction that claims approvals were found to be
consistent with the law, but regretted that GAO had
substituted its judgment on what ought to be compensated
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for that of Congress. He criticized GAO for using a purely
medical notion of disability and for "ignoring the
uniqueness of the coal industry." He also questioned the
credentials of the GAO's consultant, whose sole certification
was in preventive medicine.
The GAO study of the Department of Labor's program
closely matched the one prepared on Part B re-reviewed
claims. 15 In a few respects, however, it differed. First, a sam
ple of 50 cases was drawn from each of the nine regional of
fices that processed DOL claims during the period JanuaryDecember 1980. Of these, 205 were approved claims. Some
of these represented newly filed claims while others were rereviewed under the 1977 amendments. About 4 percent of
these approved claims were filed after March 30, 1980, the
date the interim presumptions were replaced by the perma
nent, and more rigorous criteria.
Using similar criteria to those applied to the SSA claims
audit, GAO's findings are shown in table 7.2 below:
Table 7.2
Analysis of Claims Approved
Calendar Year 1980
Sample
Number
of claims Percentage
Claims approved with
inadequate medical evidence:
Presumptions
Conflicting medical evidence
Affidavits
Unsupported medical opinion
Claims approved with
adequate medical evidence
Total approved

Estimate
Number
of claims Percentage

172
104
55
7
6

83.9
50.8
26.8
3.4
2.9

49,700
28,900
17,300
2,000
1,500

83.3
48.4
29.0
3.4
2.5

33

16.1

9,900

16.7

205

100.0

59,600

100.0

SOURCE: GAO Report, January 1982, p. 10.
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According to GAO, about 84 percent of claims approved
(172 out of 205) were not based on adequate medical
evidence. Included in these were 104 successful claims based
almost entirely on the use of the presumptions. While all the
presumptions except 411(c) (3) are rebuttable, GAO found
that "Labor rarely attempted to rebut these presumptions,
even where there was medical evidence indicating that the
miners were not disabled from black lung." 16 GAO also
reported that "a Labor official told us that Labor was con
cerned about getting claims approved and that the guidance
for rebutting presumptions did not specifically state what
type and how much evidence was needed to deny a claim. In
addition, numerous Labor field officials told us that because
rebuttable evidence was not specifically defined, they ig
nored medical evidence that could have been used to rebut
the claim." 17
In 27 percent of the approved claims, GAO found that the
file contained conflicting medical evidence, and that the
preponderance of evidence or the latest medical evidence did
not support the claim. GAO found that claims examiners at
the Labor Department did not attempt to resolve conflicting
medical evidence, instead, giving the benefit to the claimant.
The 1977 Act prohibited the re-reading of X-rays by cer
tified "B" readers. The Labor Department sent claimant's
X-rays to such experts, however, to evaluate the quality of
the picture. A positive re-reading of a previously judged
negative X-ray, however, would be used to support a claim
ant's application. GAO was able to see the results of 164 rereadings by "B" readers out of the 205 approved claims and
match these with the initial X-ray reading.
Note in table 7.3 that over one-third of the X-rays said by
the claimant's doctor to show pneumoconiosis were found to
be negative by "B" readers. Strikingly, almost 10 percent of
those X-rays initially read as negative were seen as positive
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by the "B" readers. In these cases, however, the claimant
could have the benefit of the "B" reader's decision. Thus,
"errors" of both types were present, at least as reflected by
disputes of the interpretation of chest X-rays.
Table 7.3

Results of "B" Reader Rereading of 164 X-Rays
for the 205 Approved Claims in Our Review

Initial
reading

"B" reader
rereading

Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative

Negative
Positive
Negative
Positive
Invalid

Total

Percent
of total

57
45
41
16
5
164

34.8
27.4
25.0
9.8
3.0
100.0

SOURCE: GAO Report, January 1982, p. 16.

One of two cases cited in the GAO report is repeated here:
— In June 1978, a 70-year-old former miner with ten
years established coal mine employment applied to
Labor for black lung benefits. In February 1979, the
claimant took a pulmonary function test that indicated
he was disabled and a blood gas test that indicated he
was not. The X-ray taken during the same month was
interpreted as positive for pneumoconiosis and reread
by a "B" reader in March 1979 as negative. A physi
cian examined the claimant in February 1979 and
diagnosed pulmonary fibrosis and chronic bronchitis
due to coal mine employment. Labor denied the claim
in June 1979, citing a lack of disability and causality,
but approved the claim one month later, stating that
disability, disease, and causality had been established.
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The miner received a retroactive lump-sum payment of
$4,799 and a monthly benefit payment of $348. 18
According to GAO, 7 of the 205 claims were approved
based on survivor's affidavit. The file contained no other
medical evidence, or the evidence indicated that the miner
had not been totally disabled or died due to pneumoconiosis.
GAO found that 6 claims of the 205 awards were based on
a physician's medical opinion, with either no accompanying
medical evidence, or medical evidence that contradicted the
physician's opinion. From GAO's perspective, this was
regarded as inadequate medical evidence.
The GAO tracked the experience of 191 miners whom the
Labor Department referred to the University of West
Virginia Medical Center for testing in 1977 and 1978. 19 Based
on these tests, ten of the miners were found to have met the
Department's criteria for being totally disabled. By 1980,
GAO learned, SSA had approved three claims from this
cohort of 191 and the Labor Department approved 97
claims.
The circumstances involving the latter claims are shown in
table 7.4.
Table 7.4
GAO Findings of Labor Department Approvals
____________Medically Tested Cohort___________
Claims approved by Labor with inadequate
medical evidence:
Presumptions
70
Conflicting medical evidence
5
Unsupported medical opinion
2
Claims approved by Labor with adequate
medical evidence
Claims approved by Labor (unable to locate cases
files—information obtained from payment records)
Total claims approved by Labor
SOURCE: GAO Report, January 1982, p. 33.

Approvals
77 ( 79%)

8 ( 8%)
12 ( 12%)
97 (100%)
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The GAO summarized two of the claims from this group
in their report, one of which follows:
— In November 1974, a 62-year-old miner with 13 years
proven coal mine employment applied for black lung
benefits. In October 1977, the miner had a physical ex
amination, an X-ray, and a pulmonary function test.
These tests indicated that the miner did not have black
lung or a disabling lung impairment. The doctor who
conducted the physical examination concluded that the
claimant suffered from chronic bronchitis. In January
1980, the claimant had the same medical tests perform
ed again. The X-ray indicated that the miner did not
have evidence of pneumoconiosis. The pulmonary
function test met the eligibility test values for disabili
ty. The blood gas test showed that the claimant had
normal blood gas levels. Labor approved the claim on
March 19,1980, citing the positive pulmonary function
test and a presumption of the presence of black lung
due to coal mine employment. 20
The response by the Labor Department to the GAO was
similar to SSA's reaction. The audit did not find that the
Labor Department was operating inconsistently with the
statute. It was clear in both reports that GAO's unhappiness
was with the product of congressional action and not with
how the agencies administered the law. In both cases, the
agencies used their discretionary authority in a manner that
favored claimants, i.e., the law was interpreted liberally with
respect to them.
The primary reason claims were paid in the absence of
adequate medical evidence was that Congress wrote the law
precisely to accomplish this. What GAO did not address was
why the near impossibility of obtaining conclusive medical
evidence for some persons should mean that they would not
receive compensation as would occur in traditional workers'
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compensation systems. Nor did it deal with the difficulties
claimants would face in the absence of presumptions where
medical evidence or opinion is ambiguous or inconsistent.
What the studies do, however, is shed light on the impor
tance of the various devices that were created so as to raise
the likelihood that benefits would be paid to claimants.

Conclusions
In several respects, the black lung law was historic. It
represented the first tangible step by the federal government
to involve itself in activities which, until then, had been left
entirely to the states. When viewed in conjunction with sec
tion 27 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970,
which created the National Commission on State
Workmen's Compensation Laws, it served as a possible
forerunner of much greater federal involvement in workers'
compensation matters. To the extent that it was viewed this
way, the program's successes and failures must be
understood as having an impact far beyond the limited area
of coal mining and coal workers' pneumoconiosis. It seems
highly likely, in retrospect, that the perception of the pro
gram's costs and benefits (broadly construed) may have
shaped public policy towards other possible areas of federal
involvement in compensation.
It is probably simplistic to argue that a generally well
received black lung program would have brought about a
major federal intrusion into state compensation programs.
Certainly, the many interest groups that wish to retain ex
isting state programs are not without considerable political
force. Moreover, the very substantial federal expansion into
new areas that characterized conditions in the 1960s and ear
ly in the next decade seemed to lose its impetus by the latter
part of the 1970s. One may only speculate as to how signifi
cant this single program has been in shaping a federal policy
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on workers' compensation. It is not speculative, however, to
note that the single area in compensation receiving the most
national attention in recent years, that is, asbestos and other
long latency diseases, has had a continuing flow of proposed
federal legislation without any serious movement towards
congressional passage. These bills have all been marked by
certain obvious parallels with the black lung law.
In evaluating any law, there exists the problem of identify
ing its goals. The black lung legislation is especially difficult
to nail down since its supporters appeared to have widely dif
fering agendas for it. Clearly, within the Congress there were
vastly different perceptions of it. The record makes clear
that people such as Senator Javits wanted the program to be
temporary in nature, at least after the backlog of "old"
cases was dealt with. The convoluted structure of the law,
with its separate Part B and Part C programs existed because
of the (misplaced) belief that the states would step in and
assert their jurisdiction in this area. In retrospect, this judg
ment proved to be as unsound as the one forecasting that the
states would quickly make the federal role under OSHA de
minimus.
The near frenzy "to do something for the miners" that
followed the Farmington, West Virginia catastrophe resulted
in the passage of the 1969 law. Support for something
beyond simple health and safety legislation was so
widespread that virtually no real opposition was mounted to
the original compensation provisions. It was only after the
Conference Committee reported out its substantial altera
tions to both the Senate and House versions that con
siderable controversy developed. It seems clear that the goals
of the program varied from those who would at least tolerate
a small (inexpensive) program limited to very serious cases of
a highly specific and uncommon illness (disabling, com
plicated CWP in underground coal miners), to those whose
goal was far broader.
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The reason some of the conservatives gave for limiting the
program was a fear that a large scale program could
somehow threaten the survival of state workers' compensa
tion programs. Ironically, the reverse has occurred. The
greatly enlarged scope of the black lung program together
with many of its perceived difficulties, appears to have
strengthened the hand of state program supporters.
Criticisms that are voiced regarding existing state laws are no
longer treated implicitly as a call for federalization. Thus, by
having the program grow in its dimensions beyond all the
worst fears of 1969, the security of the state programs has
become somewhat more assured.
For the ardent supporters of the program, their goal was
not simply to enact legislation that appeared to benefit
members of the coal mining community. If they aimed no
higher than that, they could have left matters alone after
1969, or certainly stopped after the time of the 1972 amend
ments. Instead, they continued to monitor the program
closely, and extended it substantially with the 1977 amend
ments. Indeed, one of the clearest aspects of the program
was that its well-placed supporters in the Congress were in
tent on having the money actually flow to former miners and
their survivors. Where administrators exercised any discre
tion that restricted this flow, the wrath of these supporters
was sure to come down on them.
The United Mine Workers of America were neither the
most ardent nor the most effective advocates of the black
lung program. Initially, the more radicalized Black Lung
Associations took the lead in generating support for a pro
gram at the local level. With its own leadership problems
preoccupying it, the miners' union was almost dragged along
into the process, both in West Virginia and nationally. As
the leadership problems in the UMWA were gradually
resolved, the union reestablished a spokesman's role for
itself, and the Black Lung Associations became less influen
tial.
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While UMWA leaders could be counted upon to assist
congressional supporters in their various reform efforts, it
seems clear that the impetus did not come from the union
itself. Instead, it was that core of totally committed members
within the Congress that responded to the messages being
received from their constituents, if and when the program
was failing to deliver on its promises.
If one is to learn from the experience of 1969 forward,
there are a number of strengths and shortcomings in the pro
gram that must be recognized. The following is a brief listing
of some of these fundamental characteristics of the program.
The underlying purpose of the program was never made
explicit. This inadequacy was more than simply an academic
nicety that Congress failed to produce. It led to a variety of
problems that shadowed the program throughout its life. For
example, was the program to be thought of as a workers'
compensation scheme, a specialized supplementary pension
program, a disability program, a depressed areas benefits
plan, or some type of indemnity or support scheme as in
agriculture or under the Trade Adjustment Act to assist vic
tims of a specific industry's decline?
The results of this vagueness that surrounded the program
were significant at several levels. First, it generated substan
tial amounts of ill will by those people, both in and out of
Congress, who were willing to tolerate a modest program. By
expanding the program at every opportunity, e.g., in the
Conference Committee, and with the later amendments, the
aspirations of the program's staunchest supporters
materialized in a way never envisioned either by them or
their opponents. This led, inevitably, to conflict regarding
the program.
Perhaps the most serious consequence of the uncertainties
regarding the program's aims was the impact on the ad
ministrative agencies. It seems clear that neither SSA nor the
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Labor Department fully understood what was expected of
them, at least until 1972, and probably not until 1978. By
1973, SSA appeared to realize that it was not operating sim
ply a small variation of its Disability Insurance program.
The interim standards so lowered the criteria for receipt of
benefits, that its Part B program took on more of the aspects
of the administratively straightforward old-age program
than its disability program.
It was only in 1977 and thereafter that the Labor Depart
ment appeared to understand that its mission was to pay
benefits quickly, and not to treat each case as a workers'
compensation claim. Once that became clear, and the
Department was able to promulgate its own interim stan
dards, it was able to comply with the intent of the program's
supporters. The uncertainty of the program's aims also af
fected the miners and their survivors. The evidence is clear
that publicity about the program was enormously effective at
getting out the claimants. Credit for this goes to the agencies,
particularly SSA, to the union, and especially to the Black
Lung Associations in the earliest days of the Part B program.
It is also clear, however, that the miners and their families
may not have understood precisely what their entitlements
were. This appears evident from the apparent disappoint
ment that many seemed to experience when their claims were
denied or not promptly paid. The measure of this disillusion
ment can be seen indirectly by the anger that members of
Congress expressed and demonstrated towards the
program's administrators, in response to criticisms they
heard expressed by their constituents. In retrospect, the ex
pectations that were raised in the mining community, partly
as a way to alert people to their rights to file claims and prob
ably, in part, to take credit for the program's existence, may
have been unrealistic, at least initially. Thus, the program
was attacked by some for being too generous and by many
others, whose expectations had been raised, for being too
tight-fisted and limited.
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It is hard to evaluate the black lung program and not be
struck by some of its contradictions. No intellectually
satisfactory rationale exists for a federal compensation pro
gram that is unique to one occupation and to one source of
impairment. The reality of its existence can be traced partly
to some vague feelings of guilt felt by the public about
economic and safety and health conditions in coal mining.
Much more influence must be assigned to the political power
concentrated in the hands of key people in Congress from
the mining states. Perhaps Congressman Dent from Penn
sylvania was right on target when he argued that the program
warranted support in Congress, just as some of the specific
agricultural support programs that had received his vote in
the past. This was legislation designed to aid a specific
population because a need was clearly present, and the votes
were there. While the other groups of workers, survivors or
retirees might also be in need of help due to a lack of, or a
shortcoming in, appropriate government programs, the
votes for them were not there.
Certainly, other serious gaps and shortcomings existed in
state workers' compensation programs in the late 1960s, but
no federal program was devised to deal with any of them.
Moreover, not a single serious study of workers' compensa
tion and pneumoconiosis had been undertaken by 1969. As a
result, while the widely accepted notion that the system was
not working may have been true, it was not documented at
all. Had Congress been willing to have the matter studied
prior to its legislative initiative in 1969, it might have found
other areas of occupational disease that were inadequately
dealt with by existing compensation practices. Certainly
asbestos was already well known to be an occupational
health disaster.
The question that remains, then, is why the foray into an
essentially virgin territory for a single disease and one set of
workers? The answer seems quite clear. A larger program,
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involving broader coverage of industries or diseases, would
have run into serious trouble. First, its potential costs would
have meant that serious opposition would have come from
the Nixon administration. Perhaps, more important, it
would have lost some support from those many members of
Congress who cared little about coal mining or black lung,
and who saw the program as no more than a miniscule tap
ping of the federal Treasury. A larger scale program also
would have brought down on Congress the wrath of all those
who were strongly committed to complete retention of the
state workers' compensation systems as they existed. Thus,
black lung mattered little to most parties so long as it ap
peared to be both small (in coverage and in dollars) and
unique. And by contrast, it mattered a great deal to its very
powerful, well-placed supporters in Congress, such as
Messrs. Perkins, Flood, Randolph, Byrd et al.
A continuing source of criticism of the program has been
of the legislated presumptions found in the law. Again, as
the law is regarded by many as a compensation law, it is in
evitably compared to the state laws which generally make
much less use of presumptions. In the insurance and
employer communities, there appears to be disdain, if not
hostility for the presumptions found in this federal law. In
deed, the term, presumptions, as associated with black lung,
has almost become synonymous with excessive liberality and
irresponsible generosity towards workers. It is also held up
as an example of what can be expected if an unsophisticated
Congress legislates in this area where it has little or no ex
perience. To make matters worse, the presence of the irrebuttable presumption was certain to offend many at
torneys who were unaccustomed to such rules in compensa
tion cases and whose legal training seems to make such bar
riers offensive to them.
There is no need here to argue the merits or the shortcom
ings of the particular presumptions found in the law. Several
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points, however, need to be made in hindsight about these
presumptions. First, many states had presumptions, in
cluding irrebuttable ones, in their laws regarding occupa
tional diseases in 1969 (some of which are still in existence).
Since these are not labelled explicitly as presumptions, some
persons may not recognize them as such. Yet various rules
that limit the rights of workers or survivors to make suc
cessful claims in such cases are nothing other than presump
tions, some of them irrebuttable, that impose burdens on
claimants. Such "artificial barriers" have been in place for
many years and seem no less offensive than the presumptions
in black lung. Thus, some of the criticism of the principle of
having presumptions in the law may be no more than opposi
tion to the ideological character of the law.
An argument for the presence of presumptions in the law,
though not necessarily of the ones actually used, probably
can be made on grounds of both fairness and efficiency. In
terms of the first, a number of circumstances existed that
made it difficult, if not impossible, for claimants to provide
proof of the kind normally used in compensation programs.
This was especially true in claims involving fatalities that oc
curred in the early years of the program or before 1969. On
efficiency grounds, the presumptions enabled many
claimants who otherwise would have been compensated
anyway, to be dealt with more speedily.
Undoubtedly, administration was simpler and cheaper
because of the presumptions, and they helped achieve the
goal of the program's advocates, that is, to get money to the
miners and their survivors. In one sense, this is confirmed by
the behavior of SSA and the Labor Department after they
became aware of the real intent of the law. Where claims did
not involve responsible operators, the agencies rarely chose
to use their legitimate right to rebut the presumptions invok
ed by claimants. As such, the presumptions served to allow
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the agencies to comply with the perceived interest of the pro
gram's congressional advocates.
Aside from various ambiguities or uncertainties that made
the law difficult to rationalize and to administer, the statute
created certain contradictions that could not be easily
justified. Two of the most obvious of these arose out of the
Part B-Part C approach, though they were not a necessary
consequence of the split programs. First, there was the
period until 1978 when the standards for determining the
presence of compensable black lung disease were substantial
ly different in the two agencies. Second, the excessively con
voluted approach to offsets meant that recipients of benefits
under Part B and Part C were treated differently.
With the benefit of hindsight, the program must be con
sidered as a burden on the integrity of the Congress.
Throughout the life of the program, estimates of prospective
usage and costs emerging from that branch were off by a
wide mark. Had those errors not taken a consistent pattern,
one could dismiss them as the simple product of having to
work in the dark, that is, a new type of program with no base
of experience from which to extrapolate. However, the er
rors were quite consistent in the direction of forecasting less
usage and lower costs than actually were incurred subse
quently. This pattern had all the earmarks of disingenuousness on the part of the program advocates in Con
gress, as they sought to sell their colleagues on the bill or its
amendments.
Praise or criticism for much of the black lung program has
been directed here consistently towards Congress. Until
1981, the role of the White House was consistently minimal.
Perhaps the program was too small to warrant presidential
attention. More likely, White House relations with Congress
were focused on other issues that could have been upset by
some strong involvement by the chief executive. It is also

284 Summary & Findings

possible that both Democratic and Republican ad
ministrators between 1969 and 1980 saw the program as a
cheap bone to throw to organized labor, at a time when little
else was being made available. For whatever reason or set of
reasons, the impetus for and the shape of the legislation were
entirely congressional and bore no real marks of the White
House.
How successful was the black lung program? If the goal of
the program was to get federal money to the coal miner com
munity, primarily to older workers or the survivors of
miners, the program was very largely successful. Given the
unrestrictive standards applied by SSA after 1972 and by
DOL after 1977, it seems totally unlikely that any significant
numbers of worthy applicants for benefits were rejected.
What seems more likely is that the hundreds of thousands of
successful beneficiaries actually exceeded the wildest possible
goals set by the program's supporters in 1969. With a signifi
cant share of the cost of the program borne by the U.S.
Treasury, and with the Trust Fund partly supported by sur
face mine operators in the West, this was accomplished
without too great an economic impact on the underground
mine employers. Such was also a goal of many of the pro
gram's advocates, especially the ones from the coal mining
states.
By most other standards the program was not successful.
Surely it is not considered a model workers' compensation
program that the states might wish to emulate. Using any
conceivable standard, the program was not administered
well. Most significantly perhaps, the program has reduced
the probability that the federal government will play a
significant role in the near future in workers' compensation
for occupational disease. Indeed the fact that efforts to
create such a federal presence all failed in the 1970s and early
1980s must be attributable in part to the perception that
another black lung program, perhaps on a grander scale,
would be an expensive blunder.
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